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Preface 
The question of reparations has usually been associated with 
Germany. Disappointing experiences after the First World War and 
the reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War have 
been the object of several studies. In some of these interpretations, 
especially those according to revisionist theories, economic factors 
play an important role in explaining the origins of the Cold War. It 
has been argued, for example, that the United States neglected to 
come to a formal decision on German reparations and thus forced 
the Soviet Union into the Cold War. 
It has not been my intention so much to examine the roots of the 
Cold War, as to attempt to explain how the question of reparations 
after the Second World War related not only to Germany, but also 
to all the European countries associated with her. I have left 
countries like Japan, which were in a different political situation, 
outside my study. 
I wish to express my special thanks to Tuomo Polvinen and 
Erkki Pihkala, who have contributed significantly to the writing of 
my research. Marjatta and Robert Bell read and improved my first 
draft. I am very much indebted to Hal Martin for translating my 
manuscript into English. I would also like to thank the Finnish 
Historical Society for including my study in its series, and to 
Rauno Enden for editorial assistance. I am also grateful for the 





Reparations as Part of 
Allied Policy 
Legacy of Earlier Reparations 
As long as wars have been waged, victors have exacted satisfaction 
from losers in one form or another. In addition to defeat the losing 
side has been burdened with the delivery of booty and reparations. 
Payments have consisted of transfers of national property such as 
machines and ships, or of items of the national income — "current 
production". Originally transfers of goods were the only means of 
payment, but as money became current it was largely used instead. 
After her defeat in the war of 1870-1871, for instance, France paid 
Germany five milliard francs in gold. 
The best-known reparations are undoubtedly those enjoined on 
Germany after the First World War. They were paid partly in 
money and partly in kind, mainly the former. These money 
payments caused serious problems. Leaving the precise sum 
unmentioned, the Versailles Treaty obliged Germany to 
compensate for all damage caused to civilians, losses arising from 
ill-treatment of war prisoners and destruction of non-military 
property; she was also obliged to pay pensions to war veterans. 
In the years following the war efforts were made to place an 
obligation on Germany which should be practical and acceptable 
to all parties concerned. This resulted in a many-phased tangle of 
events which contributed to the economic uncertainty of the 
1920s. When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany the Third 
Reich refused to recognize all the important political and 
economic injunctions of the peace treaty. 
The grand total paid by Germany cannot be particularized. On 
reparations discharged from 1918 to 1924 there are no undisputed 
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data, and in the estimates of goods deliveries there are great 
differences. According to a delegation appointed by the creditors 
Germany paid some 21.8 billion marks, while the Germans 
themselves claimed to have paid 67.7 billion. The most reliable 
calculations made by investigators suggest at a sum of about 30 
billion. At the time concerned, however, Germany borrowed some 
three milliard marks from abroad. This matter — the financing of 
reparations — was a central factor during and after the Second 
World War when the Allies considered their attitude to 
reparations. 
Various reasons have been advanced for the failure of the 
reparations article in the Versailles Treaty. Some investigators 
have stressed that the economic effects of the reparations 
concerned were in fact quite small. The main reason was the 
unstable political situation in Germany and the unwillingness of 
her people to accept responsibility for the war. For their part the 
creditors were not prepared to accept reparations in the practical 
form of goods, but demanded most of them in money. It has been 
stressed on the other hand that the obligation imposed on Germany 
was beyond her capacity to pay. For the reparations programme to 
succeed, it would have been necessary after the war for Germany to 
expand her industry vigorously and secure a large export income.1  
Mistakes in the peace treaty of the First World War cast a dark 
shadow over plans for peace after the Second World War. The 
Versailles Treaty had laid a foundation for the arms race, economic 
depression, nationalism and many other factors affecting 
international relations. For Britain, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, therefore, the central lesson of the first war was that 
Germany must be watched more effectively than in the 1920s and 
30s. The conclusion to be drawn from the relevant article of the 
Versailles Treaty was that reparations — which there was no need 
to abandon altogether — must be exacted more skilfully than 
before. The views of those engaged in the war differed, however, as 
to how mistakes should be avoided. 
1) Dillard 1967, pp. 512-515, 517-519; Röper 1964 and sources mentioned; 
Taylor 1976, pp. 69-76. 
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War Aims 
Allied war aims were expressed — very loosely — in the Atlantic 
Charter (12.8.1941) and the Declaration of the United Nations 
(2.1.1942). Both emphasized certain general principles such as just 
treatment of the defeated, but such a particular item as reparations 
was not defined in any way. Later too reparations were briefly 
passed over when Allied political leaders met — as when Eden, 
Britain's Foreign Secretary, visited Moscow in December 1941.2 
In the Atlantic Charter President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill repudiated territorial changes 
except where "freely declared" by the nations, and pledged 
themselves to self-determination and disarmament. This was not 
an adequate basis for peace, however, as economic questions and 
peace were closely connected. By the terms of the Charter Britain 
and the United States wished, on the strength of obligations then 
in force, to promote the access of great and small powers, victors 
and vanquished alike, to trade and the world's raw materials on an 
equal basis. There should be maximum collaboration between all 
countries in the economic field, so that all might be assured of a 
better living standard, economic progress and social security.3 
In the phraseology of the Atlantic Charter the "open door" policy 
of the United States was clearly reflected. International peace was 
based on economic welfare. World welfare and therefore peace 
could be achieved only by means of "healthy" world trade. This in 
turn implied open doors to markets. The United States fully 
realized that the world economy depended on the American 
contribution, but world trade would also guarantee the welfare of 
the United States. Reparations were seen in this context: they must 
not disturb international trade or otherwise oppose American 
interests. The Americans did not intend to be the financers of 
reparations. 
The United States took the Atlantic Charter as the basis of their 
policy according to which decisions concerning peace were to be 
2) Feis 1974, pp. 20-23; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko 1972, pp. 11-15; Paterson 
1975, pp. 3-8; Wheeler-Bennet-Nicholls 1972, pp. 36-43; Woodward 1962, 
pp. 203-210, 220-243. 
3) Wheeler-Bennet-Nicholls 1972, pp. 43-44. 
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left until the peace conference following the end of hostilities. In 
September 1941 with some reservations the Soviet Union 
approved the Atlantic Charter despite the fact that she had not 
been consulted over its form of words. But Stalin desired final 
decisions while the war was still going on, and in Moscow the 
policy of delay aroused evident suspicion of a united front of 
capitalist nations against the Soviet Union. It was of the first 
importance to bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible, so 
that destruction and suffering in the Soviet Union should be 
reduced to a minimum. This aim would have been effectively 
served by the opening of a second front in the west. 
The British hoped the Atlantic Charter meant that the United 
States would come into the war as soon as possible and assume 
part of its burdens, and that the Americans would also engage in 
planning the postwar settlement. In that case the United States — 
unlike their policy after the First World War — would not give aid 
without defined conditions. American funds should rather be 
directed more to Britain and the Soviet Union than to Germany 
and her former allies.' 
Preliminary Attitudes and Plans 
The above declarations and talks remained of a general nature, but 
the Allied administrative authorities continued to work towards a 
decision on reparations. The latter were linked with restrictions 
intended to prevent German rearmament when peace returned. 
Less reserved in their attitude to reparations were the Soviet 
representatives, whose views became known at the time of a 
conference of foreign ministers in Moscow (19-30.10.1943) in the 
form of an article by Academician Evgeni Varga.5 Other examples 
of a similar attitude appeared in the Soviet Union during the war. 
To the Soviet reparations were not only a question of security, but 
emphatically one of justice also: on the one hand Germany and her 
allies, as aggressors, were obliged to make good the destruction 
they had caused; on the other, the Soviet Union was entitled to the 
4) Woodward 1971, pp. 203-210. 
5) Varga, 1943. Maisky 1967, p. 383. Mastny 1979, p. 111. 
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main part of the compensation. Reparations should also ensure 
that the living standard of the aggressors should not rise above that 
of the victims. Thus reparations would help the carrying out of the 
five-year plan whose aims the war seemed to have moved far into 
the future. 
According to Varga Germany was able to pay only a small part of 
the coming reparations from property held by her abroad or from 
her national assets, and the main stress was therefore on her 
national income or current production. From 1924 to 1929 
compensation paid by Germany amounted to only 1 1/2-4 % of 
her national income, while 10 % went on capital investments and 
growth of the military potential. Only part of the funds obtained in 
foreign loans was applied to reparations, and part of the benefit 
went to German economic life. Germany in fact could have paid 
reparations, but mistakes had led to these not being carried out. 
There was a failure also on the part of the creditors themselves, 
their receiving capacity being inadequate to cope with Germany's 
productive capacity. In the light of experience after the First World 
War there seemed good reason to demand payment in kind, which 
Varga expected to be advantageous to a planned economy like that 
of the Soviet Union. With adequate supervision and planning the 
payment of reparations would be quite possible. 
As Germany was not able in practice to make good all the 
destruction caused, it was Varga's view that making good material 
damage should take priority. The total sum to be claimed should 
be divided among the states concerned in proportion to the loss 
inflicted on their national assets — not the destruction suffered in 
absolute terms. Without giving an estimate of the Soviet share 
Varga stressed that the destruction suffered by his coutry was such 
that she was entitled to the main part of the compensation. Varga's 
article actually dealt with Germany, but he also stressed the 
obligation of Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. 
Destruction caused by the Germans in Britain caused the British 
also to consider demands for reparations. Bearing in mind the 
lesson learnt after the First World War, Germany must also be 
prevented from becoming more powerful than Britain in trade.b 
6) Reparations. Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (Dalton), 
28.8.42 Public Record Office = PRO FO371 31514 U767/27/70. 
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And there were many British critics of the Versailles decision on 
reparations — most conspicuously Lord Keynes, who during the 
Second World War exerted a profound influence on the economic 
decisions of His Majesty's Government.' 
The attitudes adopted to reparations led to the appointment of a 
committee composed of representatives of various ministries. This 
committee, which was known by the name of its chairman Sir 
William Malkin, legal adviser to the Foreign Office, reported in 
August 1943.8 It took note of Germany's obligations, but 
considered that it was not practical for all the destruction to be 
made good. Germany's economic resources together with the 
provisions of the Atlantic Charter and the statements of political 
leaders imposed limits on possible demands. The committee 
recommended that actual reparations liabilities should be 
discharged within five years from the appointment of a 
commission to be set up for this specific purpose. Goods offered as 
reparations were to be supplied from stocks existing at the time the 
armistice was concluded as well as from current production. 
At the end of September a ministerial conference proposed by 
Foreign Secretary Eden was held, and at it ministers concerned 
with reparations tried to find a united line. The Malkin 
committee's report was received with reservations. The Cabinet 
had not yet decided, for instance, whether Britain desired the 
division of Germany and the dismantling of her industry, whereas 
the Malkin committee had started from the notion of a unified 
Germany with its own industrial capacity. A conclusion on the 
British line was not reached, but the views expressed in London 
were passed on to Washington.° On the basis of the Malkin report 
Keynes explained to Dean Acheson, W. Averell Harriman and 
7) FO Minute (Ronald) 13.11.1941 F0371 28907 W13570/426/49 PRO. 
Compensation to be required from the enemy. (s.d.) FO 371 28908 W13983/ 
426/49 PRO, Germany's Control over Economic, Industrial and Commercial 
Organization. The question of Restitution and Release. Memorandum by the 
Department of Overseas Trade 11.7.1942, FO 371 35305 U4456/6/70 PRO. 
Einzig, 1942. 
8) Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Reparation and Economic 
Security 31.8.1943, FO 371 35305 U4059/6/70 PRO. Cairncross 1986, pp. 
19-33. 
9) Lae (Washington) to FO 16.9.1943, F0371 35309 U4409/6/70 PRO. Keynes 
(Washington) to FO 29.9.1943, F0371 35309 U4973/6/70 PRO. 
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others that in Britain's view the "false conclusion" should be 
avoided that all attempts to obtain reparations were useless.'° 
The Malkin report showed that of the British were prepared to 
use reparations as a principal means of supervision in postwar 
Germany. In the end this question became part of a wider 
regulation of the German settlement in which several 
interconnected factors had to be taken into account. When, for 
instance, occupation of Germany appeared to be an alternative 
worth considering, the British also needed to take into account the 
economic and social state of the area to be occupied. There was no 
reason for them to incur trouble in the form of social unrest arising 
from poor economic conditions. 
Given Britain's past experience of them and their possible role as 
an alternative in peacetime planning, reparations were a far more 
meaningful matter to the British than to the Americans. In the 
United States reparations were thought of as a problem related to 
the aftermath of the First World War and a problem most easily 
solved by being ignored. The enemy had never penetrated United 
States territory in such a way as to cause a demand for raparations. 
Interest in the subject did not grow until 1944, when several 
committees studied it in Washington. Plans generally contained 
proposals for payment in the form of current production, which 
would have fitted into the economic relations inherent in the open 
door policy. German goods received without payment could have 
helped in the reconstruction of the rest of Europe, and thus might 
have lessened the need for American credits. Although German 
needs would be subordinated to those of the rest of Europe 
immediately after the war — there would be no transfers of 
national assets — the Germans would still retain sufficient 
industrial recources to engage later in economic relations without 
restraint. But before raparations were imposed on the Germans a 
reasonable living standard had to be guaranteed.11 
Larger reparations could be obtained from Germany if she were 
first allowed to recover from the war. In that case, however, the 
creditors would not have obtained the extra contributions they 
most urgently needed for reconstruction. Reparations received 
10) Backer 1978, pp. 29-30. 
11) Kuklick 1972, pp. 43-44. 
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later might weaken the open door system. In Washington, 
admittedly, opposite viewpoints were also presented. Henry 
Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, eventually proposed that 
German industrial capacity be dismantled and the country turned 
into a mainly agricultural state. His idea was not approved. 
Although no final decision was made in Washington on 
reparations, a substantial German contribution to European 
reconstruction was generally expected. Optimism was increased 
by the notion that international reconstruction and the ideas 
making up the open door policy would be quickly realized when 
the war ended.12  
Talks Begin 
Reparations became a subject of Allied discussion in October 1943 
at a conference of foreign ministers in Moscow; this was mainly 
concerned with military matters, the Soviet Union wishing to be 
assured that a second front would be opened in northern France. 
On 29th October reparations were briefly dealt with on the basis of 
a report submitted by Secretary of State Cordell Hu11.13 This treated 
the matter at a general level as part of European reconstruction. 
Limitations were proposed which were against the principles 
expressed by the Soviet Union: as a rule reparations would be 
demanded not in money but in goods and services, the receiving 
country must approve them, third countries must not suffer harm 
and German productive activity must not be exposed to 
disturbances causing economic and political problems. 
The dissatisfaction of Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. 
Molotov with Hull's proposal came as no surprise. Molotov also 
criticised it for dealing only with Germany and forgetting the 
latter's allies. Moreover more concern seemed to be shown for 
Germany's living standard than for the subsistence of the Soviet 
12) Gaddis 1972, pp. 118-121. Kuklick 1972, pp. 69-73. 
13) Conference Document No. 39. U.S.Proposal with regard to Questions of 
Reparations, Foreign Relations of the United States (=FRUS) 1943 I, pp. 740-
741. 
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people. The Soviet Union was not in a position to make a counter-
proposal, however, having received Hull's proposal only on 25th 
October. It was easy for Eden to agree with Hull's principles, 
which took into account Britain's views expressed in Washington. 
The Foreign Office estimated that Hull's proposal provided a basis 
for proceeding to details, which could be done within the German 
reparations commission which the proposal suggested.14 
The Moscow conference made no further progress in the matter 
of reparations. Allied political leaders were obvioulsy unwilling to 
analyze differences of opinion over the postwar settlement which 
might weaken the collaboration of primary importance. 
Relying on Hull's memoirs, Clemens maintains that "Hull's 
recommendations became the kernel of the Soviet reparations 
program as constructed and presented at Yalta by Ivan Maisky." As 
will appear later, the Soviet proposal at Yalta was nearer to the 
principles expressed before Hull by Varga. Molotov's qualified 
approach to the American proposal was based on real differences 
of view on reparations themselves. Yet the conclusion reached by 
Clemens shows how near to each other the views of the great 
powers on reparations were at this point.15 
The Moscow conference was important in strengthening 
collaboration between the three powers concerned. Their 
decisions endorsed the principle that preliminary peace feelers 
should be conducted by the Allied power which had been 
principally engaged in war against the country concerned. Thus 
Britain and the United States would concern themselves with 
Italy, the Soviet Union with Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland and 
Hungary.16 
German reparations were not discussed at the Teheran "Big 
Three" conference of November-December 1943. But the matter 
went to the European Advisory Commission set up in Moscow 
whose task was to prepare the surrender terms to be presented to 
Germany. The Commission held its first official meeting on 14th 
January 1944. In July 1944 it produced a draft document of 
surrender and by September a plan for the occupation of Germany. 
14) FO Minute (Coulson) 17.11.1943, F0371 35309 U5932/6/70 PRO. 
15) Clemens 1970, p. 38 and sources mentioned. Cairncross 1986, p. 62. 
16) Feis 1974, pp. 206-223. 
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In all the Commission submitted 12 agreements for Allied 
approval, but several which were concerned with the status of 
Europe and above all Germany remained unapproved amid the 
deepening disagreements of the great powers. Among the matters 
they dealt with was that of German reparations, about which the 
next phase of discussion was to take place at the Yalta conference. 
Teheran: Finland 
Although no progress was made at Teheran on reparations with 
regard to Germany, the question arose in another connection. This 
was in discussion of the status of Finland, which had been a 
concern of great power policy during the preceding months. 
During the spring of 1943 peace feelers in the direction of 
Finland were being made on a more promising basis now that the 
war was beginning to turn in favour of the Allies, especially after 
the battle of Stalingrad and the raising of the Leningrad siege. 
Having obtained Soviet approval, the United States decided to 
make its good offices available for the arrangement of peace 
negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland. In March 
1943 Molotov communicated to the United States — but not to 
Finland — the "minimum conditions", one of which was that at 
least 50 % of the total damage inflicted by Finland on the Soviet 
Union during the war be made good." 
Thus a reparations article was included in the Soviet Union's 
first outline of peace terms. And so at this stage — several months 
before the Moscow foreign ministers' conference — the principle 
emerged that a reparations article should be included to the peace 
terms applied to states which had fought beside Germany. 
However, to make good all destruction would have been too great 
an undertaking, and the Soviet Union accordingly declared itself 
satisfied with partial compensation. 
In accordance with a pact of alliance made in May 1942 Stalin 
informed Churchill of this. The latter doubted the willingness of 
the Finns to withdraw from the war because they were dependent 
on German grain deliveries, but he left the matter to Stalin. Later 
17) Polvinen 1979, pp. 142-215, and 1986, pp. 5-9. Berry 1987, pp. 264-288. 
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the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, responded that the 
Kremlin was not seriously anxious over the handling of this 
question, but was prepared to announce its minimum terms. To 
Maisky Churchill commented only on the last item, which dealt 
with reparations. Maisky said that the Soviet Union had thought of 
accepting certain goods it needed, such as wood and paper, for 
reparations, rather than money. Churchill advised Maisky not to 
insist on the reparation terms but to lay stress on the acquisition of 
materials needed by the Soviet Union. 
It is probable that Churchill's statement was based on his own 
conclusions concerning the consequences of reparations after the 
First World War. By March 1943 the plans made in London for 
German reparations were no more than preliminary ones, and no 
complete set of terms to be imposed on Finland had been worked 
out, not even with regard to reparations. Securing timber for 
Britain was hardly an issue, for Churchill had no wish to oppose 
the Soviet demand for Finnish timber and paper as such. Churchill 
wished the Soviet Union to know, however, that he opposed 
reparations though he did not believe that the United States' 
proposal for mediation would lead to practical results. 
One reason for Churchill's negative attitude to the reparations 
article was that the Allies had not yet reached an understanding on 
the principles of reparation. This article could become a precedent 
within a broader set of arrangemets on which Churchill thought 
the Allies should come to an agreement before finding a solution 
for Finland.18 
The Soviet peace terms disappointed Washington, for the 
Americans did not believe that the Finns would accept them. The 
United States gave up its attempt at mediation to the surprise of the 
Finns, who were ignorant of the Soviet terms. In spring 1943 
Finland's peace efforts came to nought when contacts made 
through Sweden and Britain also brought no results. 
The first move toward an armistice with Finland was made by 
the Kremlin in November 1943. The Soviet ambassador in 
Stockholm, Mrs Aleksandra Kollontay, asked Erik Boheman, 
18) W.M (43) 46th Conclusions Minute 3. Confidential Annex 29.3.1943, Cab 65-
37 PRO. Churchill to Maisky 31.3.1943 FO copy, F0371 36838 N2610/37/56 
PRO. 
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Winston Churchill, Britain's Prime Minister, at his desk in No. 10 Down-
ing Street. In his opinion "the Finns might fell a tree or two", but no great 
benefit would result. 
secretary-general of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, to inform the 
Finns that their representatives would be welcome in Moscow to 
discuss peace. Stalin received the Finnish answer, which 
expressed a willingness to negotiate, while attending the Teheran 
conference of the three great powers. On 1st December he outlined 
to Roosevelt and Churchill the feelers which had been put out and 
expressed the opinion that Finland's reply showed a lack of real 
desire for peace. 
At this point Churchill intervened actively on the question of 
Finnish reparations. In his opinion "the Finns might fell a tree or 
two", but no great benefit would result. Stalin totally disagreed. He 
did not desire money, but believed the Finns capable of making 
good the destruction they had caused within 5-8 years by 
supplying paper, timber and other goods to the Soviet Union. 
Finland must be taught a lesson, and Stalin was determined to 
obtain satisfaction. 
20 
Churchill surmised that the destruction caused by Finland was 
clearly more than an indigent country could make good. But the 
discussion ended with Stalin presenting a compressed version of 
the Soviet demands, one of which was for 50 per cent 
compensation for damage caused by the Finns. Churchill still tried 
to induce Stalin to renounce the reparations article, but the latter 
declared his readiness even to occupy part of Finland as a 
guarantee of payment. If the Finns paid, Soviet troops would 
withdraw from the area concerned within a year.19 
Apart from the reparations question the western powers were 
satisfied with the Soviet peace terms and willingness to negotiate, 
which was welcomed. In accordance with agreed Allied policy the 
conclusion of peace was a matter between the Soviet Union and 
Finland on which, it was believed in London and Washington, no 
influence at all could be exerted. At this stage Finland's army was 
still deep in Soviet territory, and the country's government did not 
believe that public opinion would be likely to accept peace on 
Soviet terms. 
At Teheran Stalin demonstrated to the Allies that a peace treaty 
could not be concluded without a reparations article. Deliveries 
must be in the form of goods — he mentioned paper and wood as 
examples — over a period of 5-8 years. They should amount to 
50 % of the damage caused by the Finns — he did not specify value 
ro quantity. Also at this stage no prices were fixed for the goods 
concerned. Churchill rejected the whole possibility of reparations 
and was therefore unwilling to go into detail. 
Peace Feelers, Spring 1944 
Peace feelers initiated by the Soviet Union gathered speed when 
the western Allies and Sweden began urging Finland to make a 
separate peace. Further pressure came in the form of Soviet 
bombing attacks on Helsinki at ten-day intervals during February. 
Finland's government yielded to the extent of asking to hear the 
Soviet peace terms, which were also communicated to the Allies, 
19) Polvinen 1979, pp. 286-293. Fischer 1968, pp. 78-80. Kennan 1960, pp. 
34-36. 
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though Stalin expected the British to stand aside from the actual 
negotiations. Among the terms it was stated that reparations 
should be discussed in Moscow. The British view was that the 
terms were a good starting-point for negotiations after the 
adjustment of a few details. As the Foreign Office saw matters, 
Britain was entitled to intervene with regard to all the peace terms 
— reparations included. 
On 20th March Eden was able to inform the War Cabinet that the 
Soviet government had consented to the arrival of Finnish 
representatives in Moscow, where they would be given an 
interpretation of the terms without preconditions. At the end of the 
same month Finland's representatives reached Moscow, where 
much of the substance of the articles was explained in detail. 
Molotov also made the Finns understand that no agreement could 
be reached without a reparations article. This has sometimes been 
taken to mean that Soviet demands had grown stricter since the 
terms stated in Stockholm. It had then been promised that 
reparations might be a matter for discussion, but Molotov's 
statement in Moscow was regarded as ruling this out. 
As long as Soviet archives remain closed this question cannot be 
finally resolved, but the available material does not point to so 
extreme an interpretation. To its Allies the Soviet had expressed a 
firm intention to demand reparations from Germany and her allies, 
and an article in some form respecting this was accordingly a 
minimum Soviet demand. The Soviet attitude clearly signified, on 
the other hand, that the substance of the article could have been 
discussed in Moscow. 
While Molotov stressed damage caused by Finland especially in 
Leningrad and the Murmansk area, the Finns understandably drew 
attention to the destruction suffered by Finland and to the cost of 
reconstruction in Karelia. According to Molotov destruction 
caused by the Finns amounted to 1,200 million dollars, of which 
they would be required to provide half ie. 600 million dollars in 
the course of five years. Reparations would be paid in goods such 
as ships, paper, pulp and machinery. Finnish sources make it clear 
that Molotov required prices to be fixed at current market value.20 
20) Palm 1971, pp. 90-95. Palm 1973, pp. 73-74, 80-82. 
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Regardless of the course followed by the Moscow negotiations 
some attention must be paid here to Finnish views on reparations 
in connection with the Soviet demand. To the Finns the war had 
been a defence of their own independence — as the country's 
political leaders strove to indicate. Both sides suffered losses, and 
the Finns did not feel that they had caused exceptional destruction 
to the enemy. Finnish air activity, for instance, was limited to 
actual battles: there were no resources for bombing enemy 
population centres. The Finnish government instructed its 
representatives to say that payment of reparations could not be 
regarded as reasonable. 
In the view of Finland's political leaders, however, the question 
was not merely one of justification. In the foreground was a 
mistrust of Soviet aims. Whatever their amount, reparations were 
seen as leading to a situation in which the Soviet Union would be 
able to supervise Finland's economic life. This view is well 
expressed in a letter of mid-April 1944 from Finnish Foreign 
Minister Ramsay to the Ambassador in Stockholm, G.A. 
Gripenberg. In it he states that the actual amount of the reparations 
was not ultimately important. "600 or 450 million dollars will lead 
to exactly the same result: supervision of Finnish production and a 
lowering of our living standard. "21 
Finland's answer to the Soviet Union was that the latter's terms 
were impossible to fulfil. They shook the foundations of 
independence and imposed an excessive burden on the national 
economy. This answer aimed on the one hand at avoiding a 
detailed discussion of the terms which might lead to a fruitless 
argument; on the other it closed the way to further negotiations. 
Both parties understandably tried to place the blame on each other, 
and the Finnish aim was to take advantage of all statements 
asserting the harmfulness of reparations. 
Both in Stockholm and in London the Soviet reparation demand 
was regarded as exceeding Finland's productive capacity, though 
it was privately estimated at the State Department that the 
obligation could be carried out.22 In London the situation was easy 
21) Ramsay to Gripenberg 14.4.1944, Gripenberg Papers, file 4 VA. 
22) Lundestad 1978, p. 288. Finland's Capacity to pay the Russian Reparations 
Demand 24.6.1944, RG59 R&A Report No. 2127 NA. 
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to follow because the Soviet Union informed its Allies well before 
Finland's answer was given. On 1st April the new Soviet 
Ambassador in London, F.T. Gusev, went to inform the Foreign 
Office of the negotiations which had been carried out. Under-
Secretary of State, Sir Orme Sargent, observed on that occasion 
that the British might intervene over the reparations article, though 
the terms otherwise were reasonable. The Foreign Office learned 
that Sweden too opposed the Soviet reparations demand.23 
In a reply note prepared by Britain a few days later the 
reparations question was taken up. A sum of 600 million dollars 
was considered too large for Finland's capacity, and such a 
demand might bring the whole of the peace negotiations to nought. 
Accordingly a reduction of the sum was recommended. Apart from 
Finland's capacity to deliver, the interests of Britain herself were 
noted in this reply. It was felt that Finnish reparations could not be 
provided from British property. 
The Foreign Office calculated that 600 million dollars signified 
75-100 % of all Finnish export for the following five years. 
Britain was interested in obtaining timber, pulp and paper for her 
own reconstruction, and Finland was an important source. The 
British reply did not go further, however, in exerting pressure on 
the Soviet Union, who might declare its own ability to sell Britain 
the materials she required. This alternative in all probability 
would have meant higher prices for Britain.24 
British Interests 
While Finland was still considering her answer Churchill on 4th 
April brought up the Finnish question in the War Cabinet. He 
stated that the reparations demand in itself must be considered too 
large, but Britain's interests in Finland should also not be 
forgotten. In Churchill's view these interests now came to the fore 
in discussion of Finnish reparations. He observed at the same time 
23) FO Minute (Sargent) 2.4.1944, F0371 43160 N1968/30/56 PRO. Mallet from 
Stockholm to FO 2.4.1944, F0371 43160 N1990/30/56 PRO. 
24) Great Britain's reply note to the Soviet Union 4.4.1944, FO371 43160 N2047/ 
30/56 PRO. FO Minute (Warner) 4.4.1944, F0371 43160 N2047/30/56 PRO. 
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that if this was the only obstacle to peace with Finland it would be 
in the Finnish interest to make a treaty with the Soviet Union even 
on heavy terms in the hope that reparations would be reconsidered 
at the peace conference as part of a general agreement with the 
Soviet Union.25 
Churchill took the Soviet demand as a starting-point on which 
further negotiations might be held later even if the Finns accepted 
it in principle. As will be shown more precisely later, the Finns 
were given some relief when their obligation was reduced to 300 
million dollars. This was not the result of negotiations between the 
Allies or between Finland and the Soviet Union, but was decided 
by the latter unilaterally. 
On the same day (11th April) as the Cabinet dealt with the 
Finnish question Great Britain's Ambassador in Moscow, 
Archibald Clark Kerr, obtained by letter further information on the 
Soviet peace terms at the Foreign Office's request. London wished 
to know what goods the Soviet Union desired to receive from 
Finland and on what basis it had arrived at its demand for 600 
million dollars. Britain was unable to particularize her own 
demands until this information was received from the Soviet. In 
this connection London stressed its wish to secure deliveries to 
Britain of timber, pulp and paper. Clark Kerr's letter further 
stressed that the above materials must not reach the enemy by way 
of neutral countries. In any armistice or peace treaty the Finnish 
government should be obliged to export all such material which 
were not intended for the Soviet Union to other members of the 
United Nations.26 
Churchill was also prepared to act with a view to reducing 
Finnish reparations. Without knowing of the action taken by the 
Foreign Office he inquired of the Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, on 12th April 1944 how a revision of 
reparation terms for Finland and Rumania might be suggested to 
Molotov in view of the world economic situation at that time. 
Reminding Cadogan of what happened after the First World War 
Churchill forecast that the Soviet Union was unlikely to get much 
25) W.M. (44) 47th Conclusions Minute 2. Confidential Annex 11.4.1944, Cab 
65-46 PRO. 
26) Clark Kerr to Vyshinsky 11.4.1944, F0371 43160 N2814/30/56 PRO. 
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out of the countries concerned.27 Following the British note to the 
Soviet Union on 4th April the Kremlin had given no answer, and 
for this reason Churchill though it expedient to send Clark Kerr 
instructions on 15th April suggesting the above-mentioned 
revision.28 Thus Clark Kerr received instructions to take steps 
which he had already taken by order of the Foreign Office. 
Finnish reparations were a potential source of friction in Anglo-
Soviet relations, but they did not become so on account of the 
answer given by Finland. In Western Allied circles the Finns were 
expected to make clear that the reparations demand was beyond 
the country's productive capacity. But the Finnish statement gave 
grounds for considering that the Soviet proposals in their entirety 
— not merely with regard to reparations — had been rejected, as 
Churchill noted at the Cabinet meeting.29 In London it was thus 
possible to conclude that at this stage the British were no longer 
needed: the next move was for the Soviet Union alone. If it had 
been a question of reparations only, the Foreign Office would 
probably have intervened in the reply to be given to Finland, as 
was pointed out in a note conveyed to Gusev. What this would 
have ment in practice was a matter to occupy the Soviets, and the 
records shed no light on it.3o 
In both London and Stockholm there was a strong impression 
that a different answer would have enabled Finland to proceed to 
further negotiations on the reparations article and thus — partly 
with the support of Western opinion — to obtain easier terms for 
an armistice or at least for a final peace treaty. Stockholm had 
information that the Kremlin was willing to discuss the matter, but 
the Finns had acted "with their typical diplomatic stupidity." 
By the answer they gave, Finland's political leaders avoided a 
situation which the British and Swedes hoped they would reach: 
engagement in negotiations which would lead to easier reparation 
terms. It should be noted, however, that reparations were made by 
no means the only obstacle in the way of peace. Removal of 
27) Churchill to Cadogan 12.4.1944, Prem 3 170/3 PRO. 
28) Cadogan to Churchill 14.4.1944 and Churchill to Clark Kerr in Moscow 
15.4.1944, Prem 3 170/3 PRO. 
29) W.M. (44) 53rd Conclusionc Minute 1. Confidential Annex 20.4.1944, Cab 
65-46 PRO. 
30) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 22.4.1944, F0371 43160 N2441/30/56 PRO. 
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German troops from the country and territorial questions were also 
impediments to a mutual understanding. In this connection it is 
pointless to calculate whether Finland would have obtained other 
concessions than these over the reparations article. Finland's 
political leaders took the view that the terms as a whole were too 
severe to form a foundation for peace. 
When the peace feelers led to nothing the Soviets did not find it 
necessary to explain the principles behind the reparations liability 
they had insisted upon. Inquiries made by Clark Kerr throughout 
the summer were answered repeatedly with the reply that the 
Finnish question was not of current interest.31  
31) FO Minute (Nutting) 17.8.1944, FO371 43163 N4913/30/56 PRO. 
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The First Treaties 
Peace Feelers in Relation to Rumania 
During the spring of 1944 the question of an armistice with 
Rumania also arose. The Allied aim was to detach Rumania from 
the war as soon as possible, and peace feelers were put out by the 
Rumanians from the early part of 1944 onwards. The Red Army 
advanced into Rumanian territory at the beginning of April 1944, 
and soon after this the Soviet Union gave its terms for an 
armistice.32 One of the minimum demands consisted of reparations 
for damage caused to the Soviet Union by Rumania in the period of 
hostilities and occupation. At issue was the establishment of an 
obligation: there was no mention at this stage of the amount and 
composition of deliveries to be made. Britain and the United States 
approved the Soviet proposal with small changes mainly 
concerning future frontier arrangements.33 The State Department 
had already noted earlier in the year that in principle Rumania 
owed compensation to the United Nations.34 
In the terms proposed to Rumania it is noticeable that the 
amount of reparations is not mentioned in detail whereas in 
Finland's case the precise sum was known early in April. This 
omission was evidently because the Soviet Union first announced 
the reparations term in principle — as in the case of Finland 
earlier. If the negotiations had reached the detailed stage the sum 
would probably have been specified. Only when the original 
figures are published will it be possible to say whether the sum 
32) MacWeagh from Cairo to SD 8.4.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 169-170. 
33) Lundestad 1978, pp. 223-225 and sources mentioned. 
34) SD to Winant in London 2.2.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, p. 140. 
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was 600 million dollars. 
However, Britain and the Soviet Union were in some 
disagreement over reparations. In London the reparations article 
for Rumania was considered auspicious because it remained on 
the level of general principle. The British interpreted this as 
meaning that the Kremlin now assented in the case of Rumania to 
the reservations which London had about naming the actual 
reparations sum. On the other hand the British had agreed — with 
qualification — to a reparations demand based on a specific sum 
for Finland. Before the break in negotiations the Soviet Union had 
given no sign of willingness to specify the reparations sum for 
Rumania too. Thus the attitudes of Britain and the Soviet Union 
were not yet fully clarified. 
In April the German hold on Rumania was powerful, and 
Rumania's mistrust of Soviet aims was evident. No armistice was 
achieved at this stage, but a new possibility arose when Rumania's 
Ambassador in Stockholm, Nanu, received easier terms from the 
Soviet. The Rumanian government was guaranteed a free 
administrative area which foreign troops would not enter and was 
allowed a 15-day interval between a cease-fire and a declaration of 
war on Germany. A reduction of reparations was also promised,' 
but even these concessions did not settle matters. Instead, the Red 
Army advanced further into Rumanian territory, at the end of 
August came a change of regime in Rumania, and with it a change 
of sides in the war. On 22nd August a new government led by 
General Sanatescu announced that its first actions in foreign policy 
would be aimed at an armistice. 
On 26th August Molotov informed Clark Kerr and Harriman that 
the Soviet Union was still prepared to make the three afore-
mentioned concessions to strengthen the position of the new 
government.36 With regard to reparations London could not 
understand these concessions because, in the British opinion, their 
sum had been left open, to be determined only at the peace 
conference. It was difficult to imagine a reduction of a sum which 
had not even been fixed.37 Yet the Kremlin assumed that Britain 
35) Lord Moyne from Cairo to FO 8.7.1944, F0371 44003 R10668/294/37 PRO. 
36) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 26.8.1944, F0371 44005 R13271/294/37 PRO. 
37) FO Minute (Reed) 26.8.1944 and FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 26.8.1944, 
F0371 44005 R13271/294/37 PRO. 
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had agreed in April to the inclusion of a reparations article in 
armistice terms for Rumania. On 28th August Molotov announced 
that there was no further reason to leave the fixing of a reparations 
sum until the peace conference.38 
It was time, according to the Soviet concept, to move from the 
level of general principles to that of details, but Molotov still gave 
no hint of the actual sum. This was revealed to the British only on 
31st August, when they received a complete draft of an armistice 
agreement.39 Under its terms Rumania declared war immediately 
on Germany and Hungary, and the Allies occupied all areas of 
Rumania. Thus the Soviet Union finally "forgot" its earlier 
concessions. 
The Soviet proposal was based on deliveries of Rumanian goods 
to the value of 300 million dollars in six years. The Americans very 
soon approved the Soviet principles. Though the State Department 
would have preferred to leave the sum unspecified, the Americans 
agreed to these terms when Molotov stressed the special 
importance which the Soviet Union attached to the matter. In 
Washington it was not believed that the Soviet attitude would 
change voluntarily. But the reparations question was not 
considered a sufficient reason for endangering Allied 
collaboration. The State Department urged Harriman, however, to 
explain to the Soviet government that as a matter of principle the 
United States wished to avoid mention of a specific sum until 
agreement was reached on an Allied reparations policy towards all 
enemy countries.40 
London, however, was not willing to agree to a named sum for 
reparations. Clark Kerr was sent a draft of a new reparations article 
in which the sum was not mentioned.43 Molotov did not agree, but 
demanded that 300 million dollars be mentioned. Clark Kerr 
informed the Foreign Office on 4th September that he did not 
believe he could change Molotov's attitude. In the Kremlin, stated 
Molotov, this article in particular was considered the most 
38) Molotov to Clark Kerr 28.8.1944 and Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 
28.8.1944, FO 371 44006 R13472/294/37 PRO. 
39) Harriman from Moscow to SD 31.8.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 205-206; SD to 
Leahy 2.9.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 208-212. 
40) SD to Harriman in Moscow 5.9.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 221-223. 
41) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 3.9.1944, F0371 44006 R13697/294/37 PRO. 
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important in the armistice agreement. Molotov asked again and 
again whether the British thought the sum in question too large. In 
Clark Kerr's opinion Molotov obviously did not believe that the 
British were pursuing a matter of principle — London's more 
likely purpose, he thought, was a revision of the sum concerned.42 
On no account did the Foreign Office wish to argue with the 
Soviets on the question of whether Rumania was able to pay 
reparations of 300 million dollars in six years. It was essential to 
remember the experience of German reparations after the previous 
war. Available data indicated, in the Foreign Office view, that the 
demand exceeded Rumanian productive capacity, so that the 
experience of Germany might be repeated. Also Rumania would 
set a precedent in the setting of reparation levels. Before a sum was 
fixed the Allies were obliged to agree on what damage, loss and 
expenses should be included in determining reparations for each 
country.43  
When Clark Kerr reaffirmed that His Majesty's Government 
could not agree to mention the sum which had been named, 
Molotov made "a short speech" on the extensive destruction 
suffered by the Soviet Union. The reparations article, he said, was 
at the heart of any armistice, without it an agreement would be 
worthless and could not be signed. In the spring His Majesty's 
Government had agreed to a named sum of reparations in the case 
of Finland, so that now he would evidently be obliged to inform 
his government and people that Britain had changed her attitude. 
At this stage Clark Kerr used his powers, producing a new draft 
article which went some way towards meeting Soviet demands, 
but Molotov was still not satisfied. He wished to be assured that 
the sum mentioned in the draft signified the Soviet share only, and 
proposed an addition for reparations payable to the other Allies. 
Clark Kerr again informed London that he did not believe Molotov 
would deviate from the original Soviet proposal. Clearly 
disappointed, Clark Kerr noted that he had received no support 
from Harriman, who had announced at an early stage that he 
would be satisfied with a settlement reached by Britain and the 
42) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 4.9.1944, F0371 44007 R13955/294/37 PRO. 
43) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 5.9.1944, F0371 44007 R13955/294/37 PRO. 
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Soviet Union." 
The Foreign Office explained to Clark Kerr that Molotov's 
assertion of a British change of attitude was quite wrong. In the 
case of Finland the Soviet proposal had been agreed to primarily 
because there had been no time for discussion of the terms before 
they were communicated to the Finns. And there was no need to 
protest later, as the negotiations came to nothing. But in the 
Rumanian case Britain had consistently refused to approve the 
sum named, in addition to which the Soviet Union itself had 
approved a reparations article in accordance with British wishes 
regarding Italy.45  
Draft for an Armistice Agreement with Finland 
Before the British and Soviet negotiatiors had time for a final 
discussion of the proposed agreement with Rumania, Molotov on 
6th September presented the draft of an agreement with Finland. 
Only the Petsamo question emerged as a substantial subject of 
dispute between the Soviet Union and Britain. Harriman followed 
the arrangement of Finland's affairs as an observer only. In the 
original proposal Moscow required the Finns to pay compensation 
to the Mond Nickel Company, but London could not approve this 
since it was possible that Finland with her burden of reparations 
would be unable to pay the Anglo-Canadian company. In the 
second place it was unjust for the party relinquishing the territory 
to pay compensation. The area with its rights and obligations 
would be transferred to the Soviet Union, as any other solution 
would be difficult to explain to public opinion. The section 
dealing with compensation for Petsamo was removed from the 
draft and a compromise reached, the nickel company receiving 20 
million dollars in compensation from the Soviet Union, who 
announced that it would take this sum from what was received 
from Finland.46 
On going through the terms intended for Finland with Clark Kerr 
44) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 6.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14078/294/37 PRO. 
45) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 7.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14078/294/37 PRO. 
46) Polvinen 1980, pp. 106-117. 
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and Harriman, Molotov devoted great attention to the 
compensation paragraph. The Soviet demand had fallen from 600 
million to 300 million dollars and the time for payment was 
extended from five to six years. Molotov made it clear that the 
reduction had been made in order to meet the British government's 
wishes. He supposed that the sum proposed could be approved in 
London.47 Clark Kerr committed himself to nothing at this stage, 
however. 
The reason given by Molotov was understandable, bearing in 
mind that Churchill had declared his opposition to large 
reparations at an early stage. During the spring and summer of 
1944 the British had repeatedly expressed this attitude. From 
another point of view it was important for the Soviet Union to 
agree quickly on terms with its Allies so that countries which had 
fought beside Germany might soon be removed from the war. It 
was not worth weakening Allied collaboration for the sake of long 
negotiations on the substance of a single article. And to make an 
agreement at this stage would have the advantage of securing some 
results at least for the Soviet Union. When the major war ended the 
Western Allies might be unwilling to make an agreement, 
especially on reparations. 
The Soviet Union had proposed earlier that half the damage 
caused should be made good. When the claim was reduced, that 
principle was relinquished. In March 1944 Molotov estimated the 
damage caused by Finland at 1,200 million dollars, but since the 
time concerned the sum had undoubtedly risen. Thus a claim for 
300 million dollars would not have covered as much as a quarter of 
the total damage. In the terms for Rumania the Soviet Union 
intimated that 300 million dollars was a fifth of the total damage. 
For purposes of calculation on the above basis the sum for Finland 
too was a fifth of total damage, but in that case the damage caused 
by Rumania and Finland would have needed to be of the same 
degree. Because source material remains unavailable for the 
moment the basis of calculation cannot be made clear, but no sum 
representing the damage can possibly be more than an estimate. As 
the reparations sum for Rumania and Finland was the same and its 
proportion of the total damage was not to be mentioned in the final 
47) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 6.9.1944. FO371 43164 N5405/30/56 PRO. 
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agreement, the sum was evidently arrived at on the basis of other 
factors. It is possible that without a precise basis of calculation 300 
million dollars seemed a suitable liability on which the Allies 
reached an understanding. 
Agreements for Rumania and Finland 
In accordance with instructions received from London Clark Kerr 
on 8th September presented a new draft of the compensation 
article for Rumania. The reference to 300 million dollars as a 
proportion of the total damage (equivalent to a fifth) had been 
removed, and Molotov now agreed. A second change was that the 
British wished the word "provisionally" to appear before the sum 
in question. In practice this would have delayed the fixing of the 
final reparations sum until later, to which the Soviet Union could 
not agree. Clark Kerr was prepared to leave the word out if the 
Allies would sign a separate document stating that the reparations 
sum of 300 million dollars could be reconsidered if it proved too 
large for Rumania. A second article would mention that although 
the Soviet Union would receive 300 million dollars, the other 
members of the United Nations would also receive a sum 
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equivalent to a share of reparations from all enemy countries in the 
final agreement. Clark Kerr let it be understood that according to 
British calculations Rumania would be unable to pay the proposed 
reparations sum. Molotov stated, however, that the Soviet Union 
would not agree to sign such a document. British and Soviet views 
were in conflict, and Clark Kerr was obliged once more to ask 
instructions from London.48  
Negotiations between Britain and the Soviet Union on the 
subject of a reparations article for Rumania had reached a dead end 
from which London tried to find a way out. At the Foreign Office it 
was thought dangerous to let a Rumanian armistice collapse over 
this question, because on all other problems a solution had been 
reached. The Soviet could sign its own armistice agreement with 
the Rumanians, which would leave the British to make their own 
arrangements. Allied collaboration would have suffered as a result 
of this. The British also admitted that the Soviet Union had the 
primary influence in matters affecting Rumania. The Foreign 
Office doubted whether Rumania had any practical importance as 
a precedent. The problems of Germany were of a quite different 
order, however.49 In the opinion of the Treasury, however, 
Rumania would set a precedent in any economic decisions bearing 
on Germany, and accordingly the Treasury held closely to the 
original British attitude.5° 
Chiefly in order to maintain Allied collaboration the Foreign 
Office assented and on 10th September gave Clark Kerr authority 
to approve the Soviet reparations article. The Foreign Office 
stipulated, however, that reference be made in writing to the views 
of His Majesty's Government on two points. First, in the final 
disposition of reparations each creditor country should receive an 
agreed share of the reparations to be taken from all enemy 
countries. In London the settlement of reparations was seen as a 
whole — regardless of whether separate armistice agreements had 
been made, in the final peace conference reparations should be 
further deliberated, and if necessary the articles of agreements 
already made should be altered. 
48) Harriman from Moscow to SD 8.9.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 226-227. 
49) FO Minute (Howard) 9.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14185/294/37 PRO. 
50) Treasury (=T) to FO 9.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14185/294/37 PRO. 
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Second, whatever happened in the case of Rumania, it did not 
mean that His Majesty's Government consented to that case 
becoming a precedent in other cases. In the Rumanian case, as in 
the others, Britain reserved the specific right to inquire into the 
observance of the article if British interests were endangered by 
full-scale reparations.51 These matters were contained in a letter 
from Clark Kerr to Molotov dealing with both Rumania and 
Finland and bearing the same date as the armistice agreements 
with these countries.52 
The Allies reached an understanding on the wording of the 
armistice agreement for Rumania as late as 10th September. The 
Rumanians tried in vain to obtain changes in the reparations 
article, and the agreement was signed on 12th September 1944. 
Regarding the reparations article for Finland the Foreign Office 
waited for the decision on Rumania. Clark Kerr informed London 
that in April Britain had not been in favour of suggesting a 
particular reparations sum, nor was there a basis for fixing one in 
September. At issue was a struggle which the British were 
eventually to lose. To save time and avoid bitterness Clark Kerr 
recommended British assent to the terms in question.53 As the 
Rumanian armistice was signed and the economic effects of the 
Finnish armistice terms could not be considered unduly heavy, 
London no longer had reason to reject the Soviet terms in this 
regard.54 
During the negotiations in Moscow the Finns did not obtain the 
relief they had proposed from their reparations liability. Foreign 
Minister Carl Enckell emphasized, quoting calculations by Finnish 
experts, that the reparations sum proposed was impossible for 
Finland to pay. He also inquired whether part of the reparations 
might be paid in dollars, in which case Finland could borrow the 
sum concerned. Molotov did not even engage in serious discussion 
of the matter. He contented himself with saying that he would read 
the Finnish memorandum only if the experts could prove that one 
year of war was cheaper for Finland than one year of peace with 
51) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 10.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14185/294/37 PRO. 
52) FO to Clark Kerr in Moscow 10.9. and 11.9.1944, F0371 44007 R14271/294/ 
37 PRO. 
53) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 9.9.1944, F0371 43164 N5476/30/56 PRO. 
54) FO to Moscow Embassy 10.9.1944, FO371 43164 N5476/30/56 PRO. 
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reparation payments.55 
The reparations article had been agreed between the Allies, and 
the Soviet Union did not wish its formulation to be dependent on 
enemy attitudes. Enckell's proposal of money payments with loans 
was against the combined views of the Allies, who would therefore 
probably have rejected the Finnish proposal unanimously, above 
all the aforementioned parts of it. 
The American and British desire to delay the fixing of a 
reparations sum until the peace conference may be regarded — as 
Geir Lundestad has shown in the case of Rumania56 — as an 
attempt to limit Soviet influence in Rumania and Finland. Though 
the attitude of the Western Allies possibly had some such effect, 
this was obviously not the central motive. 
The American and British wished to be careful, of course: they 
had no desire for the Soviet Union to benefit from large 
reparations. But if the intention had actually been to use 
reparations as an instrument of power politics, the Americans in 
particular would hardly have avoided disagreement and assented 
to the Soviet proposal as easily as in fact happened. The 
approaching Presidential elections, to be sure, may have 
contributed to the caution of Roosevelt's policy on these matters. 
Reluctance on the part of Britain and the United States alike to 
approve a specific reparations sum and their attempt at least to 
leave the door open for a possible change, were due mainly to the 
fact that Rumania and Finland were setting a precedent in the 
settlement of the reparations issue. Reparations would have a 
powerful influence on postwar economic relations between states, 
and the Americans and British wished to play their part in 
bringing about a comprehensive settlement. It was to be feared that 
the Soviet Union would by its present tactics bring into effect a 
decision unsuited to such a settlement in connection with a peace 
treaty. There was a further danger that later the Kremlin would 
demand — especially for Germany — that the same principles be 
applied, appealing to the fact that the Americans and British had 
already agreed to them. In order to maintain collaboration, 
55) Records of Finnish Armistice Negotiations, FO371 431 43179 N8137/30/56 
PRO. 
56) Lundestad 1978, pp. 226-227. 
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however, the Western Allies acceded to the vigorous Soviet 
demands. 
British Needs 
Britain's interest in Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian reparations 
was due above all to important British commercial interests in 
Finland. In 1937 Finland took 14th place among the countries from 
where Britain imported and 21st among the countries receiving her 
exports. With Rumania and Hungary, on the other hand, trade was 
slight before the war and there would be few chances of 
improvement after it.57 Now that the reparations of Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary were interlinked, the British were obliged to 
watch their interests in all these countries.58 
Table 1. British trade with various countries in 1938, 1946 and 1955 (mill. 
US dollars) 
Export Import 
1938 1948 1955 1938 1948 1955 
Total 2602.8 6635.4 8467.6 4496.3 8374.5 10886.5 
Rumania 6.8 3.9 8.4 18.7 13.2 9.8 
Finland 28.6 81.7 121.2 94.2 140.4 210.7 
Hungary 3.2 10.2 8.5 11.9 24.5 6.5 
Source: Direction of International Trade 1958, pp. 115-117. 
In the British Treasury's opinion Finland could not possibly pay 
reparations worth 600 million dollars to the Soviet Union even if 
she supplied nothing to Britain» Thus by London's reckoning the 
Soviet demand was too big from the standpoint of both the British 
and the Finnish economies. 
Although British interests in Finland were evident, they were 
57) Cole 1956, pp. 187-188. 
58) Hurstfield 1953, p. 473. 
59) T Minutes (Keynes) 6.4.1944 and (Playfair) 6.4.1944, T236:91 PRO. 
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only a part of Britain's foreign economic relations. At the 
beginning of May 1944 the Ministry of Supply completed an 
estimate of the likely timber situation in the first year following the 
armistice.60 This allowed for an armistice with Germany near the 
end of 1944, so that the estimate actually referred to 1945. 
Calculated for that year were both the requirement and the supply 
of timber at home and abroad. For pit-props especially, large 
imports from Finland were planned: the Soviet Union and the 
Baltic States would supply 225,000 standards and Finland 
200,000, while from Canada the figure would be only 100,000 
standards and from Sweden 50,000. An important role was thus 
reserved for Finland in the revival of Britain's mining industry 
after the war. 
40 % of the pit-props imported by Britain in 1938 were bought 
from Finland. Such a high figure was not to be reached 
immediately following the war, for in 1945 Finland's relative share 
of pit-prop imports was only 29 %: but growth was rapid and the 
pre-war level was reached by 1947.61  
Understandably, housing construction played a central part in 
the use of softwood in postwar conditions. Housing needs 
involved not only replacing dwellings which had been damaged or 
totally destroyed in the war. There was also pre-war inheritance of 
unsuitable housing as well as an actual shortage. The number of 
families had risen greatly during the war, while construction at the 
same time had satisfied only a fraction of the increased demand. It 
was reckoned after the war that about 1,700,000 dwellings were 
needed.62 
Housing took up 42 % of softwood supplies in 1946, and 30 % 
was still needed in 1948. As British exports revived sawngoods 
were needed more than before for packing export commodities, 
added to which was their use in industry and shipbuilding. 
Finland's share of softwood imports in 1938 was 23 %, while in 
post-war years it stayed well below this level.63 
60) Timber. Estimate of Position in the First Year after an Armistice Supp. Minute 
2.5.1944, FO371 40912 U4519/4519/71 PRO. 
61) Holopainen 1952, pp. 16-17. 
62) Holopainen 1953, p. 26. 
63) Ervasti 1955, pp. 196-197. 
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Although the Finnish share of British imports did not 
immediately reach pre-war figures, the British had full reason to 
expect important timber deliveries from Finland. When the above-
mentioned plan was drawn up it was impossible to know what 
form Finland's political status would finally take, nor were 
production conditions known to the British, but to secure 
commercial independence and to find an expedient solution to the 
reparations question were in the British interest. This was also the 
aim of plans presented by Foreign Secretary Eden to the War 
Cabinet at the beginning of August 1944.64 
But Soviet reparation demands did not necessarily mean that 
Britain would obtain no Finnish goods. London was considering 
an alternative: that the Soviet Union should supply the reparation 
goods she obtained from Finland in exchange for goods exported 
by Britain to the Soviet. They did not wish to raise this possibility 
with the Soviet Union, however, because trade directly with 
Finland was cheaper. Finland had taken out loans before the war 
which London wished to be repaid. If Finland did not obtain 
export revenue there would be no question of this. For this reason 
it must be stressed to the Soviet Union that in the coming 
armistice or peace agreement the Finnish government must be 
required to place its export at the disposal of the United Nations. 
But Britain's wish to have the loans repaid should not be taken as 
the reason for this idea. It should be urged, instead, that the United 
Nations needed the exports in question, which should not in any 
case be allowed to reach the enemy through neutral countries. One 
exception could be made at once to this principle, for Finnish 
exports to Sweden must certainly be allowed.65 
Timber for the British 
The 19th article of the Finnish armistice agreement directed 
Finland to place at the disposal of the United Nations such 
requisites and products as these nations might demand for war 
purposes. 
64) Nevakivi 1976, pp. 199-200; Polvinen 1980, pp. 92-94. 
65) FO to Moscow Embassy 9.4.1944 Board of Trade copy, BT11/2241 PRO. 
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Britain's credits due from Finland at the beginning of March 
1944 were over 3.6 million pounds, while Finland's corresponding 
credits due amounted to less than 1.6 million pounds.66 If the 
armistice and peace terms were not too heavy a burden and 
Finland were allowed to return to normal economic life, London 
expected no particular problem with the credits due. Finland's 
trade relation with Britain had been favourable and her reputation 
was good as a payer of debts. There was no wish whatever to push 
claims at the expense of Finland's economic revival — access to 
Finnish markets must be secured by proceeding with courtesy in 
this matter.67 
Also, a stricter attitude was required by London with respect to 
Britain's credits that were due. The Board of Trade warned against 
estimating the importance of credits due to Finland on the basis of 
advantageous trade, as the situation after the war might be quite 
different.68 In the opinion of Lord Keynes Britain must first secure 
her credits due in any case. An agreement must be made with 
Finland obliging the latter to use the whole of her export surplus to 
pay the loans in question before the money was used for purchases 
elsewhere.69 Keynes' view, however, was not shared by the 
Treasury, where the opinion was held that it was necessary to wait 
for the final peace terms imposed by the Soviet Union on Finland. 
The primary objective at all events was to start trading, which the 
payment of credits due must not be allowed to frustrate. For the 
payment treaty which was planned terms had been envisaged 
requiring Finland to pay her pre-war debts before starting trade 
elsewhere in the sterling area.70 
An appendix to article 11 dealing with reparations in the Finnish 
armistice agreement required the parties concerned to negotiate on 
the classification of goods and the confirmation of delivery time. 
Not only did the Allied Control Commission arrive in Helsinki 
during October 1944 but also a Soviet delegation concerned with 
reparations and they launched negotiations with Finnish 
66) Finland — Property Claims Note by Trading with the Enemy Department 2.3 
1944, T23686 PRO. 
67) T Minute (Playfair) 7.3.1944, T236/86 PRO. 
68) BT to T 21.3.1944, T236/86 PRO. 
69) T Minutes (Keynes) 21.3.1944 and 28.3.1944, T236/86 PRO. 
70) T Minute (Playfair) 30.3.1944, T236/86 PRO. 
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representatives on detailed arrangements for reparation 
commodities. 
On 21st October the Chairman of the Control Commission, 
Colonel-General Andrei Zdanov, met Francis Shepherd, who had 
been appointed Britain's political representative. From the first 
Shepherd stressed Britain's wish to obtain timber from Finland, 
though without sidetracking Soviet demands. Zdanov stated that 
the Soviet Union had no objection to the opening of contact 
between Britain and Finnish suppliers. Timber, pulp and paper 
would surely be enough for both parties." 
From the standpoint of reparations the armistice agreement left 
two important questions open. It was not made clear how the 
nominal sum of 300 million U.S. dollars should be divided in 
terms of deliveries of various goods. The agreement included a 
short list which began with Finland's traditional exports: timber, 
paper and pulp. Correspondingly, from Rumania and Hungary also 
their traditional exports were demanded. The Finns therefore 
expected deliveries to be based mainly on the above goods. 
The agreement also made no mention of how the goods 
concerned should be priced. 
As negotiations proceeded towards the end of October the Soviet 
Union began to stress the role that metal industry products should 
play in reparations deliveries, and the Finns were obliged to start 
planning what was quite a new industry. This change of emphasis 
occurred at a time when the Control Commission had arrived in 
Finland and was gathering preliminary information on the 
country's productive capacity. It is possible that these first figures 
altered earlier notions of that capacity, for the country's metal 
industry had grown substantially during the war. If its production 
index is put at 100 for 1938, the figure was 120 by 1944 and had 
grown to 200 by 1948. Timber, paper and other branches of 
industry, on the other hand, never attained their 1938 production 
volume during the war.72 
Finland enjoyed conditions more favourable to production than 
many other countries engaged in the war. Cessions of territory, 
resettlement of population, the war in Lapland and many other 
71) Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 22.10.1944, FO 371 43196/5799/56 PRO. 
72) Sahavirta 1958, pp. 39-46. Lehtinen 1967, p. 212. 
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burdens were of course heavy, but on the other hand the actual 
destruction caused by the war was confined to relatively limited 
areas. Fewer industrial installations had been destroyed than in 
central Europe, for instance. In Finland, unlike in Rumania and 
Hungary, there was no Allied army of occupation whose upkeep 
would have been a great expence. 
As a timber-exporting country the Soviet Union understandably 
laid stress on the metal industry in its reparation demands. It 
followed from this that Finland was able to export her 
woodprocessing products elsewhere, chiefly to Britain. This 
undoubtedly made it easy for the British to accept the Soviet terms 
with regard to this item.73 
If Finland had been obliged to export her only vital export 
material free of charge, no foreign currency would have reached 
the country. She lacked many important industrial raw materials 
and machines, nor was reconstruction possible without substantial 
imports. Seen from this angel, the Soviet stress on capital goods 
was advantageous for Finland, as for others. 
The Soviet demand for Finnish industrial products was not 
made, however, without raising problems for Britain and the 
United States. The Finns were not capable alone of meeting the 
reparation demands, but machinery and raw materials passed from 
the West through Finland to the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet 
Union increased the quantity of metal industry products allocated 
to it following the end of the war. In the West it was reckoned that 
the Soviet Union was deliberately trying in this way to benefit at 
the Western Allies' expence.74 This was certainly an important 
reason for the suspicion aroused by reparations, especially in the 
United States. Daniel Yergin has asserted that at a later stage the 
Soviets saw the Marshall Plan as an alternative form of reparations 
— but for them a less satisfactory one.75 
73) Caplan: Preliminary Notes on the Principal Economic Consequences of the 
Armistice. Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 22.11.1944, FO371 43200 N7730/ 
5976/56 PRO. 
74) Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 19.11.1944, FO371 43169 N7253/30/56 PRO. 
75) Yergin 1978, p. 317. 
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Reparations and Economic Collaboration 
At the end of November a stage was reached in Soviet-Finnish 
negotiations at which the Soviet Union announced — when the 
Finns tried to exert an influence on the composition of deliveries76 
— that all possible concessions had been made. Zdanov 
communicated this to the Finnish delegation led by Enckell on 
29th November. The Foreign Minister tried to describe the 
situation to the members of his delegation by a gesture reminiscent 
of hanging. This did not go unnoticed by Zdanov, whose 
immediate reaction also revealed the Kremlin's aims. Zdanov was 
angrily surprised at the Foreign Minister's poor sense of reality. If 
the Soviet Union actually wished to do what Enckell had conveyed 
by his gesture, it need do no more than wait calmly while the 
workers returned to their factories which stood empty for lack of 
orders and raw materials — with the consequences which this 
implied. At that moment, Zdanov admitted, the situation for the 
metal industry was impossible, but it could be overcome by 
expanding the industry as the Soviet Union had done in its time. 
When reparation deliveries were completed the Soviet was 
prepared to give Finland a sufficient number of orders, so that 
expansion would be beneficial in the long term also." 
What Zdanov's attitude shows above all is the Soviet wish to 
find through reparations a basis for long-term economic 
collaboration between the two countries. Although it was part of 
the Soviet purpose to demand — on the principles expressed 
during the war — the satisfaction it considered justified for the 
destruction it had suffered, reparations were, most importantly, a 
guarantee of co-operation in the future. Timber was not needed by 
the Soviet Union, and diversification of Finnish production was 
therefore the most practical solution at that time. It is undoubtedly 
an exaggeration to maintain that the reparations programme 
"saved" Finland economically, yet it is also certainly true that the 
decisions then made had lasting beneficial effects on Finland's 
economic development. 
Later studies have shown that the reparations timetable and list 
76) See e.g Paasikivi 1985, (= Paasikivi's Diaries) 25.11. and 27.11.1944. 
77) Harki 1971, pp. 48-49. 
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of goods were not in themselves a problem to the Finns. The worst 
problem in several industrial branches was to obtain domestic and 
foreign raw materials as well as machinery. Jensen comes to the 
conclusion that the burden of reparations as a whole — without 
belittling some indisputable difficulties — was not as heavy as 
generally supposed. By 1952, for instance, the metal industry had 
expanded considerably more than the reparations liability 
required,78 which shows that this industry had a natural capacity 
for growth. 
From that time until the present there has been some wish in 
Finland and in Western countries to interpret reparations as a 
screw tightened by the Soviet Union at Finland's expense. By 
forcing the Finns to build a new industry which after reparations 
would be dependent on Soviet markets, the Kremlin acquired an 
effective means of pressure. Thus, knowing their dependence, the 
Finns were compelled to follow a line friendly to the Soviet Union. 
According to this conception the "traditional and natural" focus of 
Finland's exports was only to be found in her woodprocessing 
industry directed to Western markets.79 
We must await the publication of original material to know 
whether Soviet political leaders entertained such thoughts when 
they put the main stress of reparations on metal industry products. 
However, that industry grew to have an important status in the 
country's economic life. Undoubtedly the metal industry with its 
direction towards Soviet markets can be looked at from the angle of 
dependence and pressure between buyer and seller. But it should 
also be asked whether Western countries have not at least as 
important a means of exerting pressure in relation to 
woodprocessing exports. 
Britain and the Pricing of Reparation Goods 
There was satisfaction in London when Moscow demanded 
reparations mainly in the form of metal industry products, so that 
78) Jensen 1966, pp. 109-111. 
79) See e.g. Allen 1960, p. 40; Aubrey 1961, pp. 227-228; Junnila 1964, p. 93; 
Kovner 1961, pp. 60-61. 
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timber remained available for export to Western markets. In the 
pricing of reparation goods, however, the British were 
disappointed. When negotiations started the Soviet delegation 
mentioned no particular price basis to the Finns, who therefore 
believed that world market prices at the time of delivery would be 
the basis for pricing reparation goods. On 18th October, however, 
the Soviets declared that some pre-war price level could be 
adopted. As the quantities proposed for delivery by the Soviet 
delegation grew in the course of negotiations the Finns expected a 
speedy settlement of this question. At the beginning of November 
the Soviet Union stated that in the course of peace feelers during 
March 1944 Molotov had mentioned, when speaking of the 600 
million dollar reparations term, that deliveries should be made at 
normal prices. This had signified prices prevailing before the war 
or, to be more precise, prices in 1938, the last year of peace. 
According to the Finns Molotov had mentioned that goods would 
be priced at their "current" value.80 
Whatever had been said in Moscow at the time, the Finns found 
the Soviet demand unjust. For raw materials and machinery the 
Finns would have to pay prices which had risen during the war 
and would change during the period of reparations. It was also 
unjust that in the armistice agreement reparations of a given 
quantity should have been agreed but their actual value left 
dependent on future prices. In the Finnish view an interpretation 
which diverged from world market prices was against the spirit of 
the reparations article. 
During the war commodity prices had risen so much that, 
reckoned at the 1938 price level, the Finns maintained that they 
would have to deliver some 600 million dollars' worth of goods. It 
was calculated later that in the reparations period lasting till 1952 
— having obtained some relief from the original programme — 
Finland paid a total of 444.7 million dollars at the price level of the 
time of delivery and 546 million dollars at the 1952 rate. 
The Finns believed that since spring 1944 the Soviet attitude to 
pricing had changed. Available material neither confirms nor 
contradicts this idea. With good reason the Soviets might say that 
in the situation of autumn 1944 there could be no talk of "normal" 
80) Auer 1956, p. 17. 
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or "current" prices. After the war prices were expected to fall 
sharply. Another possibility is that in March the Soviet Union still 
had no firm notion of pricing. The list of reparation goods was 
decided only when the Control Commission came to the country 
and Finland's capacity for delivery was elucidated. It is possible 
that prices were fixed on principles which were settled in this 
connection. 
The armistice agreement left open both the composition of 
reparations deliveries and their pricing. This may have happened 
not inadvertently but in order to make an appropriate reparations 
demand possible. The armistice agreement as such did not exactly 
define the actual composition of reparations, which were specified 
in yearly delivery programmes. The Soviet Union also agreed to 
changes in the original programme, so that Finland's reparations 
were conducted — so far the creditor was concerned at least — 
more flexibly than has been generally understood. 
The Soviet demand for a 1938 price basis caused resentment not 
only in Finland but also among the Western powers and in 
Sweden. In London the reduction of the reparations demand from 
600 to 300 million dollars was regarded as a British achievement, 
and now the Soviet Union was seen to be making good its 
concession. Mistrust of Soviet policy grew on London 
substantially. 
As long as Soviet archives remain closed the aims of the Kremlin 
cannot be fully verified, but the Soviet attitude to the whole 
question of compensation points to a different conclusion. From 
the first the Soviet had demanded deliveries of goods, regarding 
them as the only practical possibility for its own economic system. 
In other words the Kremlin expected a certain volume of goods 
whose reception could be fitted into its own economic plans. If 
variable world market prices had been relied on for the pricing of 
these goods, the quantity of goods would have varied, creating 
difficulties in the receiver's plans for their use. In the autumn of 
1944 world market prices were considered exceptionally high and 
a fall was expected, whereas the 1938 price level gave a firm basis 
for pricing. 
Inquiries during the autumn of 1944 had convinced the British 
that substantial quantities of timber should be bouhgt from 
Finland if others did not intervene. In mid-November the Foreign 
Office decided to raise the question of reparation pricing with the 
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Soviet Union. At the same time it was decided that Finland might 
purchase raw materials against payment, but Britain, already in 
difficulties over credits, could not issue loans to the Finns.81  
No American Support 
Before raising the matter in Moscow Britain wished to be assured 
of United States support. At London's request the State 
Department informed its Moscow embassy that Britain opposed 
the Soviet demands on pricing. In principle the State Department 
agreed with the British argument. The Americans were advised to 
stress in Moscow that the United States had from the first 
supposed the prices to be those current on world markets. No other 
interpretation was reasonable. Because the United States was not 
at war with Finland she did not wish to intervene in Finnish 
reparations. In the Rumanian case the United States had similarly 
resisted the pronouncement of a specific sum as compensation. 
The sum appointed for Rumania was high in relation to the 
country's payment capacity, and no interpretation which raised it 
could be approved. The Soviet Union's right to compensation for 
its losses must give way to the needs of European reconstruction 
and the United States' own interests.82 
In practice, however, the United States had no wish to act in the 
matter of reparations. The formal reason was that the United States 
had received no confirmation from the Soviet Union of the 
principles to be applied over pricing. During the war the 
Americans wished to avoid inter-Allied disputes on a question 
which was of secondary importance from Washington's 
standpoint. It was known that Molotov would adamantly oppose 
any change in the armistice agreements proposed, and the Soviet 
Union would not withdraw the interpretation it had already given. 
The British proposal had very little chance of approval. As the 
Hungarians were aware of the armistice terms for Rumania and 
Finland they might pay attention to the pricing question. To be 
bound to the British proposal in no way suited the United States' 
81) FO Minute (Nutting) 14.11.1944, FO371 40999 UE2338/23/77 PRO. 
82) SD to Kennan in Moscow 23.11.1944, FRUS 1944 IV, pp. 262-263. 
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purposes.83 
This American reasoning caused annoyance in London: the 
Soviets were known to dislike giving information voluntarily, but 
Washington could ascertain matters by asking its representatives 
in Bucharest. The Foreign Office finally acted without American 
support. The British believed the Finnish interpretation of the 
talks held with Molotov while understanding that there was no 
wish for such a view to be made known in Moscow. It was 
understandable — so London conceded — that the Soviet Union 
should protect itself against an exceptional price level. But to 
apply the world market prices current at the time would have been 
an equitable solution, because these prices, raised by inflation, 
also worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union in the form of 
increased export revenues — deliveries to Britain, for instance, 
were based on them. The motive for Britain's attitude — as the 
Soviet government was informed — was her own interest in the 
matter, because the more Finnish and Rumanian exports took the 
form of reparation deliveries, the less hope Britain had of obtaining 
the commodities she wished. But it was not in the Soviet interest 
to prevent such debtor countries from paying for imports without 
which reparations deliveries would be broken off.84 
To the Soviet Union the British spoke of a difference of 
interpretation — there was not even a hint of revoking the 
concession granted. It was a basic argument in London that if the 
armistice signatories — including therefore Britain — had wished 
to fix the prices of reparation goods at some past value, they would 
presumably have mentioned this in the terms. It was not part of the 
armistice agreement to apply local prices or exchange rates or a 
price level which had prevailed earlier. To observe world market 
prices would not only have protected the Soviet Union from 
unduly high local prices, but would also have secured the 
advantage of increasing deliveries if the expected fall in world 
market prices occurred. 
The Finns did not learn of these British moves in Moscow. 
Instead, Finland's representatives tried in vain to convince the 
83) Harriman from Moscow to SD 10.1.1945, RG59 740.00119EW1-1045 
National Archives (=NA). 
84) FO to Moscow Embassy 17.11.1944, F0371 40999 UE2338/23/77 PRO. 
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Soviets of a solution based on world market prices or — for 
instance — an average of 1936-1938 prices. On 25th November 
Zdanov stated that the value of reparations deliveries could be 
raised from the 1938 price level by 15 % for capital goods and by 
10 % for consumer goods. Some forms of relief desired by the 
Finns were also granted in the composition of the reparations 
programme and in quantities of goods.85 A few days later Shepherd 
hinted to the Finns that, on the one hand, the 1938 price level was 
hard for the Finns but, on the other, the 1944 level was impossible 
for the Soviets to approve; it would thus be worth while to pursue 
a compromise on the basis of delivery times — a solution the 
British had proposed in Moscow.86 
Shepherd learned that Zdanov had asked Finland for an answer 
by the 29th, when Britain's proposal in Moscow would have had 
no importance. In Helsinki the British tried to induce the Soviet 
Union to change its view, but the positions of the Allies remained 
far apart. In the Soviet opinion pricing was a matter between 
Finland and the Soviet Union in which Britain had no reason to 
intervene. They stressed two facts to the British in Helsinki. First, 
by lowering her standard of living Finland had every chance of 
discharging her reparations. Having avoided wartime destruction, 
the United Stated enjoyed an economic advantage which was 
clearly impressive, and the Soviet Union, by consistently 
reparations from Germany and all her allies, could reap advantages 
to its security and economy alike. 
The second argument was also a principle of justice emerging 
from the war: it was for the attacker who had caused great material 
destruction and human suffering to make good his deeds. It was 
unjust that the Soviet Union should be in a worse position than the 
attacker at the end of the war. Without reparations Germany and 
her allies might rise from wartime destruction more quickly than 
the Soviet Union. With reference to Finland the Soviet Union 
stressed particularly the destruction and suffering caused in the 
Leningrad region.87 
Britain for her part had one aim only: to secure timber and pulp 
85) Hyvämäki 1977, p. 252. Paasikivi's Diary 19.11. and 25.11.1944. 
86) Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 27.11.1944, F0371 43170 N7913/30/56 PRO. 
87) See also Krosby 1978, p. 45. 
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from Finland. At issue was no concern over a correct interpretation 
of the armistice agreement, pursuit of a consistent policy or sheer 
friendship for Finland. Reparations should simply be as small as 
possible, so as to allow Britain to obtain many commodities 
without needing to export raw materials to Finland. 
Before the meeting of Soviet and Finnish representatives on 29th 
November Shepherd wrote to Zdanov88 expressing London's 
dissatisfaction with the 1938 pricing basis and declaring that the 
matter had been raised in Moscow. These British views had no 
effect, however. A few days earlier Zdanov had talked to Prime 
Minister Paasikivi and assured him that the Soviet Union would 
not retreat from its attitude. Stalin had himself decided, and 
Rumania had accepted the decision on 25th November. The Finns 
must understand that this was not a business deal but a political 
levy. The Soviet Union had brought the war to an end and given 
Finland an opportunity to withdraw from it without occupation of 
the country. If agreements was reached on the pricing of 
reparations many other matters would be resolved easily.89 
British Left Aside 
On 29th November the Finns announced their acceptance of the 
Soviet pricing proposal. On the same day the Soviet Union 
delivered a list of goods to be supplied by Finland as reparations. 
Final composition of the programme was so prolonged, however, 
that a basic agreement was not signed until 17th December 1944. 
Despite this Finnish decision the British continued to defend 
their own attitude. In Helsinki the Soviet representatives did their 
best to avoid meeting Shepherd, who nevertheless made contact 
with Minister Pavel Orlov, political adviser to the Control 
Commission, on the last day of November. The latter regretted the 
way Britain had put pressure on her ally. A few days later Orlov 
revealed to Shepherd that the Soviet Union intented to apply the 
1938 price level only until normal trade relations between the 
88) Draft of Shepherd's letter to Zdanov (English and Russian) 29.11.1944, 
F0511:109 PRO. 
89) Paasikivi's Diary 27.11.1944. 
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Soviet and Finland were restored, a period of one or two years in 
Orlov's estimation.90 
The thought of a temporary application of the 1938 price level 
emerged only in talks between Shepherd and Orlov. The Soviet 
Union did not officially confirm it later, nor did the British return 
to it. Despite this the talks show that the Soviets were at least 
considering a relaxation of their stand on the price question. The 
Finns had also proposed that the 1938 price level be applied until 
the figure of 300 million dollars was reached.91 It is especially 
notable in the opinion expressed by Orlov that application of the 
1938 price level was linked to the return of normal trade relations 
and not for instance to a specific period such as two years. This 
indicates that the Soviet Union attached considerable importance 
to the reopening of trade with Finland. 
While stressing the part to be played by metal industry products 
in reparations, the Soviet Union promised sufficient orders for 
these products on completion of the reparations programme. The 
Soviet also agreed to supply grain to Finland. Undoubtedly the 
arrangements announced by Orlov would not have been to the 
Soviet advantage. They would have shown that application of the 
1938 price level had no logical connection with the armistice 
agreement. 
Emphasis on the metal industry in the delivery programme 
suited Britain's designs well, but the pricing issue threatened 
British interests. For this reason London was not yet willing to give 
up the game, but expected the Kremlin to answer His Majesty's 
Government's letter. When there was no sign of an answer 
Embassy Counsellor John Balfour on 10th December sent a new 
letter to Molotov. This stated that the British government had not 
abandoned its attitude to the pricing question despite Rumania's 
and Finland's compliance with Soviet demands.92 The Foreign 
Office also expressed its wish that the Americans in Moscow be 
informed of the situation and their support obtained for the 
Rumanian solution. Bucharest and Helsinki were informed that 
discussions with the Soviet Union could not yet be considered 
90) Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 3.12.1944, F0371 41000 UE2485/23/77 PRO. 
91) Paasikivi's Diary 25.11.1944. 
92) Balfour from Moscow to FO 10.12.1944, F0371 45744 UE467/20/77 PRO. 
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decisive, but talks on pricing would continue.93 
The Soviet answer was given only when the basic agreement had 
been signed, and the British were thus faced with a fait accompli. 
The attacker's duty to make good the destruction he had caused 
was restated in the answer, as was the fact that a fixed price level 
gave Rumania and Finland a basis for returning to normal 
economic conditions. An attempt was made to lessen British fears 
by insisting that the agreement would have no adverse effect on the 
Finnish and Rumanian economies. After deliveries had been made 
there would still be goods remaining for export, as timber and 
paper composed only a third of reparations.94 
Britain's resentment was not reduced by the Soviet answer, 
however. Shepherd had been completely ignored in the course of 
events, and London had no intention of accepting defeat easily. 
There was some thought at first that another solution might be 
attempted with the United States' support.95 But in practice the 
game was played out, for the Americans had even less reason than 
before to bind themselves to the British proposal. There was no 
foundation for further action. The agreement which had been 
made would probably enable Finland's economy to be preserved 
and guarantee an export surplus for Britain. All that could be done 
was to bear in mind the promise made by Orlov to Shepherd that 
the 1938 price level would be applied only until normal trade 
relations were restored. With Hungary and Germany, on the other 
hand, the aim was to define the basis for the pricing of reparation 
goods in the agreement.96 
Armistice with Hungary 
Allied negotiations on the armistice terms to be offered to Hungary 
were of current importance from mid-October 1944 onward, when 
agreements with Rumania and Finland were signed. The Soviet 
93) FO to Moscow, Bucharest and Helsinki Embassies 9.12.1944, F0371 41000 
UE2518/23/77 PRO. 
94) Balfour from Moscow to FO 19.12.1944, F0371 41000 UE2734/23/77 PRO. 
95) Shepherd from Helsinki to FO 19.12.1944, F0371 41000 UE2733/23/77 and 
FO Minute (Haigh) 21.12.1944 F0371 41000 UE2734/23/77 PRO. 
96) FO Minute (Pink) 22.12.1944, FO371 41000 UE2734/23/77 PRO. 
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proposal was based on these agreements. In the 13th article the 
reparations sum was set at 400 million dollars (while for Rumania 
and Finland it was 300 million in six years) and the time allowed 
five years. 
British and United States views on the weakness of the debtor's 
payment capacity, the necessity of international free trade and the 
bad experiences after the First World War were emphasized out 
more strongly than before with reference to Hungary. This was due 
in the first place to Allied political interest in Hungary. In October 
1944 Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden were 
visiting Moscow, where they wished — against the wishes of 
Roosevelt — to agree with Stalin on spheres of influence in eastern 
Europe. Although no actual agreement was signed, areas of relative 
importance were discussed. Churchill suggested for the Soviet 
Union a position of 90 % dominance in Rumania, and for Britain 
and the Americans together a similar measure of authority in 
Greece. In Bulgaria the Soviet Union would have 75 %, while in 
Hungary and Yugoslavia influence would be divided equally 
among the great powers.97 
Economic advantages were linked with political interest. In 
Hungary as in Rumania the Americans and British possessed an oil 
industry whose ownership became a matter of dispute between the 
Allies. It was also to be expected that reparations would be an 
encumbrance to the oil companies concerned. However, the 
Americans did not think it expedient to tell the Soviets that their 
wish to limit reparations was based on their own economic 
interests, although these in fact played a central role in the State 
Department's attitude.98 
During the Moscow discussions on spheres of influence Eden 
had an opportunity to tell Molotov that the Americans and British 
regarded 400 million dollars as too large a sum for reparations. The 
same day Stalin told Eden that he consented to a reduction to 300 
million dollars, of which 100 million would be divided between 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.99 
97) Woodward 1962, pp. 310-312. 
98) SD to Harriman in Moscow 14.10.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 906-907; SD 
Memorandum (Luthringer) 21.10.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 917-918. 
Lundestad 1978, pp. 229-230. 
99) Kennan from Moscow to SD 20.10.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 915-916. 
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The State Department was not satisfied with this proposal. In its 
opinion an appendix making matters more precise should be 
added to the reparations article, or the United States would reserve 
the right to raise the question of reparations again at a later stage. 
The United States wished the following of reparations deliveries to 
be in the hands of all three powers and outside the exclusive 
supervision of the Soviet Union; for this purpose a special 
reparations department should be set up in the Allied Control 
Commission. Only those goods directly connected with 
reconstruction, should be definable as reparation goods, which the 
receiving power should not then be able to export to a third 
country. Reparation goods obtained from current production must 
be priced on the basis of world market prices at the time of 
manufacture. The reparations timetable should also be so arranged 
as to disturb normal trade relations as little as possible.10° 
An armistice with Hungary became possible at the end of 
December, when the Soviet Union presented a draft agreement.101 
Regarding reparations the Soviet had taken note of the adjustments 
agreed with Eden: the sum was fixed at 300 million dollars and the 
time for payment at six years; of the total sum 100 million dollars 
were to be divided between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. But 
the American proposal of a three-power reparations department 
and the British suggestion of a pricing system based on world 
market prices did not appear in the Soviet terms. 
Molotov announced at the end of December that the American 
and British terms could not be approved. Reparations for Hungary 
should be regulated by the same principles as for Rumania and 
Finland — no economic or political factors had appeared to justify 
abandonment of the terms applied in those cases. The only matter 
to be considered was whether Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
should be accepted as members of the Control Commission for the 
reception of reparations. Britain's representatives in Moscow felt 
that the Soviet Union might make one single concession under 
pressure: reduction of the reparations sum to, say, 240 million 
dollars.102 
100) SD to Kennan in Moscow 2.11.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 922-925. 
101) Harriman from Moscow to SD 27.12.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 940-942. 
102) Balfour from Moscow to FO 31.12.1944, F0371 48474 R83/82/21 PRO. 
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Americans Concede 
In Harriman's opinion the reparations sum was not unreasonable. 
From the United States standpoint it might even be useful to tie the 
Soviet Union to the sum in question, because growth of appetite 
might have caused the Soviet to raise its demands. At the heart of 
the Soviet answer, in Harriman's view, was the wish to give the 
Americans and British no chance to take part in supervision of 
reparations deliveries: this would lessen their opportunities to 
oversee the economic life of Hungary and to direct the 
reconstruction of Europe. Harriman did not believe that the Soviet 
Union would easily change its attitude: he even proposed that the 
continuance of Lend Lease aid be made to depend on this.103 
Washington was unwilling to resort to such far-reaching 
measures but the State Department remained committed to the 
idea of a three-power reparations department. If this were not 
erected the United States would reserve the right to raise the 
question of compensation again if American economic interests 
were endangered. Compensation must also be guaranteed for the 
destruction of the property of the United States and the other 
Allies.104 
At the Foreign Office it was admitted that the Soviet Union could 
not be induced to give up the 1938 level in pricing or to agree to the 
formation of a reparations department. As, however, the 
Americans and British considered the agreements with Rumania 
and Finland opposed to the armistice conditions in principle, the 
British felt that they could no longer agree to a similar wording. In 
the cases of Rumania and Finland it could still be argued that the 
British had agreed in good faith to the prosed Soviet agreement, 
supposing as a matter of course that world market prices would be 
taken as a basis. This was no longer possible, and the matter must 
be clearly noted in the armistice conditions or an appendix. His 
Majesty's Government still took the view that no specific sum 
should be mentioned in the armistice agreement. If a sum were 
103) Harriman from Moscow to SD 31.12.1944, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 951-953; for 
Lend Lease aid see Herring 1973. 
104) SD to Harriman in Moscow 3.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 954-955 and SD to 
Harriman in Moscow 6.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 963-965. 
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mentioned, however, it must not influence a reassessment of the 
sum if the burden of reparations proved too heavy.105 
The State Department agreed in principle with the British view 
and did not directly refuse its support, but advised Harriman to 
follow primarily his instructions from Washington.1o6 
The Soviet Union held steadily to its view that a department to 
deal with reparations was not needed in the Control Commission. 
The Commission contained an economic department which would 
receive all information connected with reparation payments. After 
this promise the Americans were prepared to approve the article 
for Hungarian reparations. At the signing ceremony, however, the 
United States submitted a written statement reserving the right to 
raise the reparations question if need be. Before the delivery of this 
statement Molotov tried to show that it was unnecessary, as 
reparations could always be discussed through diplomatic 
channels. A separate statement merely weakened the armistice 
agreement. Harriman said he had received instructions on the 
matter which he was bound to follow. The statement was 
addressed only to Britain and the Soviet Union; it need not come to 
the knowledge of the Hungarians even if the United States were to 
consider its publication unavoidable. The Americans thus sought a 
means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union to change its 
attitude. Molotov remarked custly that the Soviet government 
might find it necessary to repay the Americans in their own coin. 
The discussion ended with Harriman remarking that the Soviet 
had every right to do so.'°' 
A Consolation Victory for the British 
In Britain's view the Americans had again yielded too easily to the 
Soviet will, but this time London demanded that its own demands 
be taken into account. The Foreign Office gave its Ambassador in 
Moscow permission to inform Soviet representatives that Britain 
saw two alternatives in the prevailing situation. First, the armistice 
105) FO to Washington Embassy 5.1.1945, F0371 48474 R83/82/21 PRO. 
106) SD to Harriman in Moscow 9.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, p. 967. 
107) Harriman from Moscow to SD 9.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 968-969. 
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agreement might contain an appendix stating that the pricing of 
reparations goods would be based specifically on the 1938 price 
level + 10/15 %. Second, the armistice agreement would be drawn 
up according to the Soviet proposal, whereupon Britain would 
hand a separate note to the Soviet government. In it His Majesty's 
Government would declare its opinion that world market prices 
were fair in this connection: it would not change this opinion even 
if the Soviet Union made an agreement on some other basis. In all 
probability the matter would then be made public.108 
Molotov did not yield at once to British pressure. The Soviet 
wanted an agreement similar to the terms it had given to Rumania 
and Finland even if Molotov promised, on the strength of 
Harriman's proposal, to inform the Hungarians in advance of the 
pricing basis. This was a mere formality, however, as the 
Hungarians were of course aware of the situation. This being so, in 
Harriman's opinion little would be achieved by the British 
proposa1.109 
The British were annoyed by the Americans' unwillingness to 
perceive the principle underlying this matter. A change in the 
previous texts of the agreements and a specific mention of the 
pricing basis would show in factual terms that the procedure 
followed in the Rumanian and Finnish cases was not the right 
interpretation. The Soviets had misled the British over Rumania 
and Finland, and wished still to save their faces. Also the Soviet 
Union might lose its bargaining position in relation to the 
Rumanians and Finns if the altered text referring to Hungary 
should become public.110 
On the evening of 15th January Molotov informed Balfour and 
Harriman that the Kremlin had agreed, besides some other 
concessions, to the proposal of His Majesty's Government to 
mention the 1938 price level + 10/15 % in an appendix to article 
12 of the armistice agreement.111  The British had won a consolation 
victory. To be sure, a certain sum was mentioned and pricing was 
still based on the 1938 level, but the mention of a pricing basis 
108) FO to Moscow Embassy 11.1.1945, F0371 48474 R641/82/21 PRO. 
109) Harriman from Moscow to SD 10.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 969-970 and 
Harriman from Moscow to SD 14.1.1945, FRUS 1944 III, pp. 972-975. 
110) Balfour from Moscow to FO 14.1.1945, F0371 48474 R1069/72/21 PRO. 
111) Balfour from Moscow to FO 15.1.1945, FO371 48474 R1170/82/21 PRO. 
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added to the Hungarian agreement softened the defeats suffered by 
Britain in the regulation of the reparations question.112  Once 
Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States had reached 
agreement on all terms of the armistice agreement, the Hungarian 
delegation from 18th to 20th January 1945 had a chance to state 
their own point of view. They tried to have the time for payment 
extended from six to ten years, but the Allies did not consent.113 
The armistice agreement was signed on 20th January 1945. 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were authorized to negotiate 
directly with Hungary so that Czechoslovakia should receive 
deliveries to the value of 30 million dollars and Yugoslavia 70 
million. 
Yalta: a Soviet Proposal 
In the first year of reparations Rumania, Finland and Hungary 
began to deliver goods to the Soviet Union while German 
reparations again became the subject of Allied discussion. The 
Normandy landing of the Western Allies in June 1944 and the 
military action following it led the Allies into a situation where a 
decision had to be made out on the policy to be followed towards 
Germany. The position of Germany and thus the peace terms 
applicable to her — including reparations — differed from those of 
the above-mentioned countries. For instance, the Allies wished to 
ensure the dismantling and limitation of German war potential in 
future, so that definitive moves on reparations were in the 
foreground. But deliveries from current production — the chief 
basis for decisions already made — remained in the background 
because the construction of an industry for reparations might mean 
the growth of an industrial potential which would become 
dangerous. Thinking on these lines united the Allies. The views of 
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau were partly responsible for 
persuading the Americans.114 
112) FO Minute (Sargent) 17.1.1945, F0371 48474 R1350/82/21 PRO. 
113) Balfour from Moscow to FO 19.1.1945, F0371 48474 R1471/82/21 PRO. 
114) SD Memorandum (Harriman) 20.1.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 176-
178. Gaddis 1972, pp. 114-126. 
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V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs. 
The first combined Allied declaration on German reparations 
was made at the Yalta conference of 3-11.2.1945. At the second 
general session on 5th February the matter was raised by Stalin, 
who asked Maisky to introduce the Soviet proposal. This provided 
for a division of reparations into complete transfers of goods 
lasting two years and a delivery programme from current 
production lasting ten. Germany's heavy metal, electrical and 
chemical industries would be cut by 80 % and her armaments 
industry dismantled altogether. Germany was to be placed under 
strict three-power supervision, including a reparations 
commission to be set up at once in Moscow. Maisky also stated the 
principles on the division of reparations and demanded at least 10 
billion dollars for the Soviet Union.15  
All agreed that German reparations were such a complicated 
question that it could not be solved at a summit conference but 
should be left to the reparations commission to be set up in 
115) Second Plenary Meeting 5.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 611-633. 
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Moscow. 
Maisky's proposal showed that the Soviet Union still considered 
reparations a crucial question for Allied collaboration. The 
proposal centred on those principles which Varga had brought out 
in his article. Included was the mention of a reparations sum, 
which had led Britain and the Soviet Union into a dispute over the 
armistice agreements with Finland, Rumania and Hungary. This 
confrontation was repeated at Yalta in the discussion of German 
reparations. 
Churchill and Eden strongly opposed the Soviet proposal. If 
German industry were dismantled so ruhtlessly, poverty and even 
starvation would result. If this plan were carried out the 
Americans and British would have to provide for the Germans. For 
this reason a reparations sum should not be fixed and the time for 
payment should be shortened. 
Roosevelt did not accept the Soviet proposal unreservedly. He 
wished to ensure that the Allies did not expect the Americans to 
pay reparations on Germany's behalf as they had done after the 
First World War. Nor would they agree to reparations which drove 
the Germans to starvation, for which the Americans might be 
blamed. "Our objective is seeing that Germany will not starve in 
helping the Soviet get all it can in manpower and factories and 
helping the British get all they can in exports to former German 
markets ... Leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her 
from starving." 
The Finnish "Mouse-Trap" 
The Americans had expressed similar reservations before. At the 
end of November 1944 in Stockholm a representative of the British 
Ministry of Supply had asked what the American attitude would 
be to the possibility of dollar credits for Finland. Referring mainly 
to experiences after the First World War the Americans had then 
announced their unwillingness to play the part of helper: dollars 
would not be given merely to allow the British to obtain timber, 
whereupon Finland would be able to buy raw materials and the 
Soviet Union would receive its reparations. This would reserve for 
the United States only the dubious right of helping Finland: "What 
right have the Finns or any others to suppose that it is the policy of 
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the United States to give money to the Finnish mouse-trap."116  
In answer to the inquiries about credit the State Department sent 
instructions to Herschel Johnson, American Ambassador in 
Stockholm, to the effect that it would be extremely unwise to adopt 
a policy of aid for countries paying heavy reparations. The United 
States did not wish to pay reparations for others, as after the First 
World War, but reparations should be fixed according to the 
payment capacity of the debtor. If the United States were to give 
economic aid, they would adopt a different method.117 
Yalta: the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. reconciled 
At Yalta Maisky insisted that the Soviet programme was not un-
reasonable. 10 billion dollars represented only 10 % of the U.S. 
budget for 1945 or six months of war costs for Britain. 
The reparations plan expressed orally by Maisky was distributed 
in writing at a foreign ministers' conference on 7th February.118 By 
its provisions the Soviet would receive 10 billion dollars' worth of 
reparations, Britain and the United States eight billion together 
and other countries two billion in all. These countries "have borne 
the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the 
enemy." 
At a later stage of discussion Maisky presented Soviet 
calculations in more detail. A total of 20 billion dollars had been 
arrived at because when the war began German national assets 
were estimated at 125 billion dollars and when it ended at 75 
billion. For industrialized countries transferable assets averaged 
30 % of national assets or in Germany's case 22-23 billion. The 
Soviet proposed that 10 billion of this be transferred and that an 
equal sum from current production also be transferred over a 
period of 10 years. With the assets which remained the German 
living standard would be adequate if lower than, for instance, that 
116) Caplan from Helsinki to Supp 5.12.1944 FO copy, FO371 43200 N7977/5676/ 
56 PRO. 
117) SD to Johnson in Stockholm 19.12.1944, FRUS 1945 IV, pp. 633-635. 
118) Soviet Proposal on Reparations from Germany and Soviet Proposal on the 
Establishment of an Allied Reparation Commission (s.d.), FRUS Malta and 
Yalta, pp. 707-708. 
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in the Soviet Union. The reparations from current production 
would reduce the German national income by an estimated 5-
6 %, which again was a reasonable demand. 
The Soviet calculated reparations for Germany on a quite 
different basis from that applied to Rumania, Finland and 
Hungary. The principle of showing the total destruction caused by 
these countries and demanding a certain proportion of it as 
reparations did not serve in the case of Germany. In various 
connections the Soviet stressed the extent of the destruction 
caused by Germany — it was literally impossible to estimate — 
and the proportion of it which could be made good by reparations 
would be conspicuously small compared with the liability of 
Rumania, Finland and Hungary. 
If the Soviet Union with the other Allies aimed at supervising 
and limiting German economic growth it was expedient to base 
calculations on the figures of German industrial life. That would 
lead in a direction which the Americans could accept: discussion 
of how much the debtor was able to pay. 
Time was reserved for study of the Soviet proposal, and the 
foreign ministers began dealing with it on 9th February. In a 
counterproposal by the U.S. Stettinius suggested various changes 
of phrasing. In substance the important change was that in the 
American proposal the amount of the reparations would be the 
first object of study for the Moscow Reparations Commission, 
which should in this connection take note of the Soviet suggestion 
of 20 billion dollars. 
Maisky demanded this sum "as a basis" for the work of the 
commission. After a moment's discussion Stettinius agreed that 
the commission should consider as a starting-point for discussion 
the sum of 20 billion dollars mentioned by the Soviet Union, 
which would receive 50 % itself. Once more the Soviet Union and 
the United States had easily reached an understanding and the 
British remained alone in opposition. 
With the Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian examples in mind 
Stettinius questioned Molotov on the pricing of reparations goods. 
Molotov confirmed that 1938 prices + 10/15 % would be followed 
as in the above-mentioned cases.79 
119) Matthews to Stettinius 9.2.1945. FRUS Malta and Yalta, p. 816. 
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During the conference Maisky and Molotov tried in vain to 
persuade Britain to back the Soviet proposal. At a conference of 
foreign ministers on 10th February Eden submitted a British 
proposal in which a reparations sum was not mentioned at all. 
Suggested instead was the use of German manpower as a third 
form of reparations in addition to complete deliveries and current 
production. The British proposal showed that London did not 
oppose reparations on principle as long as they did not lead to an 
intolerable situation for the occupying power.12° 
Maisky found Eden's answer very "disappointing". Without a 
specific figure of reparations the commission would have no basis 
or guideline for its work. Britain's attitude, thought Maisky, was 
inspired by the thought of taking as little as possible from 
Germany, and this suspicion was certainly increased by Eden's 
wish to shorten the period of current deliveries to five years. 
Stettinius in turn remarked that this period was only taken as a 
basis for discussion, nor was the Soviet Union bound to its 
demand of 20 billion.121 
At a general session on 10th February Stalin tried once more to 
obtain the agreement of his allies. In the agreements with Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary a reparations sum had been mentioned, and 
no special problems had arisen in these countries as a result — as 
the British had feared, the settlements reached then had become 
precedents. Stalin insisted that the Germans could pay what the 
Soviet Union asked and still live as well as their eastern 
neighbours. Maisky had given extensive statistical data which 
supported Stalin's estimate. Stalin suspected that the British still 
wished to leave Germany strong: if Britain did not wish the Soviet 
Union to receive reparations it would be best for her to say so 
directly. He went on to suggest that the conference should follow 
the American-Soviet proposal and allow the Moscow commission 
to take a reparations demand of 20 billion dollars as a starting-
point for its work. A little later Stalin said — thus showing his 
willingness to negotiate — that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
120) British Proposal on Reparations 10.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, p. 885. 
Clemens 1970, pp. 167-168. 
121) Meeting of the Foreign Ministers 10.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 871-
877. 
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Sir Anthony Eden, Britain's 
Foreign Secretary, who opposed 
the American-Soviet proposal on 
German reparations. 
take the sum in question as a basis for discussion. The Moscow 
commission could either raise or lower it: "we shall bring our 
figures to the commission and you will bring yours."122 
Stalin named this draft submitted by the Soviet Union an 
American-Soviet proposal. This hit the mark in that Stettinius 
quickly approved it. Later, to be sure, Roosevelt also associated 
himself with the British when the latter strongly criticised the 
Soviet suggestion, which some subsequent American studies have 
willingly taken as a sign that the United States had its reservations. 
But the actual settlement was reached at this stage by the foreign 
ministers, and other grounds can be found for Roosevelt's 
statement. A declaration of reserve concerning reparations was 
needed above all when he returned to the United States. In the 
second place the British could not be left quite alone: Roosevelt 
wished to be the mediator in this dispute between Britain and the 
Soviet Union. 
According to the communiqué of the Yalta conference123 
Germany was obliged to pay reparations "in kind to the greatest 
extent possible." It was also stated that a commission had been set 
up in Moscow to consider how damage caused by the Germans 
122) Seventh Plenary Meeting 10.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 897-911. 
123) Communiqué issued at End of Conference 12.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, 
pp. 968-975. 
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should be made good. 
In a secret protocoll24 it was stated that the three great powers 
agreed that Germany must pay primarily those countries "which 
have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest 
losses and have organised victory over the enemy." Reparations 
were to be obtained within two years of the German surrender in 
the form of transfers of capital goods, deliveries from current 
production and use of German manpower. To put these principles 
into practice a Reparations Commission was set up in Moscow 
with representatives of all three countries. 
The protocol continued by saying that the Soviet Union and the 
United States had agreed that the commission would take as a 
basis for discussion the Soviet government's proposal that the 
value of all-inclusive goods transfers and deliveries from current 
production should be 20 billion dollars, of which half should go to 
the Soviet Union. The British delegation was of the opinion that no 
sum should be mentioned. 
At the Yalta conference agreement was reached on the principles 
of the occupation and supervision of Germany; these included 
unconditional surrender, division of Germany into zones of 
occupation, an invitation of France to join the control commission 
and to take charge of one zone, and the uprooting of Nazism from 
Germany. The principles of reparation were approved almost 
entirely in the form suggested by the Soviet Union. It was easy for 
all parties to accept the principle that reparations should take the 
form of goods deliveries to be divided in proportion to the burden 
borne and the destruction suffered. 
Only in the matter of the reparations sum did Stalin fail to get all 
he wanted. To the last he tried to induce the British to agree to 
mention the sum: Stalin said he was afraid to tell the Soviet people 
on his return that they would receive no reparations because of 
British resistance. Churchill assured him of his wish that the 
Soviet would receive large reparations. All were agreed on a public 
announcement that Germany would be obliged to pay reparations 
"to the greatest extent possible." In the protocol of the conference, 
however, the British did not bind themselves to the "American- 
124) Protocol on German Reparation 11.2.1945, FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 982-
983. 
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Soviet" mention of a 20 billion sum for reparations, but required 
the Moscow Commission to fix the sum. 
Yalta: Agreement Within Reach 
As earlier in the armistice agreements for Rumania, Finland and 
Hungary, Stalin at Yalta had succeeded in binding the United 
States to his reparations proposal. Mention of the sum — whose 
final amount could still have been discussed in Moscow — would 
have meant that the same concept was applied as for Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary. Without attaching any precise reasons to 
their demand the Soviets at Yalta presented a maximum 
programme which Germany in their opinion could carry out. The 
debtor would be assigned a reparations liability — which could be 
reduced after bargaining — up to a certain dollar sum, and the 
debtor himself would be responsible for its collection. Results 
were incomplete at Yalta because of British resistance: "Had 
circumstances been slightly different, the United States would 
have acceded to the Soviet request for ten billion dollars in 
reparations. "125 
Foreign Office dissatisfaction was directed in particular at 
Stettinius, who had been quite incapable of opposing Soviet 
suggestions in negotiations between the foreign ministers. It was 
surmised in London that the United States wanted no reparations 
for itself, and therefore wished to involve itself as little as possible 
in the regulation of the matter.126 
Britain's opposition to the Soviet suggestion was primarily 
because the occupation zone proposed for the British was a heavily 
industrialized area. Removals of plant and machinery were to be 
expected mainly from this area, but no practical solution to the 
food supply problem was in sight. Germany and the duties of her 
occupiers had to be examined as one whole — a fact that the 
Americans were fond of stressing later. 
The Americans for their part were willing to make a concession 
to the Soviet Union in one matter so as to gain advantages 
125) Clemens 1970, pp. 168-170. 
126) FO Minute (Coulson) 20.2.1945, F0371 45775 UE749/624/77 PRO. 
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elsewhere. From the United States viewpoint the Soviet proposal 
was not unreasonable but provided an easy occasion for letting the 
Soviet Union have its way. More troublesome was the British 
attitude, but while the war continued and anti-German feelings 
prevailed it was expedient for Roosevelt to incline toward a more 
severe reparations programme. 
It should be stressed, however, that Soviet and British views at 
this stage were not very far from each other. In all other respects 
than the mention of a reparations sum the Foreign Office found the 
Soviet proposal well suited to British interests. Reparations from 
current production were a starting principle approved by 
Britain.127 
In the Soviet proposal all-inclusive transfers — not included at 
all for Rumania, Finland and Hungary — were placed before 
current production as a share of German reparations. An addition 
was the use of German manpower, which was linked later to the 
decision over prisoners of war. Stalin and Molotov explained that 
the Soviet intended to use two or three million Germans for 
reconstruction in the Soviet Union over a period of 10 years. They 
would be chosen initially from among those guilty of minor war 
crimes, and secondarily from among the unemployed. 
127) ibid. 
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Reparations and the 
Occupation of Germany 
Americans as Occupiers 
Returning from the speeches of Yalta to everyday tasks Roosevelt 
experienced a disappointment: Stalin did not respond to his 
attitude with the concessions the President had hoped for. One 
source of disappointment was the formation of the Groza govern-
ment in Rumania which Roosevelt considered an infringement of 
the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed in Yalta. Dissension 
arose too over the ownership of the Rumanian oil industry and its 
role in reparations. Still more difficult was the political status of 
Poland: the London government in exile was regarded in Moscow 
as anti-Soviet, while the Lublin government was regarded in the 
West as a Soviet puppet. 
In private talks during the last weeks of his life Roosevelt 
intimated that he was planning a "tougher" attitude to the Soviet 
Union. The granting of reconstruction credits was left to depend 
on whether the Soviet attitude changed, and the invention of an 
atomic weapon remained an American secret for the moment. 
At the beginning of April after Roosevelt's death Harry S. 
Truman became President of the United States. As Vice-President 
he had been little concerned with questions of foreign policy. 
Truman wished to continue Roosevelt's line in essentials, aiming 
at an appearance of firmness in the hope of thus persuading the 
other party to collaborate and compromise. In the matter of 
reparations efforts were now made to achieve a settlement in 
which the Soviet Union with the other Allies would accept 
responsibility not only for supervision of the reparations 
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programme but also for its effect on economic life.128 
When spring came in 1945 Roosevelt had striven above all to 
ensure that he could not be accused at home of forcing American 
taxpayers to pay the debts of foreign states — including in this case 
a brutal enemy. The aim was to make the occupation as short as 
possible and thus to minimise its cost to the Americans. For this 
reason every effort should be made to ensure that Germany became 
self-sufficient, so that American credits and food deliveries were 
not needed to balance a trade deficit. This was the basis of the 
American demand that export revenues should be used primarily 
for the payment of essential imports, the so-called first charge 
principle. And because foodstuffs were more abundant in the 
Soviet occupation zone than in the Western zones, the American 
view was that they should be imported to the West, while other 
goods should be exported from the West in payment for these 
foodstuffs. For the achievement of balanced trade the whole of 
Germany should be treated as an economic unit. 
The view of German reparations held by the Americans fitted 
into their total view of the German economy. Edwin W. Pauley, 
who led the United States delegation at the Moscow Reparations 
Commission, presented an equation which well illustrated the 
American attitude to this question. It was R = P-(O+C+I), in which 
the amount of reparations from current production (R) was equal to 
production (P) less the sum of occupation costs (0), essential 
German consumption (C) and import (I).129 The Americans empha-
sized that before reparations could be paid the German economy 
must produce an actual surplus. In practice this meant that 
reparations from current production could not have started for 
some time after the war ended. But the examples of Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary had shown the Soviet Union that despite 
post-war economic problems it was possible to carry out the 
reparation programmes as soon as the war ended, when the needs 
of creditors were at their greatest. 
The so-called JSC 1067 instructions on the United States' 
German policy was aimed at the dismantling of Germany's 
128) Gaddis 1972, pp. 120-124, 215-217. Paterson 1975, p. 239. 
129) Pauley to Maisky 13.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam I, pp. 547-548. Paterson 1975, p. 
251. 
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industrial potential and also at the establishment of a self-
sufficient German economy. Moreover, the United States began to 
use its economic might to persuade the Soviet in favour of 
American plans for the creation of a post-war Europe. More openly 
than before the Americans used Lend Lease aid and possible 
credits for reconstruction as a means of political pressure. 
In London, on the basis of the settlements with Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary, it was reckoned that the Soviet Union, 
strongly aware of the destruction it had suffered, had decided to 
obtain as many goods as possible from the enemy in order to raise 
its own living standard. The Soviet government wished to act in 
such a way, however, that its allies should intervene as little as 
possible in the handling of the Soviet share of reparations. The 
solution to the pricing question indicated that the Soviet Union 
wished to exclude all factors having a later effect on the volume of 
reparations. Britain's opinion was that the Soviet government had 
paid no attention at all to the payment capacity of the debtor: 
Soviet policy was to take as much as possible for as long as 
possible.13° 
The progress of military action brought the occupation of 
Germany nearer day by day, but by the time Germany surrendered 
at the beginning of May the Reparations Commission established 
by the Yalta agreement had not yet started work in Moscow. The 
Soviet Union had been asked for the calculations underlying its 
reparation claim, but none had been produced. The British, for 
their part, were in no hurry to name their Moscow delegation. The 
United States and Soviet delegations were named in mid-March. 
Roosevelt had appointed Isador Lubin as leader of the United 
States delegation with Edwin W. Pauley as deputy, but Truman 
put Pauley, who was considerd a harder negotiator in the leading 
position. Also included was an expert on the human relations side 
of reparations, which indicates that the Americans saw reparations 
not only as an economic question but also — and largely — as one 
of relations between occupiers and defeated. 
Ivan Maisky was made leader of the Soviet delegation, and Sir 
Walter Monckton was finally appointed British representative. 
130) Reparation Obligations of Satellite Countries FO Minute (Conrad) 14.4.1945, 
FO371 45776 UE1716/624/77 PRO. 
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The instructions received by Pauley131 took as the objective of the 
reparation plan — in accordance with the basic aim of American 
policy — the dismantling of German industrial potential. This was 
by no means in conflict with the need to develop trade and 
economic life in general — for Germany too — on a healthy basis. 
Thus neither the reparations settlement nor a rearmed aggressive 
Germany could endanger the primary objective — the creation of 
an "open door" policy. Also, the reparations plan must not 
necessitate construction of a reparations industry — which might 
leave Germany in a more favourable position than neighbouring 
states when reparations were completed, so that these states 
became dependent on Germany. For this reason reparations should 
be in the form of all-inclusive goods transfers as far as possible, but 
for political reasons it might be unavoidable to agree also to the 
principle of current production deliveries. Although reparations 
might lower the living standard of the Germans, they must not 
endanger their minimum livelihood. 
In his memoirs Truman gives a picture of events which indicates 
already at this stage the American belief that little in the way of 
reparations could be obtained from Germany if it was intended to 
keep the country's economy active. Pauley's instructions contain 
no suggestion of the amount of the reparations, but undoubtedly 
the transfers of goods to be performed in the process of dismantling 
the war potential were expected to be considerable. The instruc-
tions presupposed no change in the principles of the Yalta agree-
ment, but reparations were still seen as an important means of 
regulating Germany's post-war status. No American sources give 
the impression that Washington wished to limit reparations from 
Germany because of any substantial economic aid the Soviet might 
have gained from them. 
At this juncture, according to Truman, the Americans were 
planning a method of collecting reparations based on the zones of 
occupation, although it emerged as an American solution only 
later — as eventyally became clear. In the instructions to Pauley 
the zones are mentioned in only one connection: the reparations 
plan to be drawn up must result in an equal standard of living for 
131) Instruction for the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on 
Reparations 18.5.1945, FRUS 1945 III, pp. 1222-1227. 
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each zone. It was of course desirable to avoid the spread of envy 
among the Germans because conditions were better under one 
occupying power than under another. This purpose was served 
also by the first charge principle: post-war food supplies must be 
assured on an equal basis for the whole of Germany area. 
Monckton's instructions, in which Britain's policy was defined, 
demanded the satisfaction of minimum demands from the 
occupation forces and the Germans before payment of reparations. 
The task of the Control Commission was to determine which goods 
were indispensable for the livelihood of each occupation zone. 
German production was to be used primarily for payment of 
imports from abroad, and there were no grounds as yet for fixing 
the final sum of reparations. In accordance with their previous line 
the British wished the sum to be fixed at the peace conference, not 
before.132 
Summer 1945: a Change in United States 
Policy 
When the war in Europe ended early in May the Allies acquired a 
new common concern. It was no longer a question of defeating the 
enemy: the occupying powers now had to consider the fate of 
Germany in peacetime. At the same time, however, the great 
powers seemed to be drifting more deeply into dispute. The San 
Francisco conference, intended to serve as an opening for the 
United Nations, threatened to become a forum for quarrelling 
rather than collaboration. When Germany surrendered the United 
States broke off Lend Lease deliveries to all countries except for 
materials needed in the war against Japan. Though this decision 
affected other countries besides the Soviet Union and Truman 
rescinded it later, the incident was bound to affect relations 
between the countries. 
As the Moscow Reparations Commission at last began its 
negotiations the altered situation clearly influenced the attitudes 
132) Reparations Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer C.P. (45)16 
5.6.1945, FO371 45779 UE240/624/77 PRO. Cairncross 1986. pp. 80-86. 
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of those who took part. The United States began to dissociate itself 
from the Soviet idea of reparations. In concert with the British the 
Americans increased their efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to a 
united settlement which would also take note of Allied interests as 
occupying powers. 
At the beginning of May, to be sure, George F. Kennan had 
advised from the American embassy in Moscow that it was no use 
expecting the Soviet Union to start serious negotiations. The 
Soviet government would make political rather than economic 
demands, and any attempt by the Western Allies to discuss 
economic matters would lead to mere "horse-trading",133 
The difficulties encountered by the occupying powers very soon 
taught the American authorities that goods deliveries were not, 
after all, an expedient form of reparation. But many Americans still 
saw Germany as a brutal enemy whose duty it was to make good at 
least part of the destruction caused. More and more frequently the 
American authorities prepared public opinion to understand that 
Germany would be incapable of paying substantial reparations. 
One such statement was by Pauley, published in the New York 
Times on 6th June. 
One of Pauley's readers was General Lucius D. Clay, commander 
of the American occupation zone, who believed that considerable 
reparations could be obtained from Germany. He agreed with 
Pauley that German industrial production could not be set in 
motion for several years despite the fact that not more than 25-30 
% of the country's industry had been destroyed. But Clay came to a 
different conclusion from Pauley: because the undestroyed 
industry was standing idle in any case and was thus outside the 
minumum needs of Germany, it could very well be removed as 
part of reparations.134 
In accordance with the Yalta decision Maisky in Moscow 
demanded that a German reparation sum of 20 billion dollars be 
taken as a basis for discussion. But U.S. policy had changed: on 
19th June Pauley declared — without officially renouncing the 
Yalta decision — that there could be no discussion of a specific 
133) Kennan from Moscow to SD 3.5.1945, FRUS 1945 III, pp. 1203-1205. 
134) Clay to McCloy 29.6.1945, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 35-45. 
Paterson 1975, pp. 251-252. 
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sum of dollars before a preliminary estimate of Germany's 
payment capacity had been made. Also, before a total sum was 
fixed the demands of all countries entitled to reparations must be 
considered. Pauley and Monckton awaited the calculations on 
which the Soviet demand had been based. 
The Soviet Union gave no statistics — data covering the whole 
country were hardly available at this stage, and statistics would 
hardly have resolved the disputes between the Allies. The work of 
the Reparations Commission was marking time because the 
Americans — to the satisfaction of the British — rejected the aim of 
finding a specific sum and thenceforth stressed the share of 
reparations to be received by each allied country. In the cases of 
Rumania, Finland and Hungary the Soviet Union had expressed a 
demand in dollars and subsequently supervised payment without 
Allied collaboration. The Americans and British did not want this 
situation to be repeated in Germany. If relative shares were fixed 
for the three great powers the Soviet would be forced to co-operate 
with the Americans and British in estimating the total sum of 
reparations and dividing it among the creditors. This had the 
advantage, in Pauley's view, of keeping the three great powers 
more closely together. This in turn would save the smaller allies 
from suspecting that their interests would be endangered. 
From the division of reparations between the Allies it was a short 
step to the principle that each occupying power should receive 
reparations mainly from its own zone. The Americans certainly 
had in mind thus to place the Soviet in a situation where it must 
carefully consider whether large reparations could be demanded 
without the deliveries having a disastrous effect on the position of 
the occupying power. Zone-based reception meant little as a 
principle, as the Allies failed to make a joint decision and each 
occupying power had to be content in any case with reparations 
drawn from its own zone. This was in fact against the principle 
approved by the Americans, that Germany should be treated as an 
economic whole. It is true that Pauley tried to insist that there was 
no contradiction in this: reparations could be collected by zones 
and Germany still treated as one economic whole. 
Pauley would personally have been prepared to change the U.S. 
reparations policy. He proposed that the Americans make their 
own demands — the only problem was, what goods could the 
Americans transport over the sea. Machinery and manpower were 
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not suitable in this connection, but suitable reparations for the 
Americans might consist, for instance, of gold, property abroad, 
patents and technical knowhow.135 
Washington did not believe that Pauley's plan was practicable, 
however. Pauley tried to insist that gold, for instance, would pay 
the expenses of occupation. The State Department did not change 
its view that it was not worth while for the Americans to procure 
large reparations — whether for a small economic benefit or for 
propaganda reasons. The main point was that all countries who 
had been under German occupation should receive a just share.136 
Pauley took advantage of a situation in which the Soviet Union 
either could not or would not present calculations of Germany's 
capacity to supply. If Germany were assigned reparations up to a 
certain sum of dollars without careful estimation of the country's 
industrial capacity, the demand in Pauley's opinion might fall 
short of what in fact was perfectly feasible. And the other extreme 
was also possible: the demand might become too large even if the 
German living standard were limited severely. 
Preparing for Potsdam 
The conference of the three great powers was approaching, but no 
conclusions had been reached in Moscow regarding the 
preparation for it. Pauley noted the questions which he thought 
should be answered before the Potsdam conference. 
1. How were the three great powers to share among themselves the 
reparations considered to be available for this purpose? 
2. How were the shares of the other creditor countries to be 
determined? 
3. How were "reparations", "restitution" and "booty" to be 
defined? 
4. Agreement to be reached on an immediate programme of 
provisional reparations for all creditor countries. 
5. Principles for the management of reparations to be agreed upon. 
On two of the above points an agreement was made on 12th July 
135) Pauley to SD 19.6.1945, FRUS Potsdam I, pp. 510-511. 
136) SD to Pauley 2.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam I, pp. 519-521. 
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allotting 56 % to the Soviet Union and 22 % each to the United 
States and Britain.137 
Negotiations centred on the question of whether to include 
France with the three great powers. Washington and London 
wanted to include her, but Moscow thought it unnecessary. France 
was eventually exluded — the four powers would occupy 
Germany, but only three would decide on reparations. 
The idea expressed at Yalta, that the Soviet Union should receive 
half the reparations, met no resistance. More discussion arose over 
the shares to be given to other creditor countries. The United States 
was even prepared to suggest that the Americans and British 
should both be satisfied with 10 %, leaving 30 % for France and 
the other allies. 
Understanding was reached on reparations to be paid to other 
allies on the basis of a Soviet suggestion. Under its terms allies of 
Germany during the war must submit their claims within a month 
to the Reparations Commission, which would then decide on the 
share for each creditor. These shares would be provided from the 
quotas of the three great powers. Half the reparations total was 
secured to the Soviet Union by fixing its share at 56 %, of which a 
part could be paid to some other country. 
On the definition of the terms "reparations", "restitution" and 
"booty" agreement was not reached before the summit conference 
of the three great powers. For restitution the British on 7th July 
submitted a draft definition which the Americans approved. The 
Soviet Union on 13th July made its own proposal in which 
restitution was understood in a far wider sense than in the 
American and British draft. 
On 5th July the Soviet Union promised to submit a draft 
definition of "booty" by the 11th, but when it did not arrive by that 
day the Americans submitted a draft of their own. The matter was 
not discussed, however, nor was the definition of "reparations". 
The drawing up of a provisional reparations programme also 
remained unfinished. The Americans presented a draft, but there 
was time for only a brief discussion of it. 
In Pauley's operational programme the last point concerned 
agreement on the principles for reparation management. Following 
137) Clark Kerr from Moscow to FO 12.7.1945, F0371 45783 UE2962/624/77 PRO. 
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the instructions he had received Pauley on 22nd June made a 
proposal on this matter. At the beginning of July he informed 
Washington that after prolonged negotiations the delegations of 
the three powers had decided to recommend eight principles to 
their governments. 
Recommendations 
1. Removals of property for reparations shall be primarily such as 
to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany 
by eliminating that part of Germany's industrial capacity which 
constitutes war potential. 
2. Reparations shall be such as will speed recovery and 
reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands. 
3. For the purposes of making a reparations plan Germany shall 
be treated as a single economic unit. 
4. Any plan of reparations shall be avoided which necessitates 
external financial assistance either to enable reparations deliveries 
to be made or to facilitate economic reconstruction required for 
reparations purposes or which might in the opinion of the govern-
ments concerned prejudice the successful execution of the task 
entrusted to the armies of occupation. 
5. To a minimum extent reparations shall be taken from existing 
national wealth of Germany. While for convenience claims may be 
stated in money, it is necessary to bear in mind that in contrast to 
reparations after World War I which were assessed and exacted in 
money, this time reparations will be assessed and exacted in kind 
in the form of things such as plant, machines, equipment, stocks, 
foreign investments etc. 
6. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and 
disturbing the long-term stability of the economies of the United 
Nations, long-run payment of reparations in the form of manufac-
tured products shall be restricted to a minimum. 
7. In justice to those countries occupied by the enemy, 
reparations shall be calculated upon the basis that the average 
living standards in Germany during the reparations period shall 
not exceed the average of the standards of living of European 
countries. (European countries mean all European countries 
excluding UK and USSR). 
79 
8. After payment of reparations enough resources must be left to 
enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. 
In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary 
means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the 
governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made from 
current production or from stocks of goods.138 
Of the above recommendations the Soviet Union approved all 
except the last, which obliged Germany to pay for her imports 
before deliveries from current production of from stocks could be 
made. This absolute preferential treatment for imports meant in 
practice that payment of reparations would have been deferred to 
an unknown future date. The examples of Rumania, Finland and 
Hungary showed that it was not necessary to wait for the growth of 
an export surplus. From the Soviet viewpoint the attitude of the 
Western Allies seemed adverse to the reparations claim as a whole. 
While the war was still in progress the Americans and British had 
made some promise of compensation to the Soviet Union, but now 
this was in effect cancelled. 
Separate attention must be given to the matter of what the Soviet 
Union was prepared to approve if all the recommendations had 
been fulfilled. Germany would have been treated as a single 
economic unit. What this would have meant in practice was not 
stated in the recommendations. 
The Soviet Union was also willing for the main part of 
reparations to be in transfers of capital goods. In the proceedings of 
the Potsdam conference reparations from current production are 
not mentioned at all, and the recommendations did not reject such 
reparations in principle, though the amount involved was to be 
limited in practice. At the Moscow negotiations the Soviet was 
prepared to reduce its claim substantially from 20 billion dollars as 
a basis of discussion. But the Americans and British still required a 
plan with reasons given, which was awaited in vain in Moscow.139 
Soon after reaching its occupation zone the Soviet had started to 
move heavy industry, railways and other equipment as "booty". 
This had been done despite the fact that the Americans had bluntly 
prohibited such moves in the name of a "combined reparations 
138) Pauley to SD 6.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam I, pp. 527-528. 
139) T (Playfair) to FO (Dent) 17.7.1945, F0371 45783 UE3048/624/77 PRO. 
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policy".10 The question of Germany's eastern frontier was also 
linked with reparations: if the Soviet Union wished to move the 
frontier further west in favour of Poland, the reduction of the area 
must be taken into account as weakening Germany's payment 
capacity. 
Potsdam 
At the first plenary meeting of the Potsdam conference Truman 
submitted a memorandum regarding Germany: this mentioned the 
seven reparations principles approved by the Allies in Moscow, 
and the eighth point as a proposa1.141  The conference decided to 
leave preparation of the economic principles to be applied to 
Germany — including reparations — in the hands of the foreign 
ministers. The latter in their turn set up a sub-committee mainly 
composed of members of the Moscow Reparations Commission. 
The United States' delegation was, however, led by Assistant 
Secretary of State Clayton. 
Before a decision on reparations the conference discussed a 
definition on "booty". On 21st July the Soviet submitted a draft 
whose second article described booty as "all supplies and 
equipment used by the enemy to satisfy his military needs and 
captured by the Allies before the end of the war on territories 
where military operations were conducted. "142  In American and 
British opinion the Soviet definition was so broad that almost all 
goods found on German territory could be interpreted as booty. 
This was so far from the more limited view taken by the Americans 
and British that no compromise seemed probable. The Soviet 
Union wished to make sure of the goods to be obtained from 
Germany in case the reparations agreement came to nothing. 
The Soviet definition supported their own policy in the 
occupation zone. The Americans and British observed more and 
more instances of light and heavy industrial equipment being 
moved by the Soviet authorities. If this continued the eastern zone 
140) SD Memorandum (Bohlen) 7.5.1945, FRUS 1945 III, pp. 1209-1210. 
141) First Plenary Meeting 17.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 52-53, 775-778, 
832-835. 
142) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 21.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 846-847. 
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would be left with no means of paying reparations or maintaining 
the German economy. The Soviet Union would receive a certain 
quantity of goods while the western zones would receive no 
foodstuffs from the east.'43  
The Moscow Commission had found no compromise between 
the Soviet and American-British views on German reparations. 
Following the open door policy the Americans wished to minimise 
reparations, but the Soviet Union could not approve any reduction 
of its claim to a fraction of the original. If the United States had 
started to negotiate on a reparations sum, the change in its policy 
since the Yalta conference would have been made public. The 
United States had to find a solution which would put aside Soviet 
claims without breaking the Yalta agreement. 
The British and, in particular, the Americans wanted a 
reparations agreement with the Soviet government. Besides the 
Soviet Union many other allies had experienced the harsh 
occupation policy of Germany, and there would have been a good 
deal of sympathy for the Soviet in Europe and the United States if a 
disagreement between the great powers had come to light. For 
instance, the Soviet interpretation of booty was moderate 
compared with German practice during the war, and many 
European states would have supported the Soviet view. American 
political leaders believed that there was no point in competing 
over a suitable sum for reparations or a definition of booty. On the 
other hand it was in the American interest to reach something like 
an adequate agreement on reparations to prevent the accusation 
that they had forgotten the punishment of Germany. It was 
preferable for failure, if unavoidable, to occur in the practical 
application of agreed principles. 
At the time of the Potsdam conference the Soviet Union in its 
occupation zone had adopted a policy of moving goods eastward 
without agreement between the Allies. The Western Allies could 
minimise the amount of reparations only by aiming at an 
agreement for each occupying power to collect reparations mainly 
from its own zone. Because each zone contained about as large a 
proportion of Germany's national assets as it had been planned to 
apportion to each power, division on a zonal basis was given 
143) See e.g. Pauley to Truman 25.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 873-876. 
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growing American support. 
The United States' proposal for distribution of reparations by 
zones was discussed unofficially by foreign ministers Byrnes and 
Molotov on 23rd July. Byrnes was surprised that the Soviet Union 
was able to link a reparations settlement with such factors as 
reduction of German territory by moving the eastern frontier and a 
broad definition of booty. Molotov admitted that Maisky earlier 
had not made the Soviet attitude to booty quite clear. Leaving this 
aside Byrnes continued that in order to avoid inter-allied disputes 
it might be worth while considering the division of reparations on 
a zonal basis. To supplement this an exchange of goods between 
zones might be considered.144 
Unofficial discussion between Byrnes and Molotov was 
immediately followed by an official conference of foreign minis-
ters at which the Soviet Union submitted its own reparations 
plan.145  It was a proposal supplementary to the Yalta agreement for 
approximately equal division of a total sum of 20 billion dollars 
between capital goods and current production deliveries. 
Transfers of capital goods for which assets within the frontiers of 
1937 could be used, would be carried out within two years and 
current production deliveries within ten years of the surrender. 
The Soviet Union also made a proposal for the administration of 
reparations deliveries.146  A sub-committee of the Allied Repar-
ations Commission was to be set up with members appointed by 
Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The Control 
Commission — with France included — would be kept informed 
of events, but would not play any part in actual decision-making. 
The Reparations Commission would make a list of industrial 
branches from which each occupying power might move 
equipment, and these removals together with others already made 
would be listed. 
In this connection the foreign ministers discussed the practical 
carrying out of reparations procedures, reaching no conclusion but 
to send the matter to the sub-committee for preparation. Molotov 
tried to obtain from Byrnes and Eden a precise formulation of 
American and British ideas on reparation priorities in relation to 
144) Byrnes-Molotov Meeting 23.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 274-275. 
145) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation (s.d.), FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 863-864. 
146) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation (s.d.), FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 864-865. 
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German consumption and imports. But attitudes remained as 
before.147 
In American thinking the question of defining booty was 
beginning to lose its significance. Because of wartime destruction 
and other reasons transfers of German national assets continued to 
be smaller than originally planned. The United States demanded 
that zone commanders be given responsibility for removals, 
whether reparations or booty. When Maisky submitted a proposal 
for a wider interpretation of booty, the Americans were in fact 
prepared to approve it. In their own zone the Americans could 
gradually cease the collection of reparations and if necessary take 
the goods they needed as booty.148 
On 23rd July the foreign ministers held another unofficial 
meeting.149 Molotov submitted a new "true" Soviet definition of 
booty and admitted that the Soviet Union had moved equipment 
from Germany. He was also prepared to lower the Soviet claim. But 
Byrnes and Eden gave no ground at all, and the course followed 
from the Yalta agreement on had reached its end. On the other 
hand Molotov conceded the principle of collecting reparations by 
zones. The reparations sum still remained open, but Molotov 
expected the Soviet Union to obtain separate compensation from 
the Ruhr area. 
As the conference continued the great powers tried to reach a 
settlement on the exchange of goods between the zones and the 
size of the compensation to be obtained from the Ruhr. But 
Molotov repeatedly returned to the point that the United States 
had changed its attitude since the Yalta agreement. In that 
agreement a fixed sum had served as the basis of discussion on 
reparations, but Pauley had announced that the Americans had 
abandoned this. Byrnes insisted that the United States had kept its 
promise, but in the light of events since Yalta a sum of 20 billion 
dollars must be considered "impracticable" — he avoided 
mentioning a suitable sum. 
147) Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers 23.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 276-
281. 
148) United States Delegation Working Paper 22.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 
853. 
149) Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers 23.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 
295-298. 
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The true nature of the United States' proposal had not passed 
unnoticed by the Soviet Union, of course. Having failed to agree on 
reparations the Allies had to content themselves with what they 
could obtain from their zones without an agreement. From the 
Soviet standpoint the words of the Western Allies on reparations 
were meaningless and unsatisfactory. This was clearly apparent 
when after some delay in the discussion — elections were held in 
Britain, causing Churchill and Eden to be replaced by Clement R. 
Attlee and Ernest Bevin — Byrnes and Molotov met on 27th July. 
Molotov claimed openly that at Yalta the Americans had been on 
the Soviet side against Britain on the reparations question, 
whereas at Potsdam the Americans had taken the British side. 
Byrnes insisted that the United States had not changed its attitude 
— only circumstances had changed. 
Molotov stressed the Soviet minimum demand, that it should 
receive goods transfers from the Ruhr.15° 
Molotov confirmed this on 29th July, when bargaining over 
reparations continued, the British delegation having returned to 
full strength. Molotov officially announced that the Soviet Union 
agreed to the collection of reparations by zones. From the Ruhr the 
Soviet expected goods either to the value of two billion dollars or 
to the quantity of six million tons. In the opinion of Byrnes it was 
impossible to agree on a certain dollar value or tonnage, but the 
Soviet share could be 25 % of the total reparations to be taken from 
the Ruhr. This did not satisfy Molotov, who demanded a fixed sum 
of quantity. 
The demand for a fixed sum arose understandably from the 
possibility that the Western Allies might make the total quantity of 
reparations so small that a quarter of it would be negligible. The 
express purpose of the Western Allies was to remove equipment 
connected with the war potential, but the amount of such 
equipment in the western zones was small, so small, in fact, that 
the Americans and British avoided making it public. Mention of a 
small sum during negotiations would probably have prevented an 
agreement.151  
Molotov was justifiably anxious, too, that collection of 
150) Byrnes-Molotov Meeting 27.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 449-452. 
151) Pauley to Byrnes 28.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, p. 892. 
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reparations by zones might infringe the principle of treating all 
Germany as one economic unit. Byrnes held that the American 
proposal was not against this principle — it was merely a question 
of the method of collection.152 
Potsdam: a Lame Solution 
The Potsdam conference was drifting into an impasse where 
disagreement on the frontiers of Poland was the central issue. The 
Americans did not wish to confuse opinion at home with a failed 
conference, however, and their wish to reach an agreement with 
the Soviet government on reparations was stronger than that of the 
the British — it was preferable, after all, to break relations later 
over the practical interpretation of an agreement already made 
than to leave the conference with no agreement at all. But the 
British too agreed to goods transfers, mainly in order to ensure 
food supplies in their zone. The Americans were prepared for 
goods transfers to supplement a "zero solution" for the additional 
reason that the Soviet zone contained — calculations admittedly 
varied — less than half of Germany's total national assets. Also this 
American "openhandedness" would evidently cost nothing 
because it was doubtful whether the receiving states would be able 
to use the equipment moved from the Ruhr.153 
On 30th July Byrnes, an experienced politician, suggested that 
the Soviet Union agree to the American proposal for reparations 
and the Americans for their part agree to hand over the areas east of 
the Oder-Neisse line to Polish administration until a peace treaty 
was made with Germany. As part of Byrnes' suggestion 25 % of 
such industrial equipment as was not indispensable for the 
peacetime economy would be moved from the Ruhr to the Soviet 
Union on condition that foodstuffs, coal and other commodities of 
corresponding value were moved from the Soviet zone to the West. 
In addition 15 % of such equipment from the Ruhr would be 
moved without counter-deliveries. In the situation which then 
152) Pauley to Maisky 27.8.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 893-897. 
153) Clayton to Byrnes 29.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 900-901, Pauley to 
Byrnes 30.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, p. 917. 
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prevailed the United States' suggestion signified progress, and 
Molotov promised to convey it to Stalin. True, Molotov at once 
seized on the question of who should decide what equipment was 
suitable for reparations and demanded Soviet participation in this 
through the Control Commission or the Reparations Commission. 
Molotov also wished the agreement to mention a fixed dollar sum. 
A third problem would be constituted by deliveries from the 
Soviet zone.154  
On 30th July the British made their own proposal on goods 
transfers.155 
 Under its provisions the Soviet Union would have 
obtained 10 % of the equipment suitable for reparations from the 
Western zones and particularly from the Ruhr. On the other hand 
transfers between the zones would not be made, as this would give 
reason for inter-Allied disputes. Treatment of all Germany as an 
economic unit would enable its various parts to be equally 
provided for. 
Molotov at once presumed that the American proposal was 
nearer to the Soviet view. This was partly because in Bevin's 
opinion the commander of the zone concerned should decide what 
equipment was suitable for reparations — and in the case of the 
Ruhr he was British. Molotov suggested an addition to the 
agreement — the words "and the Control Commission". Bevin 
agreed to this, but did not promise the power of final decision 
either to the Control Commission or to the Reparations 
Commission. 
At a general session on the last day of July Stalin formally 
rejected the idea of linking extraneous matters to a reparations 
settlement. He now submitted a proposal for an agreement on 
reparations.156  This approved the collection of reparations by 
zones and the exchange of goods as follows: 15 % of assets to be 
removed from Western zones — not only from the Ruhr — should 
go to the Soviet Union in the course of five years in exchange for 
the same value of goods, also 10 % of the assets in question 
without exchange. The amount of assets to be removed would be 
determined by the Control Commission after a statement by the 
154) Byrnes-Molotov Meeting 30.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 480-483. 
155) Proposal by the British Delegation 30.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 920-921. 
156) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation (s.d.), FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 1593-1594. 
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Reparations Commission. On the part to be played by the zone 
commander and the participation of France in the Reparations 
Commission the Soviet proposal, had nothing to say. But it 
suggested that the Soviet Union receive additionally 500 million 
dollars' worth of shares in industrial and transport enterprises in 
Western zones, 30 % of German foreign investments and 30 % of 
German gold which had come into Allied possession. The Soviet 
Union was prepared to pay out of its own share the reparations due 
to Poland, and the United States and Britain should pay out of 
their own shares the reparations due to France, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway. 
In the course of discussion Stalin wished to confirm a time 
within which the equipment to be moved should be defined. He 
suggested three months, but this was lengthened to six months at 
Bevin's suggestion. 
The Soviet proposal signified more goods transfers to the East 
than had been mentioned in the United States' proposal, in 
addition to which German shares and gold were suggested as 
reparations. Truman asked Stalin to be satisfied with the 
equipment transfers proposed, and to leave out shares and gold. To 
this Stalin agreed, while Bevin, negotiating for Britain, yielded to 
Truman's compromise very reluctantly. 
88 
In the negotiations French membership of the Reparations 
Commission was confirmed, as well as a formulation of an 
agreement with those other states entitled to reparations that had 
not been mentioned, that is, apart from Britain, the Soviet Union 
and the United States. 
Potsdam: Italy 
At the Potsdam conference the United States gave particular 
attention to regulation of the Italian question. During the 
occupation period its aim was to ensure by various means that 
Western democracy was implanted in Italy and its continuance 
guaranteed by helping the country to self-sufficiency and 
economic independence as soon as possible after the war. 
Although American interests in Italy had not been especially great, 
Washington did not wish to forget them altogher. The American 
share in the occupation was felt to be — not least among the Italian 
and Roman Catholic section of the American population — mainly 
a liberation from the power of Nazism and a return of the lost 
sheep to the flock.157 
Reparations did not suit the picture of a recovering, independent 
Italy, a participant in the open door policy. For the purposes of the 
Yalta conference Washington had decided on a principle which 
allowed ofr the suspension of a decision on Italian reparations 
until the peace conference. 
In the opinion of many Britons the Americans had almost 
entirely forgotten that Italy had been the Fascist ally of Germany 
which had attacked the British and changed sides in the war only 
to avoid the consequences of military defeat. The American view 
was that the British — wishing to keep Italy in subjection — had 
not broken free of their former imperialistic notions.158 
By the time of the Potsdam conference it was clear to the 
Americans that the political position of Italy would not serve as a 
basis for her to take advantage of American economic aid. For this 
reason Byrnes proposed at the beginning of the conference that 
157) See e.g. Briefing Book Paper (s.d.), FRUS Malta and Yalta, pp. 276-283. 
158) Woodward 1976, p. 467. 
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surrender terms be replaced by an undertaking from the Italian 
government to observe certain regulations before the peace treaty. 
Italy would still be obliged to pay reparations.'59 
When the American proposal came up for discusson, Stalin 
linked the Italian peace treaty with similar treaties for Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Finland and Hungary. The most urgent work of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers which had been formed proved to be 
the Italian treaty, but the preparation of treaties with the other 
countries concerned also devolved on the Council. The three great 
powers at Potsdam also agreed on the principle that Italy and the 
other countries could be members of the United Nations. 
At a foreign ministers' conference on 20th July Molotov brought 
up the Italian reparations liability. Byrnes and Eden thought that 
Italy had not the means of payment, but they did not deny the 
obligation in principle. Byrnes remarked that the United States 
government had already given Italy some 200 million dollars in aid 
and would be obliged to give a further 400 or 500 million during 
the coming winter. For this reason, in the American view, 
raparations were not an immediate problem in settling the Italian 
question. 
Molotov was able to use the example of Finland to advantage: 
could the world consider it justified for Finland, a small country, 
to pay large reparations while Italy, a large country, paid nothing? 
Eden bypassed Molotov's statement by asking him on the basis of 
his previous statement what connection there was between 
reparations and membership of international organizations. Rep-
arations would be arranged as part of the peace treaty and had no 
wider importance. Molotov observed that members of the United 
Nations would not pay reparations. The question of United 
Nations membership and reparations remained partly open, 
though later both Eden and Molotov demanded that peace treaties 
— including their reparations articles should be signed before the 
countries concerned could enter international organizations. 
At a general session on the same day, 20th July, Truman again 
briefly indicated that the Americans did not intend to give large 
sums of money to European states — when thinking of Italian 
reparations it was as well to remember that during the following 
159) Briefing Book Paper (s.d.), FRUS Potsdam I, pp. 681-683. 
90 
winter the United States would use from 750 million to a billion 
dollars for feeding the Italians. Countries which were the objects of 
aid must be made self-sufficient. 
Discussion took a new turn when Molotov at a foreign ministers' 
meeting on 24th July made a proposal on reparations for both Italy 
and Austria. In this proposal it was said that Austria was able to 
pay 250 million dollars' worth of reparations in six years, and Italy 
600 million. The Soviet Union drew special attention to the fact 
that these countries no longer had military expenditure. These 
suggestions were left to be dealt with by the economic 
subcommittee formed earlier.16° 
But the sub-committee made no progress. The Americans and 
British could not consent to reparations from current production 
as long as Italy and Austria had to be assisted. At a meeting of 
foreign ministers on 27th July all that Byrnes could imagine as 
attainable in Italy was "removal of machinery and equipment from 
war industries, provided they had no peacetime use." To Molotov 
this was quite inadequate. Again he insisted that countries which 
had occupied Soviet territory must not come out of the war 
unpunished. Rumania was paying reparations — it was 
incomprehensible that the Italians and Austrians should not pay. 
The Rumanian armistice agreement was signed by both Britain and 
the United States — in the case of Austria he could understand the 
Americans giving up their reparations claim; the Austrians had 
not occupied United States territory. 
Byrnes appealed to the practical aspect. If a country could pay 
reparations it did not need help from UNRRA. Molotov could not 
approve such a stipulation for the work of UNRRA. The foreign 
ministers, in fact, could agree on nothing but to record differing 
opinions for the plenary meeting. At this meeting on 28th July 
Stalin began with a compromise: because Austria had had no army 
of her own in the war the Soviet Union was able to give up its 
claim for reparations from Austria. Italy on the other hand had sent 
her army to the Volga, and her liability to pay reparations could 
not be abandoned. Truman did not yield in the slightest. If Italy 
was able to pay he had nothing against it. Stalin reminded him that 
the United States had agreed to transfers of equipment and asked 
160) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 24.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, p. 666. 
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how much of such equipment there was. In this connection Stalin 
wished a fixed dollar value to be agreed upon. 
Truman replied that he could not state a value at that moment, 
and Stalin agreed to await an answer. The British hastened to 
Truman's aid. Attlee and Bevin learned by questioning that Stalin 
wished to obtain from Italy the same sort of military equipment as 
from Germany. Because this could not be particularized for the 
moment, the Soviet wished some fixed sum for reparations to be 
appointed — Stalin was prepared to discuss a reduction of the 
original sum. Bevin demanded that Italy first pay for assistance 
received from the United States and Britain, while Stalin 
demanded that the aggressor pay for at least part of the destruction 
he had caused. The question remained open when the plenary 
meeting ended. 
At a meeting of foreign ministers on 30th July both Bevin and 
Molotov submitted proposals. The British did not demand 
reparations from Austria, and the Control Commission would later 
determine the equipment and other goods to be transferred as 
booty or otherwise.161 The Soviet government proposed that Italy 
and Austria be obliged to pay reparations in the form of important 
military equipment within one year. The Austrian Control 
Commission would fix the final sum.162 Byrnes' opinion was that 
Italian and Austrian reparations had long been discussed, but no 
agreement was in sight. If Molotov still wished to return to the 
subject he could do so at a plenary meeting. Molotov did not, 
however, and the matter was discussed no further at Potsdam. 
The Americans had several reasons for opposing Italian 
reparations. First, the dismantling of industry affected the 
Germans primarily, whereas the Italian industrial potential had 
not proved dangerous. Without reparations Italy could be more 
quickly linked to an economic system in accord with American 
ideas. In addition the United States Italian population would 
hardly have looked favourably on harsh treatment of their 
homeland. 
The discussion begun at Potsdam continued at a conference of 
foreign ministers in London during September 1945. The Soviet 
161) Proposal by the British Delegation 30.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, p. 666. 
162) Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 30.7.1945, FRUS Potsdam II, p. 667. 
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Union repeated its demand for 600 million dollars' reparations. 
When Britain and the United States considered this too much, 
Molotov was prepared to reduce the sum to 300 million provided 
the Western Allies relinquished their shares. Of the reduced sum 
100 million belonged to the Soviet. On this basis the council of 
foreign ministers composed a draft Italian peace treaty which came 
up for discussion at the Paris peace conference. 
Molotov, however, could not regard as justified the British and 
American attitude to the Italian reparations liability as a whole. He 
reiterated that small countries such as Rumania and Finland were 
paying 300 million dollars, and it was therefore questionable 
policy to allow a great power such as Italy to escape without a 
similar payment. The case of Finland in particular showed the 
need to advance from the experiences of the First World War to 
new models which had proved fully satisfactory. Bevin, the British 
Foreign Secretary, observed that his country had agreed to the 
reparations clauses for Rumania and Finland only with reluctance 
and with the proviso that they should not serve as precedents. Italy 
would not be able to pay reparations, which would be shifted to 
the shoulders of British taxpayers. Byrnes agreed with Bevin's 
principles. No progress was made in the regulation of Italian 
reparations, the further treatment of which awaited the assembly 
of the Paris peace conference. 
Forward from Potsdam 
As mentioned earlier, the Potsdam agreement provided that 
equipment to be moved from Western zones as reparations should 
be defined within six months of the signing of the agreement. This 
was the task of the German Control Commission which was 
obliged, in making its reparations plan, to take note of the 
economic principles affecting Germany which had been agreed at 
Potsdam. 
The commander of each zone had final responsibility for 
deciding what goods were moved. Among the Americans, 
accordingly, General Clay and his subordinates played the main 
part while Pauley withdrew from the handling of German 
reparations. His talents as a negotiator were to be put to use in the 
settlement to be made with Japan. 
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In conjunction with the Potsdam conference the Moscow 
Reparations Commission moved to Berlin, though an official 
decision was not made until 25th September 1945 at the London 
conference of foreign ministers. France was formally invited to be 
a member, but in practice the Control Commission made the main 
decisions on reparations. The Western powers established the 
Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA) which met in Paris and 
whose function it became to allot the reparations payable from the 
occupation zones of Britain, France and the United States to the 
receiving states. Agreement on this was reached on 21st December 
1945. Relations between IARA and the Control Commission 
remained undefined in many respects, which caused friction.163 
German Production Level 
In the United States the Potsdam settlement was seen to a great 
extent as a complete solution to the German reparations problem. 
And Pauley's removal from the German issue signified a move 
from political decision-making to the executive level. 
A sign of this change was the American attitude to Finland. In 
March 1945 parliamentary elections in the style of Western 
democracy had been held in Finland, and in the summer Finland 
established diplomatic relations with all the great powers. Because 
in Finland — unlike Rumania and Hungary — political life was 
settling down in a way which satisfied the Americans, Washington 
at last bowed to repeated Finnish request for negotiations on 
credits. Early in 1946 these discussions led to the granting of 
credits.' 
These credits were intended for the needs of the woodprocessing 
industry directed to Western markets. Although reparations 
industry was left outside the credits, the dollars granted brought 
indirect relief to the discharge of this obligation. The decision on 
credits meant a change in the American policy of not granting such 
help to countries paying reparations. In Washington's view, 
163) Clay to War Department, Sept. 1945, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 
72-74. The IARA Agreement 21.12.1945, Ratchford & Ross 1947, pp. 231-
241. 
164) See Heikkilä 1982. 
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solution of the German reparations problem was so far removed 
from other cases that it was unaffected by the change of principle 
involved in allowing credit to Finland. 
Transfers of goods under the Potsdam agreement were not very 
large in quantity. The main problem was whether the members of 
the Control Comission could reach agreement on what goods to 
transfer. Representatives of the four countries were obliged to 
accept strict interpretations of the Potsdam terms, agree on the 
capacity of Germany's remaining industry, indicate the equipment 
to be removed as reparations and finally distribute it to each 
receiving state. This in turn led to the discussion of even more 
extensive matters such as the forming of a central administration 
for Germany and the making of an export-import programme. 
In the principles approved for Germany, which were based 
largely on earlier American recommendations in Moscow, it was 
noted the except for goods transfers mentioned in the reparations 
agreement "payment of reparations should leave enough resources 
to enable the German people to subsist without external 
assistance" and that a living standard should be maintained in 
Germany "not exceeding the average of the standards of living of 
European countries. (European countries to mean all European 
countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics.)" 
Thus the assessment of German reparations was directly linked 
with regulation of the country's living standard, over which the 
representatives of the four powers clashed having differing 
viewpoints. The Soviet starting-point was that equipment 
providing an average European living standard need not be left in 
Germany — the Potsdam agreement was sufficiently fulfilled if 
equipment was dismantled to a standard somewhat below the 
average. Next, Soviet representatives counted all goods produced 
as part of the living standard; each product group must be 
separately examined and if necessary brought down to the average 
standard of the rest of Europe on the per capita principle. 
The Americans and British, for their part, viewed the concept of 
living standard as one whole. Because certain fields of industry 
were dismantled almost entirely and in certain others there could 
be no production whatever, for instance through lack of raw 
materials, production in some fields had to exceed the European 
average if an average living standard was to be achieved. Behind 
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this lay the understandable fear without substantial production in 
some field the Germans would not be able to pay for their 
indispensable imports. Correspondingly the Soviet Union wished 
to expand the number of assets included in reparations. 
After negotiations at many stages the representatives of the four 
countries agreed that each of them should submit a proposed 
reparations plan by mid-Janyary, a time limit later extended to the 
beginning of the following month. It was finally possible to start 
negotiations for the accordance of these plans. 
Naturally the amount of steel production had a decisive 
influence on the quantity of equipment remaining for reparations 
and on the German living standard. A draft on this matter was 
prepared by the Level of Industry Committee, an administrative 
organ set up by the Control Commission, which held its first 
meeting on 18th September 1945. Its work, as a matter of fact, 
consisted largely of theoretical planning. The committee talked of 
a German annual steel production of 5-9 billion tons at a time 
when German industry fell far behind this. It was estimated at the 
time that at least four years must be allowed before the planned 
ceiling could be reached. Also discussed were German exports 
amounting to three billion marks when the actual exports in 1946 
came to 600 million. The practical aim was within a few years to 
reach a level above which anything remaining could be transferred 
as reparations. 
On 10th Janyary 1946 the Allies in fact reached agreement that 
5.8 million tons annual steel production should be the aim and 7.5 
million tons annually the ceiling for the expansion of German steel 
production. But the four powers soon disagreed on whether 5.8 or 
7.5 million tons annual production should be the starting-point for 
calculations of the level of Germany's other industry. The Soviet 
Union, France and the United States supported the smaller 
amount, while the British remained alone in favour of the larger. 
As a production ceiling for various goods the Soviet generally 
proposed the lowest level, while General Clay aimed at a 
compromise with the high figures suggested by the British. Later 
Clay was criticised for having agreed too quickly with Soviet 
views. For steel the Soviet ceiling had been 4.6 million tons, but 
Clay had caused it to be raised to 5.8 million. Although the original 
American proposal was near that of the British, Clay thought he 
had gained such a large concession from the Soviet government 
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that the British must be induced, on the strength of Washington's 
support, to approve it. Clay wished for collaboration with the 
Soviet Union but also wished to avoid departing too far from the 
aims of the Potsdam agreement. Also it was worth reducing steel 
production, for this would enable the output of light industries to 
be increased.165 
Clay's efforts to achieve a compromise were endangered when 
France asked what the production possibilities of Germany would 
be if the Saar territory were joined to France. Clay answered at 
once that the United States could not deal with reparations on that 
basis because the Potsdam agreement had directed that Germany 
be treated as a single economic unit. Separation of the Saar 
immediately affected the possibilities for the payment of 
reparations. The Soviet Union agreed that the matter was already 
settled: territorial arrangements had been agreed at Potsdam, and 
Germany remained an economic unit. The British, on the other 
hand, were prepared for the clarification proposed by the French 
even if the conclusions to be draw from it were outside the powers 
of the Control Comission.166 
On 18th February France asked officially for the Saar territory to 
be placed permanently under French administration. She 
announced at the same time that she could not approve the 
establishment of a German central administration before the Ruhr 
area was put under international control. The Western powers 
were left in suspense, waiting to see on which side the Soviet 
Union would cast its lot: Germany and her communists expected 
their country to remain as before, while the French government 
with communist support worked for the separation of the Saar. 
The Saar was of little economic importance to the Level on 
Industry Plan which was in preparation. In this connection the 
Ruhr was far more important.167 
After many stages of negotiation The Final Reparations Plan — 
the Plan of the Allied Control Council for Reparations and the 
Level of the Post-War German Economy — was signed on 28th 
March 1946. Despite the title, this contained no direct agreement 
165) Clay to War Department and Byrnes 31.1.1946, Papers of General Lucius D. 
Clay I, pp. 154-155. Paterson 1975, pp. 240-242, 253-254. 
166) Clay to Hilldring 1.2.1946, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 156-157. 
167) Clay to Hilldring 6.3.1946, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, p. 176. 
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on reparations whatever. But it gave a starting-point for Germany's 
future production: prohibited and limited fields of industry were 
defined, also the general level of industry and the value of exports 
and imports. Finally the agreement stated that at the next stage 
settlements must be reached "on disarmament, reparations, the 
post-war German economy and the German balance of trade." 
Once again the most difficult questions were bypassed, with the 
result that this agreement, like others, left several problems 
unsolved. There was no mention even of when the agreement 
would come into force and how long it would remain in force. As 
will be made clear later, this was of no practical importance, 
because reparation transfers ended only a few months after the 
agreement was signed. 
Unmentioned too were reparations from current production. The 
Americans and British firmly believed that the industrial level 
which was planned was insufficient for such deliveries. In several 
connections the French stressed that they wished productive 
capacity to be left for this purpose. The Soviets wished productive 
capacity to be as low as possible, but did not commit themselves 
with regard to production for reparations. The Soviet Union 
wished to return to this matter at a later stage. 
The Americans and British left the other Allies in no doubt that 
they had no wish for difficulties to be caused in Germany by too 
heavy a reparations programme. In the final stage of negotiations at 
the beginning of March 1946 the Americans announced: "it is the 
U.S. position that there should be no removals of capital 
equipment as reparations from the light consumer goods industries 
necessary to sustain a peacetime economy." But the agreement did 
not mention how reparations were to be obtained from these or 
from unrestricted fields of industry. The American and British 
standpoint was that reparations could not be received from these 
fields at all, while the Soviet Union and the French believed the 
opposite. 
Deadlock on Removals 
The aforesaid Level of Industry Plan placed a ceiling on German 
production in various fields, but some dominant aspects of 
German economic life were still unsettled: without a central 
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General Lucius D. Clay, Commander 
of th American zone in Germany. 
This photograph was taken in 1961 
when he was on the way to Berlin to 
be president Kennedy's Personal 
Delegate there. 
administration, for instance, Germany's economic life as a whole 
could hardly be controlled, and without an export-import 
programme not even the Level of Industry Plan could be carried 
out. France could not agree to the creation of a central German 
administration, however, before the decision she wished for had 
been reached on the Ruhr and Saar issue. The Soviet Union for its 
part demanded a reparations agreement before an export-import 
programme. Great power collaboration was undermined by 
uncertainty as to whether a concession made over one matter 
might prove ineffective in solving other problems. 
As long as German economic integration was not practically 
realized — and with it the organization of Western Zone food 
supplies — the Americans and British were not satisfied with the 
situation. When France and the Soviet Union showed no wish to 
assent, Clay on 4th May ordered reparation transports from the 
American zone to cease except for the removal of 24 installations 
which had already been carried out in advance. Clay's foremost 
anxiety was the lack of raw materials and foodstuffs in the 
American occupation zone. It was clear to him that if the Soviet 
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Union offered food, communism might well spread throughout 
Germany. Revival of Germany on a moderate scale, including 
currency reform and, at the least, union of the American and 
British zones, would lay the foundation for a stabilization of 
German political affairs. On the other hand, the share of factories 
and equipment allocated for reparations in the reconstruction of 
Europe and Germany was so small in Clay's opinion that it 
provided no justification for not carrying out the Potsdam 
agreement with regard to the dismantling of Germany's war 
potential. 
Clay had a conviction which now seems naive that the 
signatories of the Potsdam agreement — Americans, British and 
Soviets — would finally reach unanimity with the help of 
negotiations. But the French, who had become involved later, 
showed no real understanding of the significance of Potsdam.168 
General Clay decided to break off reparations deliveries without 
any order from Washington, where, although the German question 
was viewed from another angle, the zone commander's decision 
suited the aims of the political leaders also. It was calclulated in 
Washington that a policy of collaboration, mainly through the 
United Nations, the American monopoly of atomic weapons and 
the country's economic power would provide sufficient 
foundation for maintaining their leading position throughout the 
world. By the spring of 1946 when the Soviet Union seemed 
reluctant to bow to the will of the United States, the Americans 
began to speak in sharper tones. 
It was undestood in Washington — but not by Clay — that to 
Europeans and many American minority groups the main issue in 
international politics was not a contest between communism and 
democracy. In Europe the liquidation of fascism and its legacy was 
primary. Secretary of State Byrnes in particular wished to ensure 
that peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland and 
Hungary were concluded. There was also a wish to see how 
Europeans would perform in elections following the period of 
fascism and national socialism. On the other hand a swift and 
extensive reconstruction of Europe would have aroused 
168) Clay to Eisenhower 26.5.1946, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 212-
217. LaFeber 1968, p. 32. 
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resentment in the United States and Europe alike, which in turn 
would have increased the support for communist parties in 
various European countries. 
The basic British aim in Germany was simiral to the American. 
The spread of Soviet influence and with it communism — and 
equally the spread of extreme right-wing ideas and movements — 
were to be prevented by restoring to Germany an adequate living 
standard with a democratic system of administration and justice. 
Accordingly the British were glad to establish connections with 
Germany's Social Democratic Party and trade unions. It was not, 
however, primarily fraternal feelings that initiated these gestures 
by the Labour Government but rather their fear that these channels 
might be used by the Soviet Union for its own influence over the 
Germans.169 
169) See Rothwell 1982. 
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Reparations as Part of 
Peace Treaty 
The Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers 
At the Potsdam conference it was decided to set up a Council of 
Foreign Ministers for the purpose of preparing peace treaties with 
Germany's European satellites — Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Finland. Five foreign ministers were scheduled to 
meet on 11th September 1945 in London, but when their 
conference ended on 2nd October very little had been achieved. 
In London reparations were discussed in conjunction with the 
peace treaty to be made with Italy. The Soviet Union proposed a 
payment of 600 million dollars. The United States and Britain took 
the view that such an obligation would make the country 
dependent on foreign aid. Molotov was prepared to reduce the sum 
to 300 million, the Soviet Union taking 100 million and 
Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania sharing the rest. Rumania and 
Finland were paying similar amounts, and a country such as Italy 
could therefore do the same. Bevin reminded the others that 
Britain had assented only with reluctance to the mention of a 
reparations sum in the agreements with Rumania and Finland — 
and with the stipulation that these cases should not be taken as 
precedents later. Byrnes agreed that the experience of the First 
World War showed the danger of heavy reparations. Molotov 
preferred to make use of later experience: Finland with a 
population of four million was paying 300 million dollars on the 
basis of a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union, and the 
same should not be impossible for Italy. No further progress was 
made over Italian reparations, which were reserved for later 
discussion. 
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The deadlock in which the London negotiations ended was a 
disappointment to all parties. The process of untying the knot 
began in Moscow, where the foreign ministers met on 16th 
December 1945. It was decided that the deputy foreign ministers 
should prepare draft peace agreements with Italy, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. After completion of these drafts 
the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet not later than 1st May 
in Paris, when the 21 states which had fought against the Axis in 
Europe would be invited. On 25th April in Paris the foreign 
ministers of the four most important Allies met for the purpose of 
carrying forward the preparatory work of the deputy foreign 
ministers. It was clear at this stage that the 21-state conference 
could not open at the beginning of May. 
Byrnes soon had to alter his belief that the Soviet Union would 
eventually bow to the United States proposals on the main issues. 
For three weeks the foreign ministers negotiated with no progress 
being made on the central questions until they decided to intermit 
the conference, leaving the deputy foreign ministers to continue 
preparations. The foreign ministers returned to Paris in mid-June. 
It was only gradually and by way of unofficial talks that decisions 
were approached. The first sign of disentanglement was Molotov's 
announcement on 27th June that the Soviet Union agreed to the 
frontier line proposed by the United States between France and 
Italy. Molotov was also prepared to accept the United States 
proposal on Trieste provided the Soviet received reparations from 
Italy in the form of goods deliveries to the value of 100 million 
dollars. The Western powers approved this on the condition that 
the Soviet supplied Italy with the raw materials needed for 
reparations and agreed to the holding of a 21-state peace 
conference on 29th July for the purpose of deciding the share of 
Italian reparations to be received by the other Allies. This meant a 
clear breakthrough which was to lead to an agreement on all 
European reparations except those from Germany.10 
170) Polvinen 1986, pp. 205-208. 
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A Soviet Proposal 
Clay's decision to break off advance deliveries of reparations 
brought negotiations on Germany to a stage where it was beyond 
the authority of the Control Commission to arrive at a new 
settlement even in principle. In Paris the foreign ministers 
continued negotiations on the German question as on others, and 
here Molotov on 9-11th July offered a new opportunity for 
reaching agreement."' 
Molotov did not miss the opportunity of condemning Clay's 
decision to break off deliveries. He recalled the original Soviet 
demand for 10 billion dollars' worth of reparations in the form of 
transfers of capital goods, deliveries from current production and 
German manpower. At Potsdam transfers of capital goods had been 
agreed, but Clay had broken off advance deliveries before a final 
agreement on transfers had even been made. 
Molotov's condemnation of American policy was not surprising. 
But his views on the revival of the German economy were 
something new. Germany, he thought, formed an important sector 
of the world's economy, and to destroy her in an economic sense or 
turn her into a predominantly agricultural country served no one's 
interest. A vengeful peace would only give the Germans reason for 
another military and economic resurgence. But a controlled 
development of peaceful productivity — after total disarmament 
(military and economic) and strict four-power supervision of the 
Ruhr — would be of benefit to the parties concerned. 
The Control Commission had imposed a ceiling on German 
production which had by no means reached at this stage. Despite 
this the Soviet Union was prepared to raise that ceiling provided 
that the increased output was used for peaceful purposes and an 
increase of trade. "The adoption of a corresponding program for 
the development of German peaceful industries which will 
provide for the development of foreign trade of Germany as well as 
for the establishment of an interallied control over the whole of 
German industry satisfies the need for the implementation of the 
decisions of the Berlin Conference which provide for the treatment 
of Germany as an economic whole." 
171) Molotov's statements, FRUS 1945 II, pp. 642-847, 869-877, 880-887. 
Paterson 1975, pp. 255-256. 
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Molotov's statements differed clearly from the principles 
expressed by Varga. In its own occupation zone the Soviet Union 
had observed that reparation transfers of capital goods did not pay 
if carried to extremes. For this reason the Soviet government now 
demanded deliveries from current production, to take the form of a 
certain percentage of the output of specific factories. This 
principle the Kremlin was ready to extend throughout Germany. 
On this basis Germany would be able to start expanding her 
production. Molotov no longer said, like Varga, that the German 
living standard should remain lower than the Soviet one. 
In Paris, however, the Western Allies had made all the 
concessions to the Soviet Union that they were prepared to make. 
Byrnes and Bevin branded Molotov's statements as a blatant 
attempt to obtain more reparations while the Soviet government 
posed as the champion of a united and prospering Germany. 
Byrnes and Bevin eagerly seized of the criticism concerning the 
ending of the removals of goods, which led to discussion of the 
problems arising from payment of reparations by these deliveries 
alone. They continued to stress that if a surplus appeared in any 
zone it should be put to general use, and that imports should be 
paid for by the exports of all zones. This meant that the Soviet 
Union would have had to give up the principle enunciated by 
Molotov. 
The Western view was that Germany must produce an actual 
surplus before she could pay reparations, while the Soviet Union 
felt that reparations from current production and reconstruction 
could be made complementary. By summer 1946 there was a 
settled conviction in Washington and London that by means of 
reparations — as a part of wider aims — the Soviet Union was 
trying to extract as much as possible from Germany, while 
according to Western ideas reparations from Germany were in 
practice impossible. But it should be mentioned separately that the 
Western powers at this stage regarded reparations from current 
production as by no means forbidden in principle — it was merely 
that the necessary conditions were absent. 
After their fruitless talks on Germany and Austria the foreign 
ministers ended their conference on 12th July, and the peace 
conference of 21 states was at last able to start at the end of that 
month. The first weeks were spent in rhetorical opening speeches 
by the Allies, after which, from 10th August onward, the losers 
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were given a chance to express their views. After some general 
discussion the peace conference was divided into five political 
and territorial commissions, a combined military and a combined 
judicial commission, as well as two economic commissions, one 
dealing with Italy, the other with the Balkans and Finland. 
Paris: Deputy Foreign Ministers 
In themselves the reparations programmes for Rumania, Finland 
and Hungary could be accomplished without exerting pressure for 
changes in the reparation articles of the armistice agreements. And 
in the case of Finland there were no other reasons for change. On 
the last day of March 1946 the Soviet Union submitted the draft of 
a peace treaty with Finland.'" Its seventh article dealt with 
reparations and was similar to a corresponding provision in the 
armistice agreement, although a two-year extension of the 
compensation period allowed by the Soviet Union at the end of 
1945 was taken into account. No changes were made in the 
treatment of the reparations article by the assistant foreign 
ministers — it was merely submitted to the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in the form proposed by the Soviet Union. 
The unanimity which had prevailed in the case of Finland did 
not continue when the articles dealing with Rumania and Hungary 
was considered. The failure to regulate German reparations had 
given new meaning to the reparations question in terms of great 
power politics. On 21st June at a conference of deputy foreign 
ministers the United States delegation submitted a proposal for a 
peace treaty with Hungary. The early part of its reparations article 
was in accord with the Soviet proposal, but there was also a 
proviso which was explained. The United States delegation 
reserved the right to bring up this question again at the peace 
conference. In the explanation it was mentioned that the United 
States had reserved a similar right in the armistice agreement with 
Hungary in case American interests were injured later. 
The Americans had already declared their anxiety over the 
weakening of economic conditions in Hungary, and when this 
172) Draft Peace Treaty with Finland. Proposed by the Soviet Delegation 31.3.1946 
C.F.M. (D) (F) (46) 1, F0371 57156 U3717/69/79 PRO. 
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appeared to be threatening even a minimum living standard they 
suggested on 2nd March that the situation in Hungary be 
examined. In Paris the United States renewed its proposal for the 
setting up of a commission to do this."' Although the United 
States' initiative did not lead to noteworthy results it was a sign to 
the Soviet Union of American efforts to reduce the part played by 
reparations in economic dealings. 
The Soviet Union did not accept the proviso with its explanatory 
note for a draft treaty. The British delegation suggested a 
compromise whereby the United States' proposal as a whole 
would be included in the text in English, while the Russian text 
would contain the proviso without the explanation. Deputy 
foreign minister Gusev agreed to this on condition that the 
Hungarian gold and other property in Allied hands be mentioned 
in the draft. During the war the Germans had appropriated 
Hungarian assets, and most of these were found to be in the 
American occupation zone when the war ended. It was in the 
American interest, naturally, to play down the amount of these 
assets and to stress the importance of easing reparations, whereas 
the Soviet and Hungarians in various connections stressed the 
importance of returning the assets for the country's reconstruction. 
On 27th July, however, the Soviet Union announced a change of 
attitude, stating that it could not approve the inclusion of the 
American proviso and explanation in any printed draft agreement 
to be submitted to the peace conference. After long discussion the 
deputy foreign ministers decided to distribute draft agreements for 
Bulgaria, Italy, Rumania and Finland to the peace conference, but 
kept back the draft for Hungary until agreement should be reached 
on it. It was finally agreed that the proviso without explanation 
should remain in the draft agreement. 
Paris: Speeches by the Losers 
Rumanian reparations came to the fore when the former enemies 
were given a chance at the peace conference to give their views on 
the proposed agreements. Foreign Minister George Tatarescu, 
173) Dunn from Paris to SD 19.7.1946 and footnotes, FRUS 1946 III, p. 5. 
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president of the Rumanian delegation, spoke for his country on 
13th August. In respect of Rumania's reparations to the Soviet 
Union he suggested no change. The Soviet Union, said Tatarescu, 
had limited its demand to one fifth of the destruction caused by 
Rumania. On this basis he hoped that others too would treat 
Rumania favourably and return property which had been removed 
from her territory.14 
Tatarescu had exposed his flank, and Byrnes did not fail to take 
advantage. He told Tatarescu that he had received the impression 
that "the only way to be considered generous was to take 
something from Rumania." Tatarescu explained that he had not 
intended to deny that the United States too was generous. 
However, during the war Rumania had destroyed a great deal of 
Soviet property and the Soviet had not demanded full 
compensation, contenting itself with 300 million dollars. 
Byrnes replied that it was strange to thank people for not taking 
everything. It was wrong, he thought, to calculate compensation on 
the basis of property destroyed without taking account of human 
life lost. American demands on Rumania had increased mainly 
because of dealings in oil. The Rumanian government wished oil 
to be treated as part of reparations, paying the companies 
concerned a fixed price which the Americans thought too low. 
Tatarescu said he was aware of the situation and pointed out that 
British, Italian and Rumanian companies were receiving the same 
price. Despite this the oil companies were not in an unfavourable 
position but were prospering."' 
On 14th August Foreign Minister Janos Gyöngyösi, leader of the 
Hungarian delegation, gave his country's views on the draft 
agreement. There was no mention of reparations payable to the 
Soviet Union.16 In written statements by the Rumanian and 
Hungarian delegations there was also no reference to the 
reparations article. 
In general discussion after the Hungarian declaration the issue of 
compensation caused disagreement between the great powers. 
174) Fifteenth Plenary Meeting, August 13, 1946 4 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 190-
198. 
175) SD Memorandum (Matthews) 29.8.1946, FRUS 1946 VI, pp. 626-632. 
176) Seventh Plenary Meeting, August 14, 1946, 4 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 210-
220. 
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Byrnes stoutly defended the economic aims of the United States 
and accused the Soviet Union of breaking agreements by keeping 
the countries of eastern Europe under its own supervision. The 
United States, he said, had given and was still giving substantial 
economic help in various forms, whereas reparations meant the 
removal of foreign exchange and goods from the countries in 
question. 
In his reply Vyshinsky concentrated on the Hungarian situation. 
The Soviet government had made a justified demand but had 
shown flexibility in order to find a practical solution. Of the agreed 
35.5 million dollars Hungary had delivered only 10.5 million or 
about 35 %. In the exchange of goods between the countries, 
moreover, Hungary had received commodities from the Soviet 
Union to an extent which reduced the Soviet compensation to a 
mere 3.5 million dollars. Despite this his country had fulfilled its 
undertaking and even granted two years' extra time for payment of 
reparations. Byrnes, observed Vyshinsky, had forgotten to mention 
that the Soviet Union had not only contented itself with partial 
payments but had also given economic aid. Hungary's financial 
difficulties, he thought, were not due to payment of reparations. 
Far more important were the wartime removals of property to that 
area of Germany which later became the American occupation 
zone. 
Finland's turn to express her views on the peace treaty came on 
the same day as the encounter between Byrnes and Vyshinsky on 
reparations. The atmosphere was thus hardly favourable to a 
statement on this matter. Finland at the Paris peace conference 
found herself exposed to the cross-pressure generated by great-
power disagreements. 
Finland's views were given on 15th August by Foreign Minister 
Enckell, who proposed a reduction of the reparations sum from 
300 million dollars to 200 million. Finnish reparations, which so 
far had been outside the disputes of the great powers, now became 
a bone of contention. Against the background of earlier discussion 
the reasons advanced by Finland for this reduction could not fail 
to cause annoyance to the Soviet delegation. According to 
Enckell's statement Finland did not expect to be able to improve 
her economic position by foreign trade alone. Without aid from 
abroad — Sweden and the United States — Finland would not 
have been able to maintain her modest living standard, reorganize 
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her production mechanism and pay reparations. Thus the idea was 
indirectly presented that Western help was of vital importance to 
Finland — more important, for instance, than goods received in 
trade exchanges with the Soviet Union."' 
From the Soviet standpoint the Rumanian speech had given a 
favourable picture of the reparations position, and Hungary had 
bypassed the matter by saying nothing about it. Finland's appeal 
was exceptional and provided new weapons in the disputes of the 
cold war. The Soviet reaction to Finland was sharply negative: the 
Finns, it seemed, had tried to gain Western support against the 
Soviet Union. There was in fact no question of this. The Finns felt 
their economic situation to be more difficult than a foreign 
observer might have realized. Also, for reasons of internal policy it 
was important for Finland's government to take the initiative as it 
had done, in order to avoid later charges of neglecting the 
opportunity. In addition Finland made a written proposal for the 
reduction of reparations to 200 million dollars. To support this 
request the Finnish delegation had prepared an explanation of the 
circumstances in which reparations were paid.178 
The Finnish proposal was novel in the sense that Rumania and 
Hungary had produced nothing similar. The Finns themselves did 
not see the matter in this light, but had in mind the discussions 
held in Moscow during spring 1946. They did not feel, moreover, 
that the Soviet Union had treated them with exceptional favour, at 
least with regard to reparations. The Soviet government wished 
reparations to be dealt with between the two countries, not brought 
into the international arena. Finland for her part made proposals 
only on her own account, and contact with representatives of other 
states was confined almost entirely to formal courtesy calls. 
Confidence was restored to Soviet-Finnish relations before the 
Paris conference was over, with the result that Finland was 
promised economic concessions. This meant in the first place that 
Finland was no longer obliged to pay fines for late deliveries of 
reparations. 
177) Nineteenth Plenary Meeting, August 15, 1946, 4 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 
236-240. 
178) Observations on the Draft Peace Treaty with Finland submitted by the 
Finnish Delegation 26.8.1946, FRUS 1946 IV, pp. 282-297. 
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Paris: Economic Commissions 
After discussion of the proposals made by former enemy countries 
the peace treaty drafts were submitted to sub-commissions to be 
put into shape. Reparation articles were dealt with in economic 
commissions, one for Italy, the other for Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Finland and Hungary. Australia, who actively tried at the peace 
conference to advance the interests of small and medium-size 
countries,19 proposed changes in the reparation clauses of all five 
draft agreements. Those for Rumania and Finland were exactly the 
same, while for Bulgaria, Italy and Hungary it was noted that 
reparations were paid to more states. The proposal for change was 
first presented in the case of Rumania, for at the suggestion of the 
Soviet Union the economic commission for the Balkan countries 
and Finland began its work with the draft agreement for 
Rumania.180  
The Australian proposal had two main objectives. First, the 
claim of 300 million dollars was so large that reparations could 
bring the payer state to economic collapse or loss of independence. 
The burden imposed by reparations should therefore be lightened. 
Behind this view, undoubtedly, was the idea that the Soviet Union 
was trying through reparations to extract the maximum economic 
benefit from Germany's former allies and place them under its own 
supervision. Connected with this was a second Australian 
objective. Reparations should be removed from the exclusive 
surveillance of the Soviet Union. The proposal even went to the 
length of recommending that agreements between creditor and 
debtor be revoked and deliveries made on the basis of them should 
be reconsidered. 
Australia proposed that these objectives be reached without, as 
yet, fixing the final sum of reparations. A special reparation and 
repayment commission would investigate the payment capacity of 
the country in question and propose a final sum within six months 
of the peace treaty coming into force. The commission would also 
179) The Smaller Powers and Germany, The Economist 8.2.1947, pp. 228-229. 
180) First Meeting of the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, 
August 16, 1946, 4 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 246-247; Second Meeting of the 
Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, August 19, 1946, 4 P.M., 
FRUS 1946 III, p. 254. 
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fix a value for goods delivered to the Soviet Union since the 
armistice agreement and would deduct this from the total amount 
of compensation. The remainder would be spread over five to ten 
years with the following allowance made for payment capacity: the 
reparation sum would represent a certain proportion of the value 
of export and would be paid to the receiver state as a currency 
exchange transfer.181  
This change proposed by Australia was opposed above all to 
Soviet interests, and Molotov's brusque response is thus under-
standable. But Australia was not supported by the Americans or 
British either. As Molotov pointed out, the Australian proposal, if 
approved, would probably have meant a delay of unspecified 
length in reaching agreement on reparations, bacause the final sum 
would be the object of endless dispute in the commission. It is 
noteworthy that the American representative Willard L. Thorp also 
rejected Australia's proposal on this ground. He thought it 
desirable for both parties to know the amount of the liability as 
soon as possible. 
It was questionable whether a firm conclusion could be reached 
on a specific sum after six months' study. It was also pointed out 
that if the sum were left open the former enemy country would be 
obliged to sign a non-specific form of agreement. A clause similar 
to that contained in the armistice agreement was to be preferred for 
the further reason that the liability imposed on Rumania had not 
proved too heavy. 
The above discussion was highly important in the matter of 
Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian reparations. Britain and the 
United States did in fact approve the Soviet idea of mentioning a 
certain sum for reparations, which in autumn 1944 they had 
agreed with reservations to include in the armistice agreements. 
Experience had shown that the Soviet notion worked 
satisfactorily. In autumn 1946 the search for a solution of the 
German question was clearly following a different course from the 
Italian, Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian cases, which could no 
longer be taken as precedents for Germany. On the other hand the 
problems connected with Germany suggested that if, as proposed 
181) Amendments Proposed by the Delegation of Australia. Peace Treaty with 
Rumania, FRUS 1946 IV, pp. 674-675. 
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by the Soviet Union at Yalta, a fixed reparations programme had 
been defined — with reliefs added if necessary — many difficulties 
could have been avoided. 
Australia's proposal was unsupported, and her delegation 
decided to withdraw it. This was the only initiative which led to 
important discussion in the economic commission while dealing 
with the reparations clause of the Romanian draft peace treaty. 
When the commission submitted a report on the results of its work 
it was possible to mention that representatives were unanimous in 
approving the clause in question. 
For Rumania the United States considered reparations of 300 
million dollars justified. For Hungary it proposed a reduction to 
200 million. Of this sum the Soviet Union would receive 133 
million while Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would share 67 
million. The Americans explained their proposal by saying that 
Hungary's economy would not stand the original liability. The 
United States had made several moves for the solution of 
Hungary's economic problems, but without succes so far. In 
comparing the payment capacity of Rumania and Hungary the 
Americans arrived at obligations which would be relatively the 
same for both countries if reparations for Hungary were reduced to 
200 million dollars. 
The Soviet Union tried to set aside the American initiative on 
technical grounds. At a plenary meeting of the peace conference on 
15th August it had been agreed that all proposals for changes must 
be submitted by midnight on 20th August. Before this, observed 
Thorp, the United States had reserved the right to bring up the 
clause in question, and this had been done as soon as the turn of 
the Hungarian agreement arrived for treatment. The question of 
procedure was settled favourably for the United States, and it was 
decided to discuss the proposal.182 
The Soviet Union then sought to convince listeners that the 
imposed liability did not exceed the Hungarian capacity to pay. 
Payment of reparations had been eased by a two-year extension of 
the time limit. The country's industry had revived well, and there 
were good prospects for Hungarian economic development. The 
182) Fortieth Meeting of the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, 
October 2, 1946, 9 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 633-635. 
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Soviet Union emphasized that the new democratic Hungary 
admitted her obligation and on this basis wished to create more 
stable relations with other countries. The actual effect on 
Hungary's economic development would have been the return of 
Hungarian property from the American occupation zone of 
Germany. When a vote was taken, the American proposal did not 
receive sufficient support. Seven delegations opposed it, five 
supported it, two abstained from voting.'83 
When Hungary's affairs had been dealt with, the draft for 
Finland was the next in line. On 4th October the United States 
submitted a proposal at a meeting of the Economic Commission for 
the reduction of Finnish reparations to 200 million dollars. As in 
the case of Hungary the United States made this proposal after the 
time limit was up. Because the Americans had not reserved the 
right to reintroduce the matter as they had done with the 
Hungarian draft, the chairman of the Commission did not allow 
the proposal on the agenda. The American representative Jacques 
Reinstein admittedly observed that procedure in this case was not 
the same as for Hungary because the American proposal supported 
observations made by the Finnish government. As the Americans 
could not change the clause they decided to vote against it. The 
same was done by the Union of South Africa, Canada and New 
Zealand. Nine delegations voted in favour, Australia abstained. As 
Australia had withdrawn her own amendment, article 22 on 
reparations was approved without changes by the Economic 
Commission.184 
After the case of Finland the Economic Commission examined 
the reparations liability of Bulgaria to Yugoslavia and Greece. In 
this connection Thorp mentioned that 300 million dollars imposed 
the smallest burden on Rumania, a heavier one on Hungary and a 
still heavier one on Finland. He was prepared, however, to take the 
Rumanian case as a starting-point for considering the others, and 
accordingly recommended the sum of 100 million dollars for 
183) Forty-first Meeting of the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, 
October 3, 1946, 10 A.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 636-638; Report of the 
Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland on the Draft Peace Treaty 
with Hungary 11.10.1946, FRUS 1946 IV, pp. 535-566. 
184) Report of the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland on the Draft 
Peace Treaty with Finland 8.10.1946, FRUS 1946 IV, pp. 573-589. 
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Bulgaria. After several votes had been taken the sum proposed by 
Britain for Bulgaria, 125 million, was decided on.185 
Paris: Plenary Meeting 
No important changes were made by the Economic Commission in 
the reparations clauses of the draft peace treaties for the Balkans 
and Finland. When the drafts came up for reconsideration at a 
plenary meeting they had already taken shape. Despite this the 
American representative Senator Arthur Vandenberg proposed a 
further reduction in the reparations sum for Finland, but this did 
not have the result hoped for, Finland's liability remaining at 300 
million dollars.186 
From spring 1944 onwards the United States had stood aside 
from the preparation of a peace treaty for Finland, basing its 
attitude on the fact that the countries had not been at war with 
each other. However, Washington regarded the reparations 
liability for Finland as reasonable. The Americans would not have 
granted credits to the Finns if they had doubted the latter's ability 
to pay reparations, and when the peace conference began, it was 
not mere concern with the Finnish situation which gave them a 
reason for proposing a reduction of reparations. 
If the Americans had actually found the recent speech by 
Finland to be an important turning point, they had had several 
days in which to suggest changes. 
In fact, American efforts to reduce Finland's liability were not 
based primarily on a wish to help the Finns. Finland was 
successfully meeting her obligation to the Soviet Union, and 
reduction of that obligation would have been a propaganda victory 
for the Americans. It could have been explained to the world that 
the sum demanded by the Soviet was too much. The American 
proposal did not question the main features of the provisions of the 
armistice agreement as the Australians had done, but was 
185) Forty-fifth Meeting of the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, 
October 4, 1946, 10 P.M, FRUS 1946 III, pp. 677-681. 
186) Forty-sixth Plenary Meeting, October 14, 1946, 10 A.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 
840-843; Forty-seventh Plenary Meeting, October 14, 1946, 3.30 P.M., FRUS 
1946 III, pp. 843-856. 
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concerned only with the amount of the obligation imposed on the 
debtor. The Americans did not believe their proposal would go 
through, and it was therefore not important to ensure even that it 
came up for consideration. It was useful for Arthur Vandenberg to 
show concern in this matter: in his home state of Minnesota there 
was a substantial Finnish colony. The proposal had served its 
purpose when it had proved usable in the arguments of the cold 
war. The suggestion for a reduced sum of reparations was aimed 
more against the Soviet Union than in favour of Finland.187 
Paris: Italian Reparations 
Proposals for changes in the draft peace treaty for Italy were first 
discussed in the Italian Economic Commission on 27th August. 
Before this Italy too had had the opportunity to express her views 
on the draft peace treaty. As the reparations clause — except for 
the Soviet share of 100 million dollars — was still open, the 
Italians did not comment on it apart from a few technical 
observations. 
In the Italian case Australia had made substantially the same 
proposal for a change as in the previously mentioned cases. The 
reparations commission would have so directed payments to the 
Soviet Union and other Allies that within six months of the peace 
treaty coming into force the Italians would make currency transfers 
to the value of a certain proportion of their exports. 
After the discussion on the Balkan countries and Finland these 
proposed amendments had no chance of approval. Despite this 
Australia did not withdraw them: her representative E. R. Walker 
defended his country's views. Australia did not wish to question 
reparations for the Soviet Union — it was merely that no one knew 
whether the sum in question was suitable. Once again Molotov 
strongly criticised the Australian proposal: Australia had proposed 
so many amendments that she must have had help in doing so. The 
Soviet proposal for 300 million dollars in all was a minimum claim 
for reparations which would not satisfy Yugoslavia and Albania at 
least. The Australian proposal for currency payments, on the other 
187) Polvinen 1986, pp. 252-253. 
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hand, was clearly favourable to Western capitalists as it would 
force countries on the losing side to sell their goods cheaply to the 
West. In Molotov's opinion the settlement of reparations should 
not be delayed or left for "some superfluous commission" to 
examine.188 
Discussion of the proposed Australian amendment continued 
next day. After speeches by Greece and France Vyshinsky once 
more expressed Soviet criticism. And although South Africa was 
prepared to approve parts of the proposal, in the final vote it was 
supported only by Australia and New Zealand.189 
In a written statement the United States opposed the Australian 
proposal because in the opinion of the United States economic 
liabilities for states on the losing side should be fixed as soon as 
possible. For this reason a separate reparations commission was 
not needed, and payments as currency transfers meant 
troublesome credits from other countries.190 
On 30th August the Economic Commission for Italy decided to 
set up a sub-commission to consider reparations. Its members were 
Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France from the 
Council of Foreign Ministers and Yugoslavia, Greece and Ethiopia 
to represent the creditors. Czechoslovakia and Canada were also 
made members because they had made no claims on Italy. 
Before the sub-commission began work the Economic 
Commission prepared to vote on the articles dealing with 
reparations for the Soviet Union. In this connection two important 
proposed amendments were presented. The first — once again 
from Australia — concerned itself with a commission to co-
ordinate reparations deliveries. This was rejected, none of the great 
powers supporting it.191 
The other proposed amendment was from Brazil, who believed 
that the article reading: "The USSR shall furnish to Italy on 
commercial terms materials..." ought to have read: "The USSR 
188) Fourth Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, August 27, 1946, 4 
P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 293-294. 
189) Fifth Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, August 28, 1946, 4 P.M., 
FRUS 1946 III, pp. 305-306. 
190) Statement by the United States Delegation on Article 64 (s.d.), FRUS 1946 IV, 
p. 385. 
191) Eight Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, September 2, 1946, 4 
P.M., FRUS 1946 III. 
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shall, if necessary, furnish to Italy..." Brazil's reason was that the 
additional words emphasized that Italy could obtain raw materials 
from other sources and thus laid stress on freedom of trade. No 
wish to change the draft was evident: in the opinion of France the 
original text did not forbid Italy to obtain goods from elsewhere. 
Thorp, the American representative, emphasized for his part that 
the article obliged the Soviet Union to supply materials needed for 
current production deliveries without causing difficulties to the 
Italian balance of payments. In a written statement the United 
States pointed out that Italian reparations to the Soviet Union were 
of a special nature. The intention was that the Soviet Union should 
supply raw materials to Italy and that the Italian share should be 
"value added by manufacture." These supplies must not lessen 
Italy's opportunities to obtain foreign raw materials either for 
domestic consumption or to be used for the export industry, but 
the Soviet Union was also not prevented from obtaining these 
materials from other countries.192 
The Brazilian proposed amendment secured only four votes. 
On the last day of August the Soviet Union had proposed to the 
Council of Foreign Ministers that an order should be added to the 
reparations article for pricing to be based on the gold parity of the 
dollar on 1st July 1946. When this was approved in the Economic 
Commission reparations to be received by the Soviet Union were 
settled.193 
The Economic Commission continued its work by hearing other 
creditors of Italy. The last speeches were made on 11th September, 
when Thorp spoke for the United States and Tarchiani for Italy.194 
Thorp stressed the magnanimity of his country, which had the 
right to claim compensation but had in fact given more than 100 
million dollars in aid to the Italians. He admitted that "other 
nations which maintained large occupation forces in various 
countries might not be in the same financial position as the United 
States", so that some states could be considered entitled to partial 
192) Statement by the United States Delegation on article 64 (s.d.); FRUS 1946 IV, 
pp. 385-386. 
193) Ninth Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, September 3, 1946, 4 
P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 348-349. 
194) Fourteenth Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, September 11, 
1946, 4 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 425-427. 
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compensation. 
Thorp did not neglect the opportunity to make propaganda for 
his country. As far the suspicion expressed by Britain and other 
Allies that the Italians were being let off too easily he replied that 
fascism and its consequences had laid a heavy burden on the 
country which should not be increased by excessive demands for 
reparations. 
The Economic Commission now had to decide on the share of 
reparations for each creditor. In a voting process which lasted till 
early October this result was finally arrived at:195 
Albania 	 Nothing 
Ethiopia 	 $ 25 million 
Greece 	 $ 100 million 
Yugoslavia 	 $ 100 million 
Total 	 $ 225 million 
The recommendations of the Economic Comission for Italy were 
discussed at a plenary meeting on 9th October. Reparations to the 
Soviet Union were decided unanimously. And although the shares 
to other states required a further vote, the amounts in dollars 
decided by the Commission remained in force.196 
195) Thirty-eight Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, October 4, 1946, 
9.45 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 674-677. 
196) Thirty-sixth Plenary Meeting, October 9, 1946, 9.30 P.M., FRUS 1946 III, pp. 
727-758. 
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Germany Excluded from 
Agreements 
Reparations from Germany? 
Although preparation of a peace treaty with Germany was left till 
later, talk on the reparations which might be obtained from her 
continued during the autumn of 1946. After the thoughts 
expressed by Molotov in Paris General Sokolovsky, commander of 
the Soviet occupation zone — together with his subordinates — in 
summer 1946 brought up unofficially the possibility of increasing 
deliveries from current production as part of the German 
reparations programme. Capital transfers, on the other hand, might 
be broken off for as much as 10 years. The Americans, like the 
British, saw in the Soviet attitude an indication that transfers of 
equipment as booty and reparations had caused problems for the 
creditor, and the Soviet government was now merely trying in a 
new way to increase the material benefit obtainable from Ger-
many.197 
In Paris Byrnes gave no indication whatever that Molotov's 
proposal might lead to a compromise which would settle the 
dispute over German reparations. The relevance of the proposal in 
that connection did not escape him, however. Besides a compro-
mise the Soviet Union had other aims — so the Americans 
calculated. First, the Soviet Union was believed to be in a situation 
where its people wanted consumer goods so plentifully and 
quickly that the focus of reparations had to be shifted from capital 
goods to current production deliveries. The latter would secure for 
197) Caffery from Paris to SD 24.8.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 593-594. 
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the Soviet Union more goods than deliveries of equipment could 
produce at home, and in addition German industry would be 
firmly directed eastward. If, for instance, German industry 
exported 10 % of its output — as already in the Soviet zone — in 
the form of reparations to the Soviet Union, a stranglehold would 
be established in Germany such as the Soviet already possessed in 
Finland and the Balkans. 
It should be especially noted that from the summer and autumn 
of 1946 onwards ever-widening political aims became linked with 
reparations in American thinking. When the war ended the United 
States worked for a settlement in which the occupation of 
Germany should be as short and cheap for the Americans as 
possible. Although the Soviet right to reparations was recognized 
it must not be realized at American expense. What preoccupied 
American decision-makers above all in the autumn of 1946 was 
whether through current production reparations the Soviet sphere 
of interest could be opened to a political system in the style of 
Western democracy. Finland and the Balkan countries who had 
paid reparations from current production provided an example 
which the Americans did not find at all encouraging. 
After the current ten-year period the Soviet proposal also 
assured the Kremlin of an opportunity to decide whether 
equipment should be moved to its own territory or whether 
production in Germany would be more advantageous to the Soviet 
Union. Regarded as a whole, both politically and economically, 
the Soviet proposal appeared in American eyes a stronger effort 
than earlier to intervene in the management of German affairs. 
Solution of the deadlock was overshadowed by a strong suspicion 
of Soviet aims.198 
The alternative presented by the Soviet Union was not at once 
set aside by the Americans, however, although the British once 
again sharply rejected it. After talks with Byrnes and in 
conjunction with Control Comission work unofficial discussions 
were started by Clay and his economic adviser General (Brig. Gen.) 
Draper with Soviet representatives on the possibility of using 
German current production for reparations.199 
198) Durbrow from Moscow to SD 6.9.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 602-603. 
199) Clay to Echols 14.10.1946, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 269-270. 
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In public and in principle the United States did not rule out the 
possibility of an agreement over current production reparations, 
though in practice it was not believed to be possible. During a 
much publicized speech in Stuttgart on 6th September, for 
instance, Byrnes noted that reparations from current production 
were not mentioned in the Potsdam agreement at all, and that they 
were "incompatible" with the agreed production ceiling. Without 
mentioning Molotov's proposal he pointed out that the production 
level in question made a self-sufficient German economy possible, 
but no more. The United States had no wish to claim larger 
reparations from Germany than had been agreed at Potsdam. 
Byrnes made no comment on the idea that the production level 
might be raised and reparations equivalent to transfers of capital 
goods taken from current production — there was no agreement on 
the total sum of German reparations.20o 
A compromise on reparations might well have broken the 
deadlock on Germany. A settlement could have had still further 
advantages from the American standpoint. The decision to break 
off reparation removals meant also that the reception of 
reparations was deferred for other countries besides the Soviet 
Union. In IARA circles the United States was criticised more than 
before — there was even talk of the dissolution of IARA. The 
British and French were known to have used the occasion for 
explaining how the American decision punished receiving states 
unduly — the affluent Americans did not understand the problems 
of small European countries. Delay in settling the question of 
reparations caused problems in trade between European countries, 
and, in addition, when German factories stood idle their equip-
ment deteriorated. Molotov's ideas were considered reasonable in 
Europe. But the American demand for Germany to be treated as an 
economic whole before any payment of reparations would have 
lost its credibility if the Americans had started deliveries to IARA 
countries alone — the German reparations problem had to be 
solved in its entirety.201  
At the negotiations in the Control Commission the Soviet Union 
outlined a proposal for reparations from current production which 
200) See e.g. Ratchford & Ross 1947, pp. 242-251. 
201) Acheson to Caffery in Paris 11.10.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 611-613. 
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some Americans described as "reasonable". By its provisions the 
receiving state would supply the raw materials from which 
reparation goods would be manufactured in current production — 
as in the case of Italy the Soviet Union provided raw materials in 
this way. A central administration would be established for 
Germany including a department to supervise the implementation 
of a reparations programme from current production. The pro-
gramme for transfers of capital would remain the responsibility of 
the zone commander — prohibition of transfers would be 
abolished — but otherwise economic boundaries between zones 
would be removed completely. For Germany as a whole an export-
import programme would be drawn up. The Control Commission 
would agree on the amount of reparations from current production 
and at the same time revise the level of industry and plans 
affecting transfers of capital goods. 
The Soviet proposal contained many demands made earlier by 
the Americans. The programme would have been based above all 
on the idea of treating all Germany as an economic unit. Still open 
was the question of occupation costs as well as the question of 
responsibility for the earlier deficit and that to be expected. 
Reparation Terms 
But concessions directly linked to reparations were not enough for 
the Americans. The objective was clear: "Undoubtedly at that time 
(= meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers — HH) we shall 
want to tie in whatever agreement is made on this subject with 
political considerations. The Russian need for commodities out of 
German production is so urgent and apparent that we would be 
well-advised to use the opportunity to obtain very definite 
commitments from them on the subject of the introduction into the 
Soviet zone of occupation of our form of democratic methods."202 
Proposed as a minimum condition for a reparations programme 
from current production was the establishment of rights of 
citizenship and political equality. "This may be our last 
opportunity to use such a potent bargaining position in Germany 
202) Murphy from Berlin to SD 14.10.1946, FRUS 1946 V. pp. 621-623. 
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for this purpose. "203 
Among those who conducted foreign affairs for the United States 
were many who doubted whether concessions could be obtained 
from the Soviet Union in this connection. Messages from the 
American Embassy in Moscow suggested this in particular. Experi-
ence showed, it was stated, that the Kremlin was more willing to 
sacrifice economic aims than political ones.204 
Those who supported trading thought that although there was 
nothing to gain, there was also nothing to lose. In the first place the 
"concessions" pursued by the Americans were, in their own 
opinion, merely a fulfilment of the Potsdam agreement — in other 
words the aim was merely to secure Soviet co-operation in 
something which they had in fact accepted. A reparations 
programme from current production might win Soviet assent to the 
above political conditions, but it was still possible for the 
Americans to cut off deliveries from current production. An 
agreement should not lead to a situation where the Americans 
would give up something without good reason while the other 
party could break the agreement with impunity. The United States 
owed its strong position mainly to its status as an occupier of 
Germany, where it could act effectively, whereas in the Balkans 
and in Finland the Americans had to be content with indirect 
means.205 
The Soviet offer interested the Americans for the further reason 
that Germany's growing productive capacity would undoubtedly 
be an important factor in European reconstruction. If the Soviet 
Union supplied raw materials to Germany, the United States 
would not be obliged to give an enormous sum of dollars for 
German productive installations. Increasing production guaran-
teed employment, which in turn was expected to ensure social and 
political stabilization. The drawback was that increased pro-
duction went at least partly to reparations, while with the aid of 
exports occupation costs could have been lowered immediately. 
In Clay's opinion the advantages and drawbacks of reparations 
from current production were impossible to evaluate until a 
203) Murphy from Berlin to SD 16.10.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 623-625. 
204) Durbrow from Moscow to SD 23.10.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 626-629. 
205) Murphy from Berlin to SD 25.10.1946, FRUS 1946 V, pp. 631-633. 
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comprehensive plan was made, based on dollar values and taking 
account of Germany's internal needs together with the export-
import programme. Clay's view was that if the United States 
intended to agree to reparations from current production, no less 
than 11 preconditions must be met. They would guarantee 
fulfilment of most of the aims — political and economic — 
pursued by the Americans. On the economic side the resources of 
all Germany would have been used for both exports and repar-
ations while an export-import programme and currency reform 
were carried out at the same time. In political matters freedom of 
movement, expression and association in the style of Western 
democracy would have been achieved. 
Reparations from current production were the basic problem in 
Clay's opinion, and a solution must be found to it before 
disarmament and peace with Germany could be agreed. In the 
situation of that time the Americans had perhaps their last 
opportunity to break the supremacy which the Soviet was 
establishing over eastern Europe and East Germany.206 
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers 
Before reparations from current production were further 
considered by the foreign ministers an important change had 
occurred in the American political leadership. Secretary of State 
Byrnes had lost the President's confidence and planned to resign 
in the spring 1946. Having completed the preparation of peace 
treaties with the allies of Germany, Byrnes submitted his resig-
nation. Appointed to succeed him in January 1947 was General 
George C. Marshall, who represented a firmer policy in relations 
with the Soviet Union. 
When the Council of Foreign Ministers continued its work in 
Moscow durin spring 1947 reparation claims for the great powers 
and the small IARA countries came up for discussion. Views on 
how to settle the question had been obtained from the countries of 
206) Clay to Byrnes November 1946, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 279-
284. 
126 
Europe.207 Among west European countries Greece and Norway in 
particular demanded substantial reparations, and so did Poland 
and Yugoslavia. As the Greeks saw it: "The amount of Germany's 
liability should be fixed at the highest possible level." This applied 
also to reparations from current production, and in addition 
technically trained personnel should be placed at the disposal of 
the Greeks as a form of compensation. 
Belgium and Holland, on the other hand, were in favour of 
moderate reparations. It was necessary to wait until Germany was 
adequately self-sufficient and then consider the possibilities. At 
the same time while these states in some degree approved the 
reconstruction of Germany they expressed more often than before 
the notion of including her in a broader European economic 
system.208 
At the conference of foreign ministers in Moscow the Soviet 
Union announced — as it had done earlier in the Control 
Commission — that it was prepared to approve Germany's being 
administered as a single economic unit provided that reparations 
from current production were first agreed on. The Soviet also re-
emphasized its view that the German production level could be 
raised sufficiently to make reparations from current production a 
practical possibility.209 
Discussion of reparations from current production began in 
Moscow with opening speeches by the foreign ministers. Bevin 
stressed the earlier standpoint of the Western Allies that an 
integrated economic administration for all Germany was an 
essential factor in the search for a settlement. In his opinion the 
German production level should be raised: important though it 
was to dismantle Germany's war potential, it was equally 
important to ensure that she was self-sufficient in peacetime. 
Bevin further stressed that the British could not approve any 
further burden of occupation, which meant in practice an 
unfavourable attitude to reparations from current production. His 
Majesty's Government was willing to work for the political and 
207) Views of the Allied Governments on the Principal Aspects of the German 
Problem, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 85-89, 96-99. 
208) The Smaller Powers and Germany, The Economist 8.2.1947, pp. 228-229. 
209) Principal Economic Issues on Current German Problems for Council of 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Moscow, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 216-218. 
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General George C. Marshall, United 
State's Secretary of Defence and since 
January 1947 Secretary of State. 
economic integration of Germany. 
At the Paris conference Byrnes had announced that the United 
States was prepared to make agreements with each occupying 
power for the zones to be made into a single economic unit. After 
some uncertainty the British had assented, while the Soviet Union 
and France had declined. Earlier Molotov had strongly criticised 
the American and British agreement on the ground that it made 
possible the penetration of Germany by the economic empires of 
these countries. The Americans had replied to these charges by 
saying that American investment in Germany had not increased at 
all during the occupation.210 
Molotov continued the proposal he had made in Paris for a 
programme of reparations from current production, and appealed 
for fulfilment of the Yalta agreement. He was able to suggest 
plausibly that on the basis of this Soviet view the Allies might 
work together to revive Germany's peacetime economy, which 
210) See e.g. Clay Contradicts Russia's Charges, The New York Times 1.3.1947, 
p. 5- 
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would enable war-ravaged countries to receive the goods they 
needed. 
For his part Marshall asserted that Molotov's ideas contained no 
basis or logic for an Allied policy, and that charges and counter-
charges in his opinion solved nothing. Like Bevin Marshall 
stressed again that to treat all Germany as a single economic unit 
was the key to solution of the problem.211  
After the opening speeches the foreign ministers were obliged to 
decide wheter a representative of IARA should be heard at the 
conference. Molotov and Bidault expected backing from this 
direction, for which reason they thought it was not right to bypass 
so many countries connected with the matter in hand. Marshall 
and Bevin thought, however, that an appearance by IARA was 
unnecessary. In their view all were agreed that a start should be 
made with reparations as soon as possible. There was disagree-
ment on how obstacles to a solution should be removed, but an 
executive organization such as IARA could not help in this matter. 
It was finally agreed that the deputy foreign ministers should 
inform the Council of Ministers if IARA representatives had 
anything to add to the report they had submitted. IARA had no 
more influence than this on the negotiations of the four great 
powers. 
The Soviet Union — whose reparation claim often featured in 
the west European press — wished to expose the fact through 
IARA that many other countries awaited reparations from 
Germany. Molotov branded the Western Allies as unwilling to 
dismantle the German war potential: in the Western zones, he 
stated, only three factories out of 1,557 marked for reparations had 
been dismantled to date. In the Soviet zone, on the other hand, 676 
out of 735 had been stripped, Molotov exhorted the Western 
powers to consider without delay what factories should be sent to 
which countries.212 
According to Molotov American and British statements could 
give the erroneous impression that the Western Allies desired no 
reparations at all. Yet the Americans and British alike had received 
them from Germany substantially — gold and other German 
211) Marshall to Truman 17.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 255-257. 
212) Molotov Demands Faster Disarming, The New York Times 12.3.1947, p. 2. 
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"The Big Four at Moscow as Mr. Low sees them" (The New York Times, 
March 30, 1940). 
property, merchant shipping and German patents and inventions 
had been moved to the West. Relying on newspaper data Molotov 
placed their value at over 10 milliard dollars. In addition Great 
Britain, France and the United States were receiving reparations 
from current production, such as coal from the Ruhr and timber 
from south Germany.213  
Among the Western Allies Molotov's speech aroused violent 
annoyance, for they had been given a quite opposite picture of the 
situation. Bevin and Marshall challenged Molotov to reveal the 
information on reparations received by each country. A few days 
213) United States Delegation Minutes 18.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 257-262. 
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later American newspapers related that the United States had 
received various property from Germany to the value of less than 
275 million dollars. German assets — depending on the method of 
calculation — amounted to 150-250 million, ships to five million, 
deliveries from IARA to 66 million and direct reparation deliveries 
to less than 10 million.214 
The Americans had published all patents and inventions which 
had come into their possession and sold them to all who wished to 
buy. A Soviet representative had been one of the most eager 
purchasers. Marshall called on the Soviet Union to do the same 
with the patents and inventions which had come into its hands.215 
The next object of dispute concerned what had actually been 
agreed regarding reparations. Even before the Moscow conference 
the Americans had given an interpretation of events by which the 
Potsdam agreement had superseded Yalta. Current production was 
not mentioned at Potsdam as a source of reprations, which meant 
— in the American interpretation — that the Allies had rejected 
this form of reparations altogether. The Americans announced that 
they would not follow the Soviets from Potsdam to Yalta.216 
In reality the Americans had not interpreted the Potsdam 
agreement in this way: in the Control Commission, for instance, 
they had negotiated on the possibility of putting into practice 
reparations from current production. Meeting Marshall at an 
unofficial discussion over lunch on 22nd March, Bevin too stated 
that Potsdam was not an indisputable replacement of the Yalta 
agreement though His Majesty's Government could not of course 
commit itself to such deliveries before the German economy was 
self-sufficient. According to Marshall those Americans in particu-
lar who had been both at Yalta and at Potsdam were convinced that 
their own interpretation was justified. 
In Marshall's opinion the Soviet attitude could be understood 
simply thus: removals of capital goods had not benefited creditors 
sufficiently and the effort was being made to gain more advantage 
through current production deliveries. But there was no need to 
214) Reparations Paid to U.S. Disclosed, The New York Times 26.3.1947, p. 3. 
215) United States Delegation Minutes 18.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 257-262. 
216) Marshall to Truman 18.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 262-263. Marshall 
Disputes Soviets, Rejects Reparations Bid, The New York Times 19.3.1947, 
p. 1. 
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give the Soviet government a means of influencing economic 
matters in the zones occupied by the Western Allies. 
The American press repeated the views of its political leaders to 
the world. Marshall's warnings against allowing German industrial 
reconstruction in the guise of reparations were presented as 
eagerly as the claim that the German economy at that time could 
not sustain reparations from current production combined with 
the requirements of occupation forces and the Germans 
themselves.217 
Molotov stated that the Soviet Union took the regulations of the 
Potsdam agreement as its main starting-point — the unwillingness 
of the Western Allies to act on its reparations articles had led to a 
deadlock. The Yalta and Potsdam agreements complemented each 
other in his opinion, nor did Potsdam forbid compensation from 
current production by any means. In the Soviet view the opening 
phrase of the Potsdam agreement: "In accordance with the Crimea 
decision" indicated that the Yalta agreement had not been changed 
at Potsdam. 
The obligatory nature of these agreements was ultimately of 
secondary importance to the great powers — the political content 
was the important aspect. In his above-mentioned meeting with 
Bevin Marshall did not place himself in complete opposition to 
reparations from current production. In accordance with 
discussions at the Control Commission he said that the United 
States was considering the possibility of bringing raw materials 
from the Soviet zone for manufacture in Western zones. It must 
then be ensured, however, that the development of a self-sufficient 
German economy was not delayed. Marshall thought nevertheless 
that it was almost impossible to guarantee Congressional approval 
of a settlement which included reparations even indirectly. On 
these grounds Marshall felt that reparations from current pro-
duction could not be thought of as a practical possibility for at least 
the next two years. 
Bevin promised on his own account to consider arrangements in 
217) See e.g. U.S. is Urged to Stress Potsdam Formula on Reparations at Moscow 
Conference, The New York Times 10.3.1947, p. 4; Marshall Warns against a 
Revival of German Power, The New York Times 20.3.1947, p. 1; Warning on 
Reparations, The New York Times 22.3.1947, p. 1; Soviet Plan Held Peril to 
Germany, The New York Times 31.3.1947, pp. 1-3. 
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accordance with the above, but next day he sent a letter stating: 
"His Majesty's Government would not find it possible to agree to 
any settlement of the German problem involving reparation from 
current production which would entail further expenditure by His 
Majesty's Government."218 
In Moscow the great powers came up against several conflicts 
which had arisen over settlement of the German question. In Clay's 
opinion the basic issue for the Council of Foreign Ministers was 
not Germany's demilitarization, denazification or democratiz-
ation; it did not consist of population transfers any more than of 
territorial dispositions. The central questions for the conference 
were problems of the economy and reparations. Although the 
Soviet proposal for reparations from current production was not 
acceptable without preconditions, it was worth while — if an 
agreement of the great powers was desired at all — at least to 
elucidate what was required for reparations from current 
production.21° 
From Moscow on the last day on March Marshall sent Truman a 
report stating that negotiations on the level of industry and on 
reparations from current production had reached a decisive stage. 
Marshall thought that in principle it was possible to increase 
German peacetime industry on the basis of four-power agreement. 
It would require factory installations which had been primarily 
marked for reparations. Marshall suggested to Truman that he be 
given authority to examine the possibilities for reparations from 
current production up to the value represented by the above 
installations if they remained outside reparations. Also, the 
amount of reparations from current production would depend on 
Germany's ability to increase the export surplus. In no case would 
such a plan be carried out before the economic and political 
integration of Germany was an accomplished fact.22° 
At a meeting of foreign ministers held on 31st March all the 
parties concerned repeated their former standpoint. Marshall 
218) Memorandum of Conversation (Marshall) 22.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 273-
275. 
219) Clay's Memorandum 30.3.1947, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 328-
331. 
220) Marshall to Truman 31.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 298-299. Paterson 1975, 
pp. 244-245. 
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pointed out that although the foreign ministers in Moscow were 
resolving their differences, they should not seek an agreement 
merely for its own sake. The Americans admitted, he said, that 
their responsibility in Europe continued, and they wished to build 
solidly rather than quickly. For his part Bidault still linked the 
matter of German coal and the Saar territory with reparations, 
while Bevin saw no chance of reparations for the next few years. 
Molotov still insisted on a reparations agreement in concrete terms 
which would include raising the German production level and 
increasing exports and imports.221  
In the absence of new instructions from Washington Marshall 
presented the above ideas at the following day's meeting. Without 
committing themselves to anything as yet, the Americans were 
willing to examine the possibilities of reparations from current 
production in a stuation where these reparation would compen-
sate for the ending of removals of capital goods as Germany's 
production level rose. It should be remembered, of course, that the 
British opposed all reparations from current production. 
Molotov could not accept the American offer. Reparations from 
current production could not compensate for the cessation of 
removals of capital goods. Raising the production level did not 
lead to a reduction in the number of factories marked for 
reparations, but raising the level made reparations from current 
production possible. Views on Germany's possibilities for paying 
reparations differed greatly.222 
But the innermost conflict was not concerned with the amount 
or nature of reparations in themselves. The examples of Rumania, 
Hungary and Finland had shown the Soviet Union how beneficial 
reparations from current production were. For this reason the 
Soviet government demanded logically that agreement should first 
be reached on the principle of reparations from current 
production; it was only then that the foundations would have been 
laid for practical realization. The Western Allies, on the other 
hand, demanded the integration of Germany first: only after this — 
if the German economy stood the strain — could reparations be 
discharged from current production. In public the Americans were 
221) Marshall to Acheson 31.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 299-301. 
222) Marshall to Acheson 1.4.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 303-304. 
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able to show the Soviet Union and its partial supporter France in a 
doubtful light: by demanding both a higher production level and 
reparations from current production these countries were about to 
repeat the mistakes following the First World War in building up 
German strength with the support of reparations. "We must avoid 
at all cost establishing conditions in Germany similar to those after 
the First World War, when in an incredibly short period of time 
Germany, through increased production for reparations and 
foreign loans, was able to build up her internal economy geared for 
war."  
Less attention was attracted by a later point in Marshall's 
statement : "At the same time under no conditions should we set 
her (= Germany — HH) so low that a democratic life could not 
hope to survive in Germany."223  The basic motive of American 
policy was not fear of German military growth. If it had been, the 
Americans would not have planned the programme of recon-
struction which became known as the Marshall Plan. Just as no 
agreement was made with the Soviet Union for reparations from 
current production, so the Soviet government was provided with 
no means of influencing the management of economic affairs 
outside its own zone. 
The Moscow conference had reached a deadlock which the 
foreign ministers could not break. As the conference gave rise to 
nothing more than charges and counter-charges Clay asked 
permission on 31st March to return to Germany224 A few days later 
Clay instructed his subordinates that he was prepared to consider a 
new production level only on the basis of the American and British 
zones. To the Soviet Union and countries under its supervision 
reparations could not be delivered, and this also made the work of 
IARA impossible.225 
One consequence of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers 
was that the great powers found no solution to the question of 
German reparations. The Western powers estimated that during 
the 1950s Germany might reach a level at which an export surplus 
223) Marshall to Truman 19.3.1947, FRUS 1947 II, pp. 263-265. Marshall Warns 
against a Revival of German Power, The New York Times 22.3.1947, p. 1. 
Warning on Reparations, The New York Times 22.3.1947, p. 12. 
224) Clay to Marshall 31.3.1947, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, p. 332. 
225) Clay to Draper 2.4.1947, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay I, pp. 332-333. 
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could be achieved. Repayment of loans taken out in previous years 
would take 10-15 years, so that during the 1960s it might be 
possible to return to the question of reparations from current 
production. Sympathy for the Soviet Union was certainly felt in 
Europe: when the reparations programme came to nothing the 
Soviet were in fact obliged to sacrifice the goods they were to 
receive from Germany — which were, they thought, the least of 
their entitlement.226  But the unyielding attitudes adopted by the 
parties concerned produced a situation which did not even allow 
discussion of the substance of possible reparations. 
The Soviet Union had decided to obtain immediate satisfaction 
from Germany and Eastern Europe. The Americans and British 
were equally determined to secure the economy of a self-sufficient 
Germany which would in turn help the whole of Europe onto its 
feet. Deadlock between the great powers seemed almost 
unavoidable. It could only have been avoided by finding such 
concessions as were worth making for the parties concerned. The 
Soviet Union might have dispensed with reparations from current 
production if it had obtained the equal benefit of a loan from the 
United States. The United States held the key position in seeking a 
solution, but did not wish to give a dollar loan to the Soviet Union. 
To the Americans the policy of the Soviet Union appeared to be the 
creation of a selfsufficient, closed and powerful bloc as opposed to 
creating fruitful contacts through an open door policy, and so the 
dollars remained on the other side of the Atlantic.227 
As the war ended it was undoubtedly expected in the Soviet 
Union that substantial material assistance would be received from 
the West to repair the damage of war. Reparations were one 
method, but wartime aid was expected to continue in peacetime. 
During the war the Americans and British had understandably 
gained the reputation of friends of the Soviet Union, and this could 
not easily be changed in public opinion. Germany's future 
constitution — whether based on a central administration or a 
federation — was a distant matter to most of the Soviet people. But 
during the Moscow conference, when the course of negotiation 
was widely followed in the Soviet Union, Molotov was able to 
226) Moscow: Reparations Deadlock, The Economist 29.3.1947, p. 448. 
227) Failure of a Mission?, The Economist 12.4.1947, pp. 521-522. 
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appeal effectively to his fellow-citizens by "revealing" that Bevin 
and Marshall had ruined the Soviet reparations plan. 
The Soviet people were told of the Yalta and Potsdam agree-
ments, of Soviet willingness to increase the extent of the German 
steel industry, and of other concessions so that reparations might 
be carried out. When Western leaders appealed to the heavy 
burden on American and British taxpayers there was certainly no 
response among Soviet citizens. Even if the Western powers were 
obliged to feed the Germans for some time, the expense entailed 
was not to be compared with the destruction caused to the Soviet 
Union. Why was the feeding of Germans in the forefront of 
speeches by Western leaders while nothing was said of helping the 
Soviet Union? Also, the Western powers appeared as breakers of 
the Yalta and Potsdam agreements: this was how Anglo-Saxon 
gentlemen honoured their commitments and promises. 
After the war there was much talk in Western circles of how 
Soviet diplomacy squandered the goodwill which the Soviet 
Union had gained in the West during the war. By the spring of 
1947 it appeared that the same had happened in the opposite 
direction. Marshall and Bevin wasted the moral trust in Western 
democracy which had sprung up among the Soviet people and 
which was evidently greater than the West knew. By refusing to 
approve reparations from current production the Western leaders 
had given the Soviet leaders a form of moral reparation on whose 
basis the latter could justify their own policy.228 
228) Reparations and the Russian People, The Economist 12.4.1947, pp. 542-543. 
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Conclusion 
With regard to all the European countries on the losing side except 
Germany herself the Allies reached agreement on reparations. 
Germany's position amid the powerful conflicting pressures of 
Eastern and Western interests was such that no solution for her 
could be found. 
When a reparations settlement was planned during the war the 
Americans understood Soviet aims to a great extent and were 
prepared for concessions, while the British opposed any 
Germany the situation changed. Soon after the war ended it 
became evident that for the reconstruction of Germany loans were 
needed. The British were especially conscious of the dangers 
connected with occupation of a country which was economically 
weak. In autumn 1945 the situation already looked chaotic: food 
supplies grew steadily worse, and, as a further example, in the iron 
industry of the Ruhr output was about 1 % of what it had been a 
year earlier. The Economist noted that "to compress fifty to sixty 
million people into a territory roughly the size of Britain and then 
totally de-industrialise it can only lead to the collapse and the 
disaster we are already witnessing."229 The British understood 
Soviet claims for reparations — no one thought them unreasonable 
in relation to the destruction the country had suffered — but the 
Germans immediately after the war were in no position to pay. 
When the war ended it was clear that the revival of Germany 
required external economic help in some form or other. In practice 
only the United States could give such help — Britain's own 
economy was badly in need of dollar credits. In a political sense to 
give loans — American taxpayers' dollars — to a country which 
had been an enemy a few months before was a doubtful procedure 
229) A Policy for the Ruhr, The Economist 8.9.1945, pp. 321-322. 
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for the country's leaders. The struggle between democracy and 
dictatorship was stronger in the popular mind than a confrontation 
of the socialist and capitalist systems. 
As an alternative to loans the political leaders of the United 
States and Britain often expressed the notion that the integration of 
Germany would have made German revival possible. 
Predominantly agricultural eastern Germany would have fed the 
western parts, and the industrial surplus of the west would have 
paid for essential imports. The conditions imposed by the Soviet 
Union and France, however, brought the American and British 
plans to nought. 
In any case such ideas would have had little chance of 
realization in postwar Germany. Economic problems in all zones 
were so great that without external help there was no solution. The 
transfer of Germany's eartern territories to Poland and the 
reparations taken by the Soviet Union from its zone affected the 
general situation only a little, however. Reconstruction in both the 
Soviet and French zones would have had to be financed by the 
Americans, and in addition a fusion of the American and British 
zones was already costing a great deal. But it is obvious that the 
integration of Germany would not have been as straightforward a 
solution, economically, as the American and British attitudes 
suggested. 
The economic problems would have been best solved, 
undoubtedly, by an expansion of German industry. An export 
surplus would then have begun to accumulate, enabling the 
Germans both to repay loans and discharge reparations. Such had 
happened in the case of Finland. 
Charles P. Kindleberger has estimated with good reason that 
Finland's success in discharging the heavy liability imposed on 
her was due to a favourable current account in foreign trade, to 
foreign loans and to the relief granted by the Soviet Union the 
matter of reparation obligations. But the main factor was the 
Finnish resolve to carry out the reparations programme. "Indeed it 
can be argued that the foreign credits and the Soviet concessions 
were the consequences of that resolve, and that the help of 
favourable terms of trade was altogether secondary."23° 
230) Kindleberger 1986/1987. 
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The case of Finland showed that even a heavy reparations 
programme could have been carried out if the great powers had 
agreed on the political preconditions. The raparations settelement 
of Versailles had taught the Americans to be cautious in granting 
loans to countries paying reparations. Immediately after the 
Second World War loans were granted to Germany only to save the 
country from a financial crisis. But the object of postwar loans was 
supposed to be the revival of production. After this was achieved 
Germany would have had a chance of self-sufficiency — provided 
that an expedient policy was followed in other respects. As an 
economic problem German reparations were not especially 
difficult — their payment would have been possible as a by-
product of reconstruction. But for political reasons to give a loan, 
whether to the enemy of previous years or to an ally as a 
reparation, was impossible for American leaders. 
By the time of the Potsdam conference differences between the 
great powers on reparations were not yet too great to be overcome. 
Reparations on a zonal basis reinforced the division of Germany, 
and the solution proposed by the Americans meant in practice a 
change in the realization of their aim to include all Germany in a 
single economic unit. At Potsdam the Allies had only Hitler's 
mistakes to correct — in spring 1947 the foreign ministers also had 
their own. The reparations settled in the armistice agreements 
were brought into final peace treaties, but the question of German 
reparations remained completely unsettled. 
Despite differences over matters of detail the Americans and 
British wanted the same things. Germany, they thought, should be 
reintegrated and the occupation troops brought home as soon as 
possible. To continue the division of the country was politically 
unwise, because German efforts for integration might reanimate 
national feeling. To avoid providing for others the Americans and 
British wished to make the Germans self-sufficient as soon as 
possible; it was believed in addition that a reviving country would 
be a poor basis for extremist movements, whether right- or left-
wing. As time advanced following the end of the war the belief 
began to emerge that the revival of Germany and Europe was 
impossible without direct American aid. 
The primary Soviet objective was to obtain satisfaction for the 
destruction it had suffered. At Potsdam the Soviet Union was 
prepared to reduce its claim substantially, an indication that in 
140 
return for a large dollar loan it might have waived its claim 
altogether or lowered it to a merely token level. Yet the Potsdam 
agreement signified that the collection of reparations was a settled 
matter, and the Soviet Union in its own zone began to act 
accordingly. Reparations from the Western zones remained on a 
small scale, however, which — as the Soviet Union rightly pointed 
out — deterred the Americans and British from carrying out the 
agreed programme in its entirety. To the Soviet Union integrated 
rule for all Germany and reparations from current production were 
undoubtedly tempting for the added reason that through them it 
might extend its influence to the economic life of the Western 
zones of Germany. 
The Americans would have been placed at an economic 
disadvantage by the integration of Germany — especially after the 
Soviet Union had removed a substantial part of the equipment 
from its zone — whereas the Soviet Union would have safeguarded 
not only the capital transfers it had already obtained but also 
reparations from current production and would have obtained at 
least the indirect possibility of influencing the economic life of 
Germany. For the Americans and British the integration of 
Germany had become a political symbol, and to achieve it they 
were prepared to make economic sacrifices — if the Soviet Union 
and France had agreed to the political conditions involved. By the 
time of the Moscow foreign ministers' conference the question was 
in essence whether the Soviet Union would bow to these 
conditions imposed by the West. 
If the choice was between German integration with reparations 
on Soviet terms and no integration or reparations, there was 
widespread willingness in the Western world to give up both. To 
be sure, integration was hoped for by many, but the pressure in 
that direction, it was believed, would in any case gradually 
increase till in due course it was irresistible. On the other hand a 
reparations claim, once approved, might poison European 
diplomacy for generations, as had happened after the First World 
War. 
At the same time as reparations were appearing less desirable to 
the Western states for a number of reasons, no alternative to them 
had become visible to the Soviet Union. Soon after the war 
American dollars were available for the British, but not for the 
Soviet Union. As aid for Germany was discussed more openly in 
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the West, forecasts of a capitalist world united against socialism 
seemed to be coming true. The foreign ministers' conference in 
Moscow would certainly have had a different atmosphere if 
Washington had acceded even in part to the Soviet request for a 
loan. 
The political conditions for a loan naturally could not have 
omitted the central interests of the Soviet Union, but the great 
powers in the end made no attempt to seek a compromise in this 
matter. A loan might well have removed reparations as a conflict 
between the great powers, and if the Soviet Union had been 
admitted to the supervision of the Ruhr an economic solution 
satisfactory to all parties evidently might have been found. Even in 
January 1947 The Economist estimated that a more broadly 
favourable solution would be reached in this way.23' 
During the war the Allies adopted the idea — without actually 
discussing other alternatives — of strict supervision for Germany 
when hostilities were over. In this respect events following the 
First World War caused no misgivings — matters had merely been 
conducted wrongly in practice at that time. During the war it had 
been taken almost for granted by all that when peace returned 
Germany would have to submit to disarmament and other 
restrictions. 
When the war ended, on the other hand, several alternatives 
emerged to the policy then being operated by the great powers. The 
Economist, for instance suggested in several articles the idea of a 
punitive period for Germany, to last only for a year or two once 
peace returned. During this period war criminals would be tried 
and reparations paid but once it was over the Germans would gain 
full sovereignty — except in respect of disarmament, which the 
Allies would still be obliged to supervise. Reconstruction of the 
dismantled armament industry would be prevented by forbidding 
the inclusion of commodities intended for this purpose in 
Germany's foreign trade. The main starting-point of the palan 
differed, however, from the policy actually adopted by the Allies: 
it rejected plans for limiting German economic growth, and 
peacetime industry was to be allowed to grow.232 
231) German Unity in Question, The Economist 18.1.1947, pp. 91-92. 
232) See e.g. Is a German Compromise Possible?, The Economist 20.7.1946, pp. 
83-84. 
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The question of German reparations was a political problem in 
great-power relations at a time when many factors were leading to 
conflict between East and West. After a common Allied decision 
had been reached over reparations for Italy, Rumania, Hungary, 
Finland and Bulgaria, relations between the great powers were not 
noticeably strained by putting reparations into effect. With regard 
to Germany the great powers came near a solution which, if 
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